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Abstract
This dissertation deals with two different aspects of human capital accumulation: early childhood
development and tertiary education. Specifically, it analyzes the role that public policies or changes in
regulations affect incentives of agents in a way that ends up affecting the aggregate endowment of human
capital in an economy.
The first chapter is related to early childhood development. Recent literature has shown that skills shaped
during childhood have long lasting consequences later in life. This fact has promoted a large number of
programs aimed at stimulating the skill formation process for children in disadvantage. However, little is
known about how cost-effective are these policies. In this chapter I evaluate the cost-effectiveness of three
alternative policies aimed at improving the living standards of families in disadvantage: cash transfers,
childcare subsidies, and subsidies for child investments. I find that subsidies promoting child investments are
much more productive than the other two alternatives.
In the second chapter, co-authored with David Zarruk, we analyze the consequences that subsidized loans for
higher education have on the quality of education offered by colleges in the context of a developing country.
We find that subsidized student loan policies lead to a widening gap in the quality of services provided by
higher education institutions. This happens because the demand for elite institutions unambiguously increases
when individuals can borrow. This does not happen in non-elite institutions, since relaxing borrowing
constraints makes some individuals move from non-elite to elite institutions. The higher increase in demand
for elite institutions allows them to increase prices and investment per student. If investment and average
student ability are complementary inputs in the quality production function, elite universities also increase
their acceptance cut-offs. In this new equilibrium, the differentiation of the product offered by colleges
increases, where elite universities provide higher quality education to high-ability students and non-elite
universities offer lower quality to less-able students. We calibrate the model to Colombia, which implemented
massive student loan policies during the last decade and experienced an increase in the gap of quality of
education provided by elite and non-elite universities. We show that the increase in the quality gap can be a
by-product of the subsidized loan policies. Such results show that, when analyzed in a general equilibrium
setting, subsidized loan policies can have negative effects in equilibrium.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN CAPITAL
Rodrigo Azuero Melo
Petra E. Todd
This dissertation deals with two different aspects of human capital accumulation:
early childhood development and tertiary education. Specifically, it analyzes the
role that public policies or changes in regulations affect incentives of agents in a way
that ends up affecting the aggregate endowment of human capital in an economy.
The first chapter is related to early childhood development. Recent literature
has shown that skills shaped during childhood have long lasting consequences later
in life. This fact has promoted a large number of programs aimed at stimulating the
skill formation process for children in disadvantage. However, little is known about
how cost-effective are these policies. In this chapter I evaluate the cost-effectiveness
of three alternative policies aimed at improving the living standards of families
in disadvantage: cash transfers, childcare subsidies, and subsidies for child invest-
ments. I find that subsidies promoting child investments are much more productive
than the other two alternatives.
In the second chapter, co-authored with David Zarruk, we analyze the conse-
quences that subsidized loans for higher education have on the quality of education
offered by colleges in the context of a developing country. We find that subsidized
vi
student loan policies lead to a widening gap in the quality of services provided
by higher education institutions. This happens because the demand for elite in-
stitutions unambiguously increases when individuals can borrow. This does not
happen in non-elite institutions, since relaxing borrowing constraints makes some
individuals move from non-elite to elite institutions. The higher increase in demand
for elite institutions allows them to increase prices and investment per student. If
investment and average student ability are complementary inputs in the quality pro-
duction function, elite universities also increase their acceptance cut-offs. In this
new equilibrium, the differentiation of the product offered by colleges increases,
where elite universities provide higher quality education to high-ability students
and non-elite universities offer lower quality to less-able students. We calibrate the
model to Colombia, which implemented massive student loan policies during the
last decade and experienced an increase in the gap of quality of education provided
by elite and non-elite universities. We show that the increase in the quality gap
can be a by-product of the subsidized loan policies. Such results show that, when
analyzed in a general equilibrium setting, subsidized loan policies can have negative
effects in equilibrium.
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Chapter 1
Evaluating Early Childhood Policies:
An Estimable Model of Family
Child Investments
Abstract
There is extensive evidence showing that skills developed early in life have important
consequences for adult life outcomes. Such findings have motivated a large literature
analyzing the production of skills in young children. However, little is known about
how families make decisions about investments in their children. In this paper, I
estimate a production function of skills in young children, nested within a collective
model of household behavior, using data from Chile. The estimated model is used
to simulate the effects of various policies aimed at increasing skills of children in
disadvantaged households that are popular in developing countries. The data reveals
substantial disparities in the skills of poor and rich children when they are five years
old. I find that to close this gap in skills, it is more effective to design policies that
subsidize the acquisition of skill-enhancing goods for children than policies providing
unconditional cash transfers or childcare subsidies.
1
1.1 Introduction
Research in medicine, psychology and economics shows that skills shaped during
the first years of life have significant consequences for adult life outcomes.1 This fact
has motivated a large amount of research in economics aimed at understanding the
skill formation process. The results of these studies allow a better understanding
of the key inputs that promote skills in young children.2 For instance, they showed
that parenting and general family environment are among the most relevant inputs
in the production of skills (Heckman and Mosso, 2014; Schoellman, 2014).
Gaps in skills between rich and poor children emerge very early in life, even
before they start their formal education. Duncan and Magnuson (2013) find that
differences in reading and math test scores between children in the top and bottom
quartile of the income distribution are about one standard deviation when they
start kindergarten in the US. Schady et al. (2015) report similar quantitative re-
sults for five Latin American countries, using a vocabulary test for children younger
than five. Research in neuroscience shows that malleability of skills decreases with
age (Nelson and Sheridan, 2011). To close gaps in skills between the rich and poor
population, we need to develop policies addressing this issue during early childhood.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects that early childhood policy in-
terventions have on the skill gaps between rich and poor children. Knowledge of
1For a review, see Conti and Heckman (2012)
2See, for example, Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010)
2
the skill production function is not enough to assess the effectiveness of policies
aimed at improving children’s skills. Families administer resources and make the
relevant decisions that determine the allocation of inputs for young children. Fam-
ily investments in children might react to policy interventions. To analyze how
early childhood policies affect resources allocated to children and skill formation, I
develop and estimate a skill production function nested within a collective model of
household behavior using data from Chile. I evaluate the effects of cash transfers,
childcare subsidies and in-kind transfers, which are transfers of goods that can be
used in the skill formation process in children (for example, books, toys, puzzles,
and guides about early childhood development). I find that in-kind transfers pro-
vide the most cost-efficient way to reduce the gaps in skills between rich and poor
children.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on family investments
and child outcomes. First, there are not many papers estimating a model of house-
hold behavior where parents allocate time and money to their children to enhance
their skills (Bernal, 2008; Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall, 2014, 2016; Gayle, Golan
and Soytas, 2015). This is the first paper that empirically evaluates and compares
the effects that cash transfers, childcare subsidies and in-kind transfers have on the
gaps in skills between rich and poor children.
Cash transfer programs have been widely implemented in developing countries.
In Latin America, they constitute the largest social assistance programs, covering
3
millions of households in countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua and Colombia
(Fiszbein, Schady and Ferreira, 2009). Additionally, governments in both develop-
ing and developed countries have invested a large amount of resources in the provi-
sion of preschool services. In 2011, the United States federal government spent US$
8.1 billion on Head Start, the largest childcare program. In Chile, firms employing
more than twenty people are required to provide childcare services to their female
employees. During the last ten years, Chile has experienced a massive expansion in
the number of childcare providers. Between 2006 and 2010, the network of childcare
providers increased its capacity, measured as the maximum number of children for
whom the system could provide coverage, by approximately 500% (Chile, 2010).
A limitation of cash transfers is that it is not possible not possible to guarantee
that a given amount of money will be spent on goods that can actually translate
into better child outcomes. However, when the transfer is done in-kind via puzzles,
toys, guides about child development, or specific types of food that can improve chil-
dren’s nutritional status, governments can enrich the environment and thus promote
skills for children. These transfers are usually implemented by governments through
their early childhood development programs. Currently, the program “Chile Grows
with You”3, which is the main early childhood program in Chile, delivers a basket
of goods to families for such purposes. Given the large amount of resources that
governments spend on enriching childhood environments, and given the fact that
events during childhood heavily influence adult outcomes, it is important to un-
3In Spanish, “Chile Crece Contigo”.
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derstand the most cost-effective way of allocating these resources, whether through
cash transfers or in-kind.
This paper also contributes to the literature of household decisions and child out-
comes by allowing individual family members to have different preferences. First,
modeling household behavior through the collective approach has proven to result
in better empirical predictions than the unitary framework. Second, from a policy
perspective, it is common to see interventions targeting individual household mem-
bers. For instance, most cash transfer programs in developing countries state as
an explicit condition that, in households with children, mothers should be the sole
recipients of such subsidies (Fiszbein, Schady and Ferreira, 2009). It is often argued
that mothers have stronger preferences for meeting the needs of children and there-
fore cash in the hands of mothers translates into better child outcomes (Blundell,
Chiappori and Meghir, 2005). By estimating a technology of skill formation within
a collective setting, I am able to assess the extent to which targeting individual
household members translates into different child outcomes.
The dataset used in this article allows me to overcome some empirical limita-
tions that the literature has previously faced. For instance, studies have shown that
parental skills largely determine children’s skills (Heckman and Mosso, 2014). By
having information on parental IQ tests and personality assessments, I am able to
incorporate parental skills into my estimation strategy. Additionally, we know that
there is a multiplicity of skills that are relevant to determining adult life outcomes
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(Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010). I incorporate multiple measures of skills
across various dimensions, such as motor, communication, cognitive and behavioral
abilities in children.
The productivity of time investments in children depends on the interactions
between parents and children. Fiorini and Keane (2014) find that, when evaluating
information about the time parents spend with children, it is important to differ-
entiate among activities such as watching TV, educational activities with parents,
and educational activities with other adults, as each of these translates differently
into skill formation. By using data on the frequency with which parents perform
fourteen different types of activities with their children, I am able to incorporate
not only the time component but also the quality of interactions between parents
and children. Additionally, I use geocoded datasets matching all the nationally
registered childcare providers with the households in the survey to obtain informa-
tion about the cost of investing in children. Households that have a relatively large
supply of childcare services within their neighborhood might, in principle, find it
easier to invest in their children through preschool services. Additionally, house-
holds living in neighborhoods with a large number of preschool providers might live
in a children friendly environment, where the availability of goods to increase skills
in children is relatively high.
The survey used for this study is the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey from
Chile (ECLS). This survey was developed with the goal of precisely characterizing
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the skill formation process in children. Therefore, I am able to provide a unique
empirical description of parental investments in children. I observe the weekly fre-
quency of consumption of different types of food for children, as well as availability
of toys, books, and puzzles, as well as a precise characterization of which specific
skills such elements might promote.
This paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of dy-
namic microeconomic models with unobserved and continuous state variables. By
implementing an efficient simulation-based estimator using particle filtering tech-
niques from the machine learning and financial econometrics literature (Murphy,
2012; Creal, 2012), I propose a feasible computational approach for dealing with
the high dimensionality integration problem that arises in such models. Moreover,
this is the first paper in the literature of household choices and child development
that estimates a technology of skill formation through a dynamic latent-factor ap-
proach a-la` Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010). This allows me to obtain
non-parametric identification of the skill production technology by using a large
number of skill measures. Most of the prior research analyzing the child skill for-
mation process uses data from the United States. By analyzing this process in the
context of Chile, I bring new insights regarding the skill formation process and the
effect that policies and programs have on the skills of children in a situation where
poor children face significant disadvantages.
There has been extensive study of the theoretical properties of the collective
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model of household behavior related to goods that are “public” within the context of
the household (Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir, 2005; Chiappori and Donni, 2009;
Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2014). However, there are still very few empirical
studies (Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2012). The main challenge of estimat-
ing collective models of household behavior is that of identifying the bargaining
power, or Pareto weight, of each household member. The common approach to deal
with this issue is to observe the consumption of private goods within the household,
such as gender-specific clothing, together with distribution factors. Distribution
factors are variables that affect the final outcomes of households, exclusively by
modifying the bargaining power of each member. Examples of distribution factors
commonly used in the literature include local sex ratios, the proportion of non-labor
income in the household that is in the hands of women, and the differences in ages
between husband and wife. This approach assumes that the good observed is purely
private (i.e., a husband does not care about his spouse’s clothing) and that all the
bargaining power is explained by the consumption of a single good.
In this paper, I propose a new framework for estimating collective models of
household behavior. I use information from questionnaires related to female em-
powerment and gender roles to assess the bargaining power of each household mem-
ber. The use of answers to such questions, combined with exogenous variation in
the distribution factors, allows me to identify the Pareto weight of each member in
the household. Following such an identification strategy, I am also able to allow for
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unobserved heterogeneity.
The data from test scores show significant large gaps in skills between rich and
poor children at age 5. The skill gap between children in the lowest quintile of
the income distribution and children in the highest quintile, are in between 0.3
and 0.7 standard deviations in tests measuring cognitive abilities, socio-emotional
development, and vocabulary skills, among others. These inequalities are mostly
explained by differences in parental skills and monetary investments. Additionally,
, the model parameter estimates show that fathers’ time spent with children is 50%
as productive as mothers’ time and that mothers have stronger preferences for chil-
dren. However, the higher productivity and the stronger preferences for children
do not by themselves explain the observed disparities in time investments between
mothers and fathers. Given that women have lower bargaining power, they con-
tribute more to the provision of public goods within the household. This particular
mechanism explains 15% of the differences in time investments between mothers
and fathers.
I use the estimated behavioral model to simulate the effects that cash transfer
programs, free childcare subsidies, and in-kind transfers have on the skill gap be-
tween rich and poor children. Although less prevalent than the other two programs,
in-kind transfers are currently being implemented in Chile through the “Chile Grows
with You” program. I find that in-kind transfers are much more effective than the
other alternatives when it comes to closing the gaps in skills between rich and poor
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children.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In Section 1.2, I briefly
review the literature in order to identify the main contributions of this article. I
describe the data in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, I present some preliminary evidence
motivating the economic model, which will be described in Section 2.3. The estima-
tion procedure, together with the relevant identification arguments, are introduced
in Section 1.6. The main results of the paper are in Section 2.6. I summarize the
main points of this paper in Section 1.8.
1.2 Review of the literature
This article is related to four areas of the literature in economics. First of all,
this paper is related to the literature analyzing how household behavior affects the
production of skills in children. One of the most important decisions families make
relevant to the production of child skills, is that of labor supply. As household mem-
bers increase their participation in the labor market, this will bring more monetary
resources to the household but will reduce the amount of time parents interact with
their children. For this reason, the impact of labor force participation on the skills
of children is not obvious at first glance.
The question of how labor supply decisions affect the production of skills in
young children has been explored in the literature. Bernal (2008) estimates a struc-
tural model of female labor force participation, taking into account that skills are
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affected by family income and also by the total amount of time that mothers inter-
act with their children. Due to data limitations, she does not incorporate paternal
time as a potential input in the skills of children. Taking into account the overall
effect of an increase in income but a decrease in the amount of time that mothers
interact with their children,Bernal (2008) finds that one year of full employment
decreases the skills in children by approximately 0.13 of a standard deviation.
Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2014) extend the results of Bernal (2008) and take
into account that both parents participate in the production of skills. The authors
estimate a unitary dynamic model of household behavior where each parent allo-
cates time to labor market, leisure, or interaction with their children. Additionally,
they incorporate decisions about how much money to allocate to monetary invest-
ments in children versus consumption. Results show that, when mothers increase
time spent in the labor force, the potential negative effect is not only alleviated by
the increase in the amount of resources due to wages but also by the fact that the
father starts to spend more time with the children at home. One of the main con-
clusions is that time of both fathers and mothers are relatively more important than
monetary investments in the production of child skills. Gayle, Golan and Soytas
(2015) extends the modeling framework of Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2014) to
incorporate endogenous fertility. However, they do not observe test scores in their
data or monetary investments by parents and ignore the role of preschool education.
The article that is most related to this paper is Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall
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(2014). This paper extends Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2014) in several ways.
First, I incorporate the decision to enroll a child in preschool services. This is im-
portant given that subsidizing preschool is one of the most important policies to
improve the conditions in which children develop, and to increase female labor force
participation.
Additionally, a major point in which this article departs from the analysis of
Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2014) is that I estimate a collective model of house-
hold behavior, allowing parents to have different preferences, as opposed to using
the unitary approach. There are two reasons why this is important. First of all,
in most developing countries, cash transfers to families with children are given to
their mothers, motivated by the findings that cash in the hands of women seems to
translate into better child outcomes than cash in the hands of men (Duflo, 2000;
Attanasio and Lechene, 2014; Thomas, 1994). To assess the effect that targeting
individual household members has on child outcomes and to identify the extent
to which additional resources should be spent on targeting, I estimate a collective
model of household behavior, where parents have different preferences. Addition-
ally, the empirical regularity that there is a positive correlation between women’s
empowerment and child development (Haddad et al., 1997) cannot be explained by
considering the household as a single entity with one utility function. This has mo-
tivated a large literature analyzing the relationship between female empowerment
and child outcomes (Doepke and Tertilt, 2014). By modeling household behavior
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using a collective approach, I am able to assess the extent to which empowering
women translate into better child outcomes.
Third, this is the first paper that estimates a model of parental investments and
child outcomes using observations not only on time investments but also on in-kind
investments. The data I use includes a detailed description of the environment in
which children grow. Enumerators who visited the households were trained to pro-
vide a precise characterization of the child’s environment. For instance, not only
I do observe the availability of toys, but also whether the toys are ideal for the
promotion of specific skills, such as motor skills or behavioral skills, or toys that
help develop free expression in children. I observe the availability puzzles, costumes,
and children’s books and music. Additionally, I have detailed information about
the frequency with which children consume different types of food, such as fruits,
vegetables, and fish, among others. This information is used to assess the effect of
in-kind investments.
The dataset I use allows me to incorporate several facts about the skill forma-
tion process in children that were not incorporated in Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall
(2014). First of all, there is a consensus in the literature that skills are multiple
(emotional, physical, cognitive). In this paper, rather than using one cognitive test
score as a measure of skills, I use various indicators of motor development, cogni-
tive achievement and emotional attainment in young children as broad measures
of skills. Additionally, an important element in the skill formation process is their
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dependence on parental skills (Francesconi and Heckman, 2016). Ignoring parental
skills when estimating a production function might bias the effect of other inputs,
such as time or in-kind investments. I overcome this limitation by using various
assessments of cognitive achievement and personality traits of parents.
By implementing a dynamic latent factor structure in the estimation of the skill
production function for children, I am able to obtain non-parametric identification
of the skill production function in children. This is accomplished by using identifica-
tion results from the literature of skill formation (Cunha, Heckman and Schennach,
2010). Because of that, the results of the estimation are less sensitive to the specific
parametric form assumed for the skill formation technology, and the bias arising
from measurement error is reduced, making the results more robust. This, along
with the fact that a latent factor structure can be interpreted as unobserved het-
erogeneity (Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman, 2003) and potentially improves the
accuracy of the estimates, has made factor analysis a popular tool to get accurate
estimates of the skill production function (Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010;
Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006). This paper is
the first to estimate the production function of skills via a latent-factor approach,
nested within a collective model of household behavior.
The second area of related literature the empirical implementation of collective
models of household behavior. The income pooling assumption establishes that, in
a household composed of various members, it does not make a difference if transfers
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are given to one member or the other. Ultimately, what matters is the overall re-
sources of the household. This assumption has been rejected in contexts as diverse
as Sweden (Cesarini et al. (2013)), South Africa (Duflo, 2000)), Mexico (Attanasio
and Lechene, 2014), Brazil, the US and Ghana (Thomas, 1994). The rejection of
this assumption has motivated a significant amount of research aimed at exploring
alternatives. The collective model of household behavior assumes that each par-
ent has his/her own preferences and that the decision reached in the household is
Pareto efficient (Chiappori and Donni, 2009). The collective approach has resulted
in better empirical predictions than the unitary framework.
Although there is an extensive literature exploring the properties of the collec-
tive model of household behavior, there are still very few empirical implementations
of the model, one exception being Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012). In
their model, the authors assume that each parent has his or her own preferences
and each parent derives utility from spending time with their children. They do
not model how the time parents spend on their children impacts child skills. In this
paper, I asume parents spend time with their children in part to augment their skill
set.
Additionally, this paper provides a new framework for identifying collective mod-
els of household behavior. The usual identification strategy of such models relies on
observing the consumption of a given number of private goods, clothing being the
most popular choice. Once the decisions about consumption of such private goods
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are observed, there is a one-to-one mapping from these decisions into the Pareto
weight given to each agent. However, such arguments ignore the fact that every
good consumed within the household has a public component. For example, it is
also possible that couples care about each other’s clothing. In this paper, rather
than using private goods, I use answers provided from questionnaires about female
empowerment and gender roles as noisy measures of the bargaining power within
the household.
This article also contributes to the literature on optimal design of policies for
disadvantaged households in developing countries. Currently, Conditional Cash
Transfers (CCT) are one of the most important policies to alleviate poverty and
reduce inequality in most developing countries. Every country in Latin America
has a CCT program. In some cases, such as in Brazil and Mexico, this program ac-
counts for the largest social assistance program executed by the central government
(Fiszbein, Schady and Ferreira, 2009). In most countries, the design of such pro-
grams establishes that, in households with children, the mother of the child receives
the monetary transfers. This is supported by findings such as those in Bobonis
(2009) and Duflo (2000), where the authors explore whether or not the gender of
the recipient of a monetary transfer matters in terms of child development. In
both cases, it is found that transfers to women translate into better child outcomes
than those made to men. The common interpretation of this fact is that women’s
preferences are more aligned with child outcomes and, therefore, making transfers
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to them is more efficient. However, to establish the mechanism that is generating
such an outcome, it is necessary to estimate an economic model able to identify all
possible channels.
The finding that transfers made to women result in better child outcomes de-
serves additional analysis. One interpretation is that women spend their own income
on public goods, as explained by Bobonis (2009), or that they have stronger pref-
erences for child outcomes than men. However, there are multiple possible expla-
nations. Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) show that, as long as the marginal
willingness to pay for child outcomes is higher for women than for men, we will have
such a result. Having women with stronger preferences for child outcomes is not a
necessary condition. Basu (2006) provides an example where, even in the case in
which women care more for their children, there might be an inverted-U relationship
between the bargaining power of the women and the welfare of children, because,
as women become relatively more powerful, they can devote resources derived from
child labor into their own private consumption. It is important for the design of
policies to identify and explain the mechanism generating the positive relationship
between women’s empowerment and child outcomes. In this paper, I allow parents
to have different preferences for children. By estimating the structural parameters
of the model, I can analyze which mechanisms generate such a relationship.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature exploring the production of skills
in children. Todd and Wolpin (2007) present alternative ways of estimating the pro-
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duction function depending on the type of data available to the researcher. Cunha,
Heckman and Schennach (2010) estimate a production function of skills in children
taking into account the joint condition of multiple skills and that the productivity
of inputs might vary with age. As both inputs and outputs are observed with error,
the authors estimate the production function via a dynamic latent factor structure.
In this article, I use the estimation methods presented in Todd and Wolpin (2007),
taking into account that the availability of data allows me to use a value-added
specification. For the econometric implementation, I use a latent factor structure
as in Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010). However, to account for the en-
dogeneity of inputs, I use an economic model of household behavior. Although
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) is considered a seminal contribution to the
skill production function literature, there is little scope for counterfactual analysis
because the inputs are hard to interpret. The measures of investments do not map
to any possible effort levels or monetary investment in the family. In this paper,
by embedding the skill production function within model of household behaviors,
counterfactual analysis can be performed with easy interpretation of findings.
This is one of the few articles that have attempted to estimate a production
function of skills in a developing country. Much attention has been focused on the
United States and Europe due to the availability of data. I use a unique dataset
from Chile. A final contribution of this paper relies on the estimation strategy. Es-
timating dynamic models with continuous state variables is a huge challenge in mi-
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croeconomics. Different solutions such as discretization (Keane, Todd and Wolpin,
2011) have been proposed. I bring to the table a new alternative commonly used
in macroeconomics and macro econometrics: particle filtering techniques.
1.3 Data
I use a rich longitudinal dataset from Chile. Chile is the country of Latin America
with the highest GDP per capita -$US 20,000 PPP- and is often considered a case
of economic success in the region due to good economic performance during the
last twenty years.4 Two of the most distinctive facts about the Chilean economy
are its high level of inequality and the low levels of female labor force participation.
Women’s participation in the labor market has been historically low, not only when
the comparison is made with countries that are similar in terms of income and ge-
ographic location.
The dataset used for this project comes from the Early Childhood Longitudinal
Survey from Chile (ECLS). The first wave of this survey was collected in 2010 and
includes a nationally representative sample of all households in Chile with a child
under 5 years of age, which accounts for 15,175 households. The second wave was
implemented in 2012 and included 85% of the households in the original sample and
a new sample of 3,135 new households with children younger than 2 years of age. In
each wave, information about labor force participation for every member older than
4Since 2012, Chile has been considered as a developed country for the World Bank. However,
most of the literature treats it as a developing country, especially when dealing with data pre-2012.
The International Monetary Fund does not include Chile in the list of advanced economies.
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15 was collected, together with income, educational background, knowledge about
the process of early childhood development and productive routines performed with
the child, such as reading books, teaching letters and taking children to the park.
The dataset includes multiple test scores for children and questionnaires an-
swered by the primary caregiver of the child in order to assess the skills level of
children, for different domains such as socio-emotional development, behavioral
problems and development of vocabulary. Not every test was answered by all the
children, as all of them include different age specifications.5 The description of the
tests included in the sample is included in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. I use these test scores
as noisy information about children’s skills
Given that I want to identify how families make decisions about investments in
young children, I restrict the sample to children living with both biological parents.
I do this because the main goal of the article is to identify how parents reach such
decisions in a context where there are multiple members with plausibly different
preferences.
In the economic model, I consider the case of families with only one child under
the age of five. For that reason, I take into account families with only one child
or with multiple ones so long as the child being analyzed has no siblings within a
5For instance, the Batelle Index of Development, a questionnaire included in the 2010 survey
to be answered by the primary caregiver of the child, is designed for children between 6 and 24
months of age. Given that most children are older than 24 months in the 2010 survey, I do not
include this test when performing the analysis of skills in young children.
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five-year age range.6 The reason for doing this is that allowing for multiple children
in the economic model would imply solving additional questions that are not the
main goal of this paper. For instance, I would need to identify or take a stance
on whether parents have the same preferences for boys and girls, or whether they
have preferences for equality of skills among children, as opposed to devoting more
resources to the most promising child. Moreover, we also would need to understand
to what extent there is a quality-quantity tradeoff in fertility decisions: do parents
prefer to have more children and devote fewer resources to each of them or to ter-
minate their childbearing early and devote most resources to a limited number of
children.
In Table 1.3, I report the summary statistics of families in the survey. We see
that fathers, whose average age is 35, are on average four years older than mothers,
whose average age is 31. There is not much difference in terms of schooling, as
both fathers and mothers attain on average 11 grades of education. We do observe
significant differences between fathers and mothers in labor market variables. Fa-
thers participate in the labor force on average 44 hours a week, which is more than
twice the average of mothers, at 18 hours. As will be discussed in the preliminary
evidence section, unemployment rates do not explain a great deal of the low level
of hours that mothers participate in the labor market. This is due to women being
actively out of the labor force, not looking for a job but rather reporting that they
6A similar data restriction is implemented in Bernal (2008) and in the main analysis of Del Boca,
Flinn and Wiswall (2014).
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don’t work because they have to take care of their children.
There are differences in the wages of men and women on a weekly basis. The
weekly wage of a woman is $83,890 Chilean Pesos (CLP) whereas men make $104,220
CLP.7 In terms of ages of children, we see that they are on average 50 months old.
The survey also reports the frequency with which parents perform different types
of activities with their children. The description of each of these activities is pre-
sented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. In Figure 1.3 I present the average frequency for each
activity that parents report performing with the child for the activities reported
in 2012. As can be seen, in every activity, fathers report a lower frequency than
mothers. The most common activities that parents perform with their children are
sharing a meal, talking to them and teaching them the numbers or letters. The
least common activities are taking the children to cultural activities or parks or
reading to them.
In Tables 1.6 and 1.7, I report all the subdomains of the test scores and parental
assessments used for the skills of children in the two waves of the survey. As can
be seen, in both waves I use information about test scores related to vocabulary
tests and cognitive abilities, and also parental assessments related to overall child
development, together with behavioral and emotional skills.
The dataset also contains information about other important inputs into the
production of skills in children. For instance, there is significant information about
issues for the child during pregnancy and the health conditions at birth. This infor-
7The exchange rate for 2012 corresponds to 1 Chilean peso for 0.002 USD
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mation will be used in order to assess the skills of children at birth. The indicators
of health at birth and conditions during pregnancy are reported in Table 1.8.
To incorporate the fact that parental skills affect skills of children, I use scores of
different tests performed to mothers of the children selected. In Table 1.9, I report
all the test scores used, which include two widely-used test scores assessing general
cognition (Wais Test Scores), together with the Big Five personality traits scores
(BFI).
A relevant input into the production of skills is the amount of monetary invest-
ments that parents make in their children. This type of investment can include
any type of materials that can improve the living conditions of children or that can
stimulate their learning experiences, such as toys, food investments, physical space
exclusively used by the child, and so on. Previous studies such as Del Boca, Flinn
and Wiswall (2014) and Bernal (2008) take into account such factors in the pro-
duction of skills in children but do not observe such measures of investments. The
identification of how monetary investments affect the production of skills in chil-
dren in their studies relies, then, on functional forms assumptions. Going beyond
previous studies, I use some indicators of parental investments in children that will
give some idea of how parents invest in their children. Some of these measures are
exactly the same as those used in Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010), which
come from the HOME inventory test score. The details of the measures used to
asses the level of monetary investment in the children can be found in Tables 1.10
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and 1.11.
A novel feature of this dataset is the inclusion of questions regarding female
empowerment and gender roles within the household. For instance, there is infor-
mation on whether it is the mother or the father who manages the income and
whether the mother considers that it is better to have a bad marriage than to re-
main single. These variables allow us to identify the extent to which the woman has
a say in the household and whether she has any power when making decisions of
economic relevance. The variables used to assess the degree of a woman’s empow-
erment in the household are presented in Table 1.12. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 include
summary statistics of the answers provided on the empowerment questionnaires. It
is interesting to see, for instance, that 64% of men think that women should devote
all their time to taking care of children and should work only in the case of extra
time. However, as noted in Table 1.14, women also consider that they should be
more in charge of children involved in the workforce. For instance the question re-
lated to “A woman in charge of chores should not work” receives an average score of
2.62 out of 4. These facts show that female empowerment should be an important
concern for policymakers in this subpopulation.
In addition to the ECLS, I use information about the location of every preschool
provider in Chile and I compute the distance from each center to each household. I
use the relative availability of preschool providers near each household as a shifter in
the cost of childcare and monetary investments in children. In Figure 1.1, I report
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summary statistics about the availability of childcare providers for households. We
see that, on average, the nearest preschool provider is 0.61 kilometers away from the
household. Additionally, in Figure 1.2 I report an example of how the information
about availability of preschool allows me to geographically locate each center.
Finally, I use information from the household survey (CASEN) in 2011, together
with the CENSUS dataset in order to obtain some of the distribution factors. I use
as distribution factors the share of non-labor income in the hands of men, the differ-
ence in ages between fathers and mothers, and the sex ratio in the city of residence,
as well as the gender wage gap and the gender unemployment ratio in each region.
The descriptive statistics of the distribution factors can be found in Table 1.15.
1.4 Preliminary Evidence
In this section, I present four facts found in the dataset that motivate the economic
model developed in the next section.
1.4.1 Gaps in skills emerge early in life
When analyzing height at birth, weight at birth and the incidence of pre-term
births8, for different income groups, we do not observe huge differences between poor
and rich children, as can be seen in Figure 1.5. However, we do observe differences
in various dimensions of development, such as vocabulary, communication skills,
8These are variables that have often been used as a measure of health at birth Sørensen et al.
(1999).
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motor skills and cognitive achievement, when children are five years old. This
can be seen in Figure 1.6. The figure reports the scores in different tests and
parental assessments. All of them are standardized to be mean zero and variance
one. We see, for instance, that children in the lowest income quintile score 0.1 of
a standard deviation below the mean on the Battelle test score for Motor Skills,
whereas children in the richest quintile score 0.15 of a standard deviation above the
mean. The most dramatic case is vocabulary, where children in the lowest income
quintile score 50% of a standard deviation below children located in the richest
income quintile. This early emergence of gaps in the development of children is
consistent with the literature Schady et al. (2015); Cunha, Heckman and Schennach
(2010).
1.4.2 Mothers spend more time with children than do fathers
As shown previously in Figure 1.3, mothers spend more time with their children, in
every activity, than fathers do. One possible explanation is the difference in labor
supply. Fathers specialize in remunerated activities in the labor market, whereas
mothers specialize in taking care of children. In Tables 1.16 and 1.17, I analyze the
relationship between labor supply of both spouses and time spent with the child.
In order to simplify the analysis, I construct a measure of time investment via prin-
cipal component analysis and I regress the predicted factor with other covariates
of the family. We observe that there is a negative correlation between time spent
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with the child and labor supply decisions for both fathers and mothers, in the two
waves of the dataset being used, as can be seen in Tables 1.16 and 1.17.
Additionally, we observe a positive correlation between each parent’s own effort
and the labor supply of his/her spouse. This might be evidence of compensating
behavior by parents. For example, when one parent increases his/her labor supply,
that parent decreases the amount of time spent with the child and thus the other
parent might react by increasing the amount of time spent interacting with the
child. This compensating behavior might diminish the plausible negative impact
on child development of an increase in female labor force participation.
The evidence from these regressions is complemented with the estimates of re-
gressions in differences reported in Table 1.18. The results again seem to suggest
that, as members participate more in the labor market, they decrease the amount of
time spent with their child, but this is compensated by an increase in the spouse’s
time with their child.
Although labor market behavior might explain part of the differences in the
time investments between mothers and fathers, there are other stories consistent
with such a result. The differences might be due to preferences, as mothers find it
less costly to invest time in their children, or due to differences in productivity, as
the amount of time that mothers spend with their children might be more efficient
in enhancing children’s skills than that of fathers. Moreover, there is a possible ex-
planation related to the fact that the utility derived from children’s skills is a public
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good but the time investments are privately exerted. As women are relatively less
empowered than men, the cost of effort exerted by women is less than the cost
of effort exerted by men. This implies that, even with the same preferences and
resources, women would spend more time taking care of children. In the economic
model, I allow all these aforementioned factors to be a possible explanation of the
differences in time investment between fathers and mothers.
1.4.3 Female empowerment and child outcomes
The last point to be mentioned in the preliminary evidence section is the correla-
tion between female empowerment and child outcomes. There is evidence in the
literature pointing to the fact that women’s empowerment is associated with better
child outcomes in various contexts Attanasio and Lechene (2014); Thomas, Contr-
eras and Frankenberg (2002).
We do observe evidence of a positive relationship between female empowerment
and child outcomes. Table 1.19 presents the results of various regressions showing
positive correlations between child outcomes and the share of income earned by
women. Even after controlling for variables such as the IQ level of the primary
caregiver, total household income, grades of schooling of both parents and their
ages, we observe a positive relationship between the share of the total household
income earned by mothers and children’s outcomes.
When analyzing the responses to the female empowerment questionnaires, we
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also observe a positive relationship between female empowerment and investments
in children. In Table 1.20, some regressions of child investments and female em-
powerment are presented. I show again that, even after controlling for the same
variables as mentioned before, those households where women are relatively less
empowered make fewer investments in their children. Those households where the
woman manages the income are more likely to have toys for the development of chil-
dren, and the frequency of consumption of fruits and vegetables is higher whereas
that of bread is smaller. Similarly, households that are more accepting of the opin-
ion that women should not work and should exclusively take care of their children
are more likely to have the children sharing their bed with someone else, which
might be an indicator of lower investments in children.
The results of these regressions cannot be interpreted as incorruptible evidence
of a causal relationship between female empowerment and child outcomes. Nonethe-
less, they suggest that there are either some unobservables that are not captured
in the regressions, which are also correlated with female empowerment, and which
positively affect child outcomes, or that it is indeed female empowerment that im-
proves the conditions of children in the households. In order to incorporate such
findings in the economic model, I allow parents to have different preferences regard-
ing leisure, consumption, and skills of children, among other preferences, so that we
can understand whether the relationship between female empowerment and child
outcomes arises from such patterns or either due to unobserved heterogeneity.
29
1.4.4 Female Labor Force Participation
As mentioned before, mothers participate in the labor market 19 hours a week on
average, whereas fathers do so 44 hours a week. One plausible explanation can be
due to involuntary unemployment: it is harder for women to find a job offering a
wage higher than their reservation wage, and because of that they do not actively
participate in the labor market. However, it turns out to be the case that female
unemployment in the population analyzed is low, below 5%. The main reason for
observing these low levels of female participation in the labor market is due to
voluntary unemployment: women with young children decide not to participate in
the labor market. As can be seen in Figure 1.4, this is characteristic of women
across all age groups. Most of them are not working or looking for a job and 83%
of them state that the main reason is that they do not do it is because they are
taking care of children.
The fact that unemployment plays a small role in explaining the low levels of
female activity in the labor market should guide the economic model as to how to
approach the problem of deciding whether or not to work. Including frictions in
the model, as is usually done in the literature in order to explain unemployment
and variation in earnings for observationally equivalent agents, would complicate
the model and the gains from doing so might not be significant. Because of this, I
will simplify the usual decision about labor force participation, as is usually done in
the neoclassical model of household behavior, where people decide whether or not
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to work at a given wage determined by the market.
1.5 Economic Model
In this section I, describe the economic model used to rationalize investments in
children together with household behavior. Each household (h) is composed of two
agents (j), namely the father (f) and the mother (m). In each household, there is
also a child with a level of skills denoted by (s), who is not a decision maker.9 In
each period t, parents make decisions of time investments in their children (ejt) and
monetary investments for the child (It), private consumption (c
j
t) and labor market
(hjt) decisions. I assume that the decision of labor market participation is made
only at the extensive margin, that is, members decide whether or not to participate
in the labor market: hjt ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally, during the first period, parents need
to decide whether or not the child attends preschool (at) and then at can take the
value of zero or one depending on whether the child goes to preschool.
There is a preference shock t associated with each decision about labor supply
and preschool. Because there are two decisions about labor supply and two pos-
sible decisions about preschool, this shock is four-dimensional. In particular, the
choice set for labor supply and childcare decisions is given by Dt = {(ht, at) : ht ∈
{0, 1}, at ∈ {0, 1}}. qj,dt is an indicator function for individual j in period t taking
the value of 1 if decision d ∈ Dt is taken and 0 otherwise. I assume the preference
9This is a common assumption in the literature Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2014); Bernal
(2008) that seems reasonable given the little influence that children under six years of age can
have on the resource allocation of the household.
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shock follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance Ω.
The flow utility derived for each parent j in time t is given by the following utility
function:
ujt(c
j
t , h
j
t , e
j
t , d
j
t , st) =α
j
1,t ln(c
j
t) + α
j
2,t ln(st)− αj3,t(hjt)− (1 + hjt)αj4,tejt−
αj5,th
j
t(1− at) + jd,tqj,dt (1.5.1)
where jd,t is the d-th element of the vector t. Additionally, I allow the cost of time
investments in children αj4,t to change if there is an additional person helping with
household chores such as cleaning the house, cooking or taking care of the child.
Specifically, I set αj4,t = α
j
4,0,t+α
j
4,1,tHMt, where HMt takes the value of one if there
is a person helping with the household chores, and zero otherwise.
At period t, the skills of the child depend on monetary investments (It), time in-
vestments from both parents (ejt), preschool attendance (at), the skills of the mother
(PG), which are constant over time10, the previous level of skills (st−1) and the age
of the child in months (τt). I allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the production
of skills denoted by (ηs,t). The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term
fηs,t is gender-specific. The variable Memberst denotes the number of household
members present in period t in the household. This captures the idea that, by
10There is evidence pointing to the fact that cognitive skills remain stable at around age 8 and
non-cognitive skills are stable during adult life Borghans et al. (2008); Roberts et al. (2007). For
this reason, assuming that skills of the mother are stable is not unreasonable.
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having additional household members, not only might the production of skills be
affected but also the productivity of each input. The production of skills is specified
in the following equation:
st = rts
θ0
t−1I˜
θ1
t e
θ2
t (1.5.2)
where rt denotes the total factor productivity, specified as:
rt = exp (δ0 + δ1τt + δ2at + δ3,tPG+ δ4Memberst + ηst)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Factor Productivity
(1.5.3)
et is the total time effort invested in the child, given by the production function:
et =
[
γ0
(
e˜ft
)φ
+ γ1 (e˜
m
t )
φ
]1/φ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total time investment
(1.5.4)
where
e˜jt = e
j
t exp
(
ηejt
)
(1.5.5)
and
I˜t = It exp (ηIt) (1.5.6)
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The terms ηejt
and ηIt are unobserved heterogeneity. This term captures the fact
that parents can differ in unobserved ways in how productive they are in terms
of the time and monetary investments in their children. That is, even with the
same amount of effort and monetary investment, the productivity of these inputs
might be different across households. The terms ηIt , ηejt
and ηsjt
reflect complete
information in the sense that parents make decisions knowing the productivity of
their own inputs at every point in time.
1.5.1 Dynamic problem
I assume that parents need to make investment decisions for two periods. Each
period lasts for two years and the first period starts when children are on average
three years old. After the two periods, children enter a different stage in which par-
ents and children face a different set of incentives in the process of skills production.
Parents face a different set of incentives given that children start the formal school-
ing years and start behaving more as agents making their own decisions, which
might have consequences for their own skills. For this reason, I only model child-
hood lasting for two periods: birth to age 3 and age 3 to age 5. This assumption
is commonly made in the literature. Bernal (2008) assumes that early childhood
relevant decisions are made until age 5. Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2014) model
household behavior until children are 16 years old but only use information on two
periods to estimate their model, that is, when children are on average four and nine
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years old.
V2(Ψ2) = max
{I2,{cj2,ej2,cj2,hj2}j=m,f}
µ2u
f
2(c
f
2 , h
f
2 , e
f
2 , d
f
2 , s2) + (1− µ2)um2 (cm2 , hm2 , em2 , dm2 , s2)
(1.5.7)
Ψ2, which will be defined below, includes the state variables relevant to the decisions
made in the second period. µ ∈ [µ, µ¯] ⊆ [0, 1] represents the Pareto weight or
bargaining power of the father. The solution for the problem of the household should
satisfy the technological constraint given in 1.5.2, which is the time constraint for
each agent:
hj2 ∈ {0, 1}, for j = m, f (1.5.8)
the non-negativity constraint:
cf2 , c
m
2 , I2, e
f
2 , e
m
2 ≥ 0 (1.5.9)
and the budget constraint
cf2 + c
m
2 + PI,2I2 = Y
f
2 + Y
m
2 + w
m
2 h
f
2 + w
f
2h
f
2 + Ξ2 (1.5.10)
where wj2 represents the wage offer for individual j, Y
j is the corresponding non-
labor income, and Ξ2 is the total non-labor income that cannot be attributed to
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any specific household member.11 PI,2 is the price of monetary investments in
children for the second period. Note that in the second period parents don’t make
decisions regarding childcare attendance as virtually every child in the sample goes
to preschool during the second period. sample goes to preschool during the second
period.
The problem of the household during the first period is given by:
V1(Ψ1) = max
{I1,{cj1,ej1,cj1,hj1}j=m,f}
µ1u
f
1(c
f
1 , h
f
1 , e
f
1 , d
f
1 , s1) + (1− µ1)um1 (cm1 , hm1 , em1 , dm1 , s1)+
βV2(Ψ2) (1.5.11)
subject to the skill production technology given in 1.5.2, the budget constraint:
cf1 + c
m
1 + PI,1I1 + Paa = Y
f
1 + Y
m
1 + w
m
1 h
f
1 + w
f
1h
f
1 + Ξ1 (1.5.12)
where Pa is the price of taking the child to preschool and a can take the value of
zero or one depending on whether or not the child goes to preschool.
I assume that wages follow a Mincer equation:
ln(wjt ) = β
j
0 + β
j
1yrschool
j
t + β
j
2age
j
t + β
j
3(age
j
t)
2 + εt,wj (1.5.13)
11Examples of elements included in the Ξ2 term are subsidies for water consumption for the
household.
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where εt,wj ∼ N(0, εwj) is measurement error.12 Additionally, the relative impor-
tance of each household member will depend on characteristics of the household.
In particular, I assume the following parametrization of µt:
µt(Et) =
exp(Λ′Et + ηµt)
1 + exp(Λ′Et + ηµt)
(1.5.14)
where Λ ∈ RL is a vector of coefficients; X are variables affecting the the relative
bargaining power of each member in the household; and ηµ,t is unobserved hetero-
geneity. µ and µ¯ are the lower and upper bounds for the Pareto weight.13 In the
Et variables, I include the ratio of offered wages, the difference in ages between
spouses, the difference in grades of schooling and the father’s share in non-labor
income. Additionally, I include conditions of the local labor market, which include
the relationship between male and female unemployment, the sex ratio and the
wage ratio in the region of residence of the household. Similar specifications to this
12Note that I am imposing a separate distribution for men and women. We could assume that
all the correlation is yet given by assortative mating and is no necessary to assume a bivariate
distribution in their wages. The only difference will be to estimate an additional parameter which
will be the correlation between wage offers.
13The assumption that µ is bounded, given by µ ∈ [µ, µ¯] ⊆ [0, 1] is made without loss of
generality.
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one have been used previously in the literature.14
Et =
[
wft
wmt
,
Y ft
Y ft + Y
m
t
, ageft − agemt , yrschoolft − yrschoolmt ,
¯Femalet
¯Malet
,
UMalet
UFemalet
,
wMalet
wFemalet
]
(1.5.15)
where U¯ denotes the unemployment rate for each gender,
¯Femalet
¯Malet
is the sex ratio
in the region of residence of the household, and w
Malet
wFemalet
is the wage ratio between
women and men in the region of residence. These variables are what the literature
refers to as distribution factors, variables that affect the behavior of the household
only through its impact on the bargaining power. Descriptive statistics of these vari-
ables can be found in Table 1.15. The price of investments and the price of childcare
depend on the availability of preschool services in the neighborhood through the
following specification:
Pa = Pchildcarea,0 + Pchildcarea,1DChildcare (1.5.16)
PI = PriceI,0 − PriceI,1Dens (1.5.17)
where DChildcare is the distance to the nearest preschool provider and Dens
is the number of preschool providers within 5km of the household.
14Again, this determinant of bargaining power has been previously used in the literature Cher-
chye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012), Bruins (2015) and Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013).
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The state variables are given by:
Ψt = {rt, st−1,η, t,Ξt, Et, {jd,t, Y jt , wjt}j=m,f , Pa, PI} (1.5.18)
where the vector ηt collects the unobserved heterogeneity:
ηt = {ηIt , ηeft , ηemt , ηµt , ηst} (1.5.19)
I assume that household members have perfect information regarding the terms
related to unobserved variables at all moments. That is, in the first period they
know the levels of their preference shocks and unobserved heterogeneity in the
second period.
1.5.2 Model solution
Note that the model involves a set of discrete choices -childcare and labor supply-
together with continuous decisions such as investment, effort and consumption. I
solve this by first finding the optimal decisions about investment, consumption and
effort, for each labor supply-childcare decision, and then choosing the discrete alter-
natives that derives the highest utility. Given the dynamic nature of the problem,
I first solve for the second-period problem. The solution is given by:
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em,∗2 =
κ22(µ2)θ2γ1
(1− µ)αm4,2(1 + hm2 )
ξ2(m) exp
(−ηem2 ) (1.5.20)
ef,∗2 =
κ22(µ2)θ2γ0
µαf4,2(1 + h
f
2)
ξ2(f) exp
(
−ηef2
)
(1.5.21)
I∗2 =
κ22(µ2)θ1
(
hf2w
f
2 + h
m
2 w
m
2 + Y
f
2 + Y
m
2 + Ξ
)
κ12(µ2) + κ
2
2(µ2)θ1PI
exp (−ηI2) (1.5.22)
cf,∗2 = max{
αf1,2µ2I2
θ1κ22(µ)
, ζ} (1.5.23)
cm,∗2 = max{
αf1,2µ2I2
θ1κ22(µ)
, ζ} (1.5.24)
em,∗1 =
[κ22(µ2)θ2 + βκ
2
2(µ2)θ2θ0] γ1
(1− µ)αm4,2(1 + hm2 )
ξ1(m) exp
(−ηem1 ) (1.5.25)
ef,∗1 =
[κ21(µ1)θ2 + βκ
2
2(µ2)θ2θ0] γ0
µαf4,2(1 + h
f
2)
ξ1(f) exp
(
−ηef1
)
(1.5.26)
I∗1 =
[κ21(µ1)θ1 + κ
2
2(µ2)θ0θ1β]
(
hf2w
f
2 + h
m
2 w
m
2 + Y
f
2 + Y
m
2 + Ξ− Paa
)
κ11(µ1) + κ
2
1(µ1)θ1 + βθ0θ1κ
1
2(µ2)
exp (−ηI1)
(1.5.27)
cf,∗1 = max{
αf1,2µ2I2
θ1κ21(µ1) + βθ0θ1κ
2
2(µ2)
, ζ} (1.5.28)
cm,∗1 = max{
αf1,2µ2I2
θ1κ21(µ1) + βθ0θ1κ
2
2(µ2)
, ζ} (1.5.29)
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where
ξt(j) =
(
γjµα
f
4,t(1 + h
f
t )
) φ
1−φ
γ0
[
γ0(1− µ)αm4,t(1 + hmt )
] φ
1−φ + γ1
[
γ1µα
f
4,t(1 + h
f
t )
] φ
1−φ
(1.5.30)
κit(µ) =µα
f
i,t + (1− µ)αmi,t (1.5.31)
ζ =1.0e− 5 (1.5.32)
and
γj =

γ0 if j = f
γ1 if j = m
(1.5.33)
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The optimal decisions of labor supply and childcare are given by:
(hf,∗2 , h
m,∗
2 ) = max
{hf2 ,hm2 }
µ2u
f
2(c
f,∗
2 (h
f
2 , h
m
2 ), h
f
2 , e
f,∗
2 (h
f
2 , h
m
2 ),
df2(h
f
2 , h
m
2 ), s2(h
f
2 , h
m
2 ))+
(1− µ2)um2 (cm2 (hf2 , hm2 ), hm2 (hf2 , hm2 ), em,∗2 (hf2 , hm2 ), dm2 (hf2 , hm2 ),
s2(h
f
2 , h
m
2 )) (1.5.34)
(hf,∗1 , h
m,∗
1 , a) = max
{hf1 ,hm1 ,a}
µ1u
f
1(c
f,∗
1 (h
f
1 , h
m
1 , a), h
f
1 , e
f,∗
1 (h
f
1 , h
m
1 , a)),
df1(h
f
1 , h
m
1 , a), s1(h
f
1 , h
m
1 , a))+
(1− µ1)um1 cm1 (hf1 , hm1 , a), hm1 (hf1 , hm1 , a), em,∗1 (hf1 , hm1 , a),
dm1 (h
f
1 , h
m
1 , a), s1(h
f
1 , h
m
1 , a))
+ β
[
V2(Ψ2(h
f
1 , h
m
1 , a)
]
(1.5.35)
1.6 Estimation
The main challenge in the estimation of this model is that we do not observe the
main features of the model in the dataset. Rather, we observe measures about
the relevant factors of the model that are contaminated by measurement error.
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Specifically, I define the set K to include the latent variables in the model:
K = {{ln(st), ln(ef,∗t ), ln(em,∗t ), ln(I∗t ), µ}t=1,2, ln(PG), ln(s0)} (1.6.1)
Rather than observing them directly, we have a set of measures that give some
information about the true latent level of each variable. Such relationships between
the measures and the latent factors can be described in the following system:
Zkm = ι
k
m,0 + ι
k
m,1k + ε
k
m for m = 1...Nk (1.6.2)
where Zkm denotes the measure m for the latent variable k and Nk denotes the
number of measures available for the latent factor k. The variables used as mea-
surements for each factor are described in Tables 1.4 - 1.11. I assume the εkm are
uncorrelated across observations and follow a distribution N (0, σkm). However, as
will be shown later, this assumption is not necessary for identification.
Given the structure of the model, there is a well-defined likelihood function
denoted by:
P (O|X; Θ) = L (Θ|O;X) (1.6.3)
where (O) denotes the observed outcomes in the three periods: O = {O0, O1, O2}
and X is the set of exogenous characteristics in the model. The set of outcomes for
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the period 0 are composed exclusively of the measures of the primary caregiver’s
skills and birth outcomes. The set of observed outcomes for the first and second
period are the measures corresponding to the specified factors in addition to the
labor supply decision and the observed wages. Formally:
O0 = {{zPGm }NPGm=1, {zS0m }NS0m=1}
for t=1,2:
Ot = {hft , hmt , at,Zt} ∪ {wft }︸ ︷︷ ︸
if hft>0
∪ {wmt }︸ ︷︷ ︸
if hmt >0
Z1 = {ln(s1), ln(eˆf1), ln(eˆm1 ), ln(Iˆ1)}
Z2 = {ln(s2), ln(eˆf2), ln(eˆm2 ), ln(Iˆ2), µ2} (1.6.4)
Note that I have measures of µ2 available only for the second period. The exoge-
nous characteristics are given by the age, grades of schooling, age of parents and
distribution factors in Et.
Given that we need to integrate over the the distribution of the unobserved
factors (because they are not observed), the expression of the likelihood function
becomes a high-dimensional integral with no closed form solution. The natural ap-
proach to estimate such likelihood is to approximate the integral via Monte-Carlo
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methods - that is, drawing shocks from the distribution of the unobserved factors,
estimating the likelihood and averaging over these draws. However, note that the
time-dependency arising in the production of skills generates an additional difficulty
for this approach, because, for each draw in period 0, we would have to generate
multiple draws in the first period and for each draw in the first period we would
have to draw multiple draws in the second period. The curse of dimensionality
makes it infeasible to estimate this likelihood with the usual simulation techniques.
A pure simulation strategy to estimate the model would be computationally
infeasible. We use particle filtering techniques in order to be able to estimate the
model via simulated methods. The full description of the estimation technique and
the derivation of the likelihood function are described in Appendix A.0.2.
For purposes of estimation, I assume that the preference shocks t are distributed
according to a normal distribution with no correlation between choices. The un-
observed heterogeneity terms, ηejt
also follow a normal distribution. Although I do
not allow for correlation between these shocks, I do allow for correlation between
the underlying factors in the model (e.g., Pareto weight and skills of mother). The
assumption about normality in these terms is not an identifying assumption; as I
describe in the next section that I can obtain non-parametric identification of such
distribution under some independence conditions. The same applies to the error
terms in the measurement system of Equation 1.6.2. I assume they are distributed
according to a normal distribution and that they are independent of each other but
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this is not an identifying assumption.
The sample used for the estimation of the model includes only families with
children, in which both parents live together and where the child has no siblings
within a five-year age range. Moreover, given that I use test scores and measures of
health at birth in order to estimate the production of skills, I drop from the sample
families that did not complete such questionnaires. The description of how the sam-
ple is selected is in Table 1.21. The sample considered for the analysis consists of
950 families. Some descriptive statistics of the sample used, for the 2012 wave, are
included in Table 1.22 and some details about the age distribution of the children
included, for the 2012 wave, are included in Table 1.23. The preliminary evidence
section uses all the information available in the survey. However, the results from
the preliminary section also hold when using the sample used for the model. These
results are available in the online appendix.
1.6.1 Identification
The identification argument is divided into three parts. First, I show how the pa-
rameters of the measurement system described in 1.6.2 are identified. Secondly, I
show what variation in the data allows us to recover the distribution of the latent
factors. Finally, I show how the parameters of the economic model are recovered.
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Measurement System
The general measurement system in a factor model can be written as:
Z = ι0 + ι1K + ε (1.6.5)
where Z ∈ RM contains all the measures available, M is the total number of mea-
surements for all the factors, K ∈ R11 is the vector of 11 factors and ε ∈ RM is
measurement error. ι1 ∈ RM×11 is the matrix of factor loadings. As is common in
factor analysis, a location and scale normalizations are necessary to ensure iden-
tification of the system. The first step is to normalize the first element of ι1 for
each measure to one, which corresponds to setting ιk1,1 = 1 for every factor k ∈ K
in Equation 1.6.2. The location normalization corresponds to setting the mean of
each factor to a specified level. The arbitrary scale is set to be:
E[ln (st)] =E[ln (PG)] = 0 for t = 0, 1, 2
E[µ] = 0.5 (1.6.6)
I also set normalizations for effort levels and investments, which I will explain in full
detail in Section 1.6.1. This normalization is irrelevant given that we can re-define
new measures Z − ι0 and the analysis will remain unchanged. From the observed
47
measures Z, I can obtain the covariances by noting that:
ΣZ = ι1ΣKι
′
1 + Σε (1.6.7)
where Σx is the variance covariance-matrix of x. Note that we have M × (M + 1)/2
moments in order to identify M × 11 factor loadings, 11 × (11 + 1)/2 elements in
Σk and M × (M + 1)/2 elements in Σε. As is often the case in factor analysis, it is
necessary to make further assumptions in order to identify the relevant parameters
of the model. The normalization ιk1,1 = 1 implies that the number of factor loadings
to estimate becomes M − 11.
I still need to make further assumptions to recover all the relevant parameters.
By making the assumption that the measurement error of the skills at birth is inde-
pendent of the measurement error of the measures corresponding to the remaining
factors, I have enough moments to identify all the parameters. Formally, the as-
sumption is given by ε
ln(s0)
m ⊥ εk′m1 for m = 1...Nln(s0), k 6= ln(s0), m′ = 1...Nk. The
details of why this is enough to identify the parameters in the measurement system
are described in Appendix A.0.1.
I can recover ιkm for k 6= ln(s0) by noting that:
Cov(Zkm, Z
ln(s0)
1 )
Cov(Zk1 , Z
ln(s0)
1 )
= ιkm,1 (1.6.8)
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and the factor loadings of ln(s0) are obtained simply by changing the roles of k by
ln(s0):
Cov(Z
ln(s0)
m , Zk1 )
Cov(Z
ln(s0)
1 , Z
k
1 )
= ι
ln(s0)
m,1 (1.6.9)
Distribution of latent factors
Once the identification of the factor loadings is ensured, we can non-parametrically
estimate the distribution of the latent factors using a version of the Kotlarsky
Theorem. Define:
MEj ={
Zkj
ιkj,1
}k∈K (1.6.10)
mei ={
εkj
ιkj,1
}k∈K (1.6.11)
as long as, for at least two measures j = 1, 2, the following holds:
E [me1|K,me2] = 0 (1.6.12)
me2 ⊥ θ (1.6.13)
Theorem 1 in Schennach (2004) provides a non-parametric estimator for the joint
density of the latent factors. The theorem notes that the distribution of factors
can be expressed as a function of the Fourier transformation of the distribution of
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measures under the aforementioned assumptions:
p(K) =
∫∞
−∞ e
−iχKe
(∫ χ
0
E[iME1eiψME2 ]
[eiψME2 ]
dψ
)
dχ
2pi
(1.6.14)
Once the distribution p(K) has been identified, we can recover the second-order
moments Cov(k, k′) for any k, k′ ∈ K. Once we recover the second-order moments,
we can identify the remaining elements of Σε from the system of equations:
Cov(Z lm, Z
k′
m′) = ι
k
m,1ι
k′
m′,1Cov(k, k
′) + Cov(εkm, ε
k′
m′) (1.6.15)
Technology of Skill Formation
Because we have ensured identification of p(K), we can recover the conditional
distribution:
p
(
ln(st+1)|ln(st), ln(e˜ft+1), ln(e˜mt+1), ln(I˜t+1), µ, ln(PG)
)
(1.6.16)
from p(K) for t = 0, 1. We can define the following function:
st+1 = fs
(
st, e˜
f
t , e˜
m
t , I˜
m
t
)
=
E
[
exp
(
ln(st+1)|ln(st), ln(e˜ft+1), ln(e˜mt+1), ln(I˜t+1), µ, ln(PG)
)]
(1.6.17)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution in 1.6.16. However,
note that we are interested in a function st+1 that has as an additional argument the
term ηst corresponding to heterogeneity. Matzkin (2007) has negative identification
results in this case and shows that, in order to be able to non-parametrically identify
the function in which we are interested, we need to impose some restrictions. In
particular, if we assume that the term ηst enters additively in 1.6.17, I can trivially
identify the production of skills. Additionally, the distribution of ηs is identified as:
F(st+1|ln(st),ln(e˜ft ),ln(e˜mt ),ln(I˜mt ))
(
s˜t+1|ln(st), ln(e˜ft ), ln(e˜mt ), ln(I˜mt )
)
=
P
(
st+1 ≤ s˜t+1|ln(st), ln(e˜ft ), ln(e˜mt ), ln(I˜mt )
)
=
P
(
fs
(
st, e˜
f
t , e˜
m
t , I˜
m
t
)
+ ηs,t ≤ s˜t+1|ln(st), ln(e˜ft ), ln(e˜mt ), ln(I˜mt )
)
=
P
(
ηs,t ≤ s˜t+1 − fs
(
st, e˜
f
t , e˜
m
t , I˜
m
t
)
|ln(st), ln(e˜ft ), ln(e˜mt ), ln(I˜mt )
)
(1.6.18)
and thus we can identify the cdf of ηs,t conditional on factors other than st+1. With
similar arguments we can identify the distribution of the remaining factors.
Preferences
The parameters of the economic model are identified by a combination of exclusion
restrictions, exogenous sources of variations and functional form specifications. The
main argument used to identify preferences of fathers and mothers follows standard
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procedures from the literature on collective models of household behavior Chiappori
and Donni (2009). The use of distribution factors -variables that affect the behavior
of the household but do not modify household behavior in any other way- allows
us identify preferences of mothers and fathers. The main idea is that variation in
such instruments will cause a movement along the Pareto frontier that is exclu-
sively generated by the change in bargaining power. The distribution factors used
in this article have been previously used in the literature Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2012); Attanasio and Lechene (2014); Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir
(2005).
First, I describe identification of the Pareto weight function specified in Equa-
tion 1.5.14 because, through this function, we can separately identify preferences
of fathers and mothers. To identify parameters in Λ, I use exogenous variation in
the gender wage gap, the unemployment gender gap and the sex ratio. The key
assumption is that we have enough variation in the data for these factors, and vari-
ation is given in a way that is exogenous to the household. In Table 1.15 I report
the descriptive statistics of the distribution factors, where we see that there is some
variability that is used to secure the identification of the model. Additionally, I
impose the exclusion restriction that differences in ages and schooling do not affect
the behavior of the household other than in the Pareto weight. Finally, we need to
have exogenous variation in the share of non-labor income earned by the man to
secure identification of all the parameters in Equation 1.5.14. I describe how I get
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such variation in the following paragraph.
The way in which the Chilean social security system schedules monetary trans-
fers to households generates variation in the proportion of income earned by men
in the household. The “Social Protection Card”15 assigns a score to each household
corresponding to its socioeconomic status. This score is used as the main targeting
device through which monetary transfers are assigned to households, and all sub-
sidies are given to mothers of children whenever there is a child in the household.
The amount of the subsidy depends on an additional set of characteristics of the
households, such as the number of children under 18 living in the household. There
are seven different programs giving monetary transfers to families in Chile, but the
basic ones correspond to the “Unique Family Subsidies” and “Family Assignments”.
Under these programs, a mother who earns less than $187,515 CLP and has a score
under 11.734 on the Social Protection Card, is eligible to receive a transfer of $7,179
CLP per month, for each child under 18 and for herself. Additionally, families with
a lower score on the Social Protection Card are eligible for subsidies, all received by
the mother, depending on their score, the months they have currently been benefi-
ciaries of the programs and the demographic composition of the household.
The discontinuities in the monetary transfer programs, as well as the variation
in elements such as the number of members in the household, gives me variation in
the proportion of non-labor income in the hands of women. Using variation in re-
sponses to the female empowerment and gender roles questionnaires, we can identify
15“Ficha de Proteccion social” in Spanish
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the extent to which non-labor income affects the process of decision-making within
the household. The structure of the basic monetary transfers in Chile is reported
in Figure 1.7. A description of how the monetary subsidies scheduling system has
evolved over time is available in the Appendix in Section A.0.6.
At this point, it is important to normalize the remaining factors that were not
normalized in Section 1.6.1. Effort and investment units do not have natural units.
I impose the following normalizations:
E
[
ef,∗t |µ = 0.5, hf = 1
]
= 1 (1.6.19)
E [I∗t |µ = 0.5, d = 10] = 1 (1.6.20)
The average effort of fathers in families with a Pareto weight of 0.5 and who
participate in the labor market is normalized to one. Similarly, the average in-
vestments for families who have a Pareto weight of 0.5 and who have 10 childcare
providers within 5 kilometers is normalized to one. Once this normalization is done,
we can identify sources of variation in the data that allow me to identify the key
parameters.
Because I see variation in effort levels in both, fathers and mothers, due to
changes in distribution factors, this allow me to identify preferences for children of
both parents. For instance, variation in distribution factors might increase the bar-
gaining power of the mother. If we see that effort levels increase as a consequence of
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the variation in the distribution factors, this gives us information about the relative
preferences for children between fathers and mothers. Similarly, changes in invest-
ments due to changes in distribution factors allow me to identify the preferences for
consumption of mothers and fathers.
Identification of the remaining parameters follows standard arguments in the
literature. For wages, as long as we have enough variation in education and age,
we can identify the β coefficients. Similarly, the price elasticity of investments,
with respect to the availability of preschool providers PI,1, is identified as long as
we have variation in the number of preschool providers within five kilometers of
households. In Figure 1.1, I show that there is significant variation in the data
regarding this variable. The fact that Chile saw a massive expansion in the number
of providers between 2006-2010 gives us significant variation in the data, as the
system increased its capacity, measured in the number of children that the system
can provide services for, by 450%. Following the normalization in Equation 1.6.20,
and with the corresponding variation in childcare providers, we can identify the
parameters PI,1, PI,0. Similar arguments are used to identify price of childcare.
1.7 Results
The results of the parameters estimated, together with the corresponding standard
errors, are presented in Tables 1.24 - 1.30. As we see, childcare services tend to lib-
erate more time resources for mothers than for fathers. In the same regard, having
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one additional member in the household decreases the cost of time investments more
for mothers than for fathers. We observe that mothers have stronger preferences
for children and that fathers find it more costly to spend time with their child than
mothers do. Having an additional person in the household helping with childcare
or with household chores decreases the utility penalty of investing time in children,
more for mothers than for fathers.
Regarding the estimates of the production of skills, we see some evidence of
differences in the productivity of time investments of mothers and fathers. It is not
possible to make comparisons between the productivities of different inputs because
they are measured in different units (except father’s and mother’s effort). Nonethe-
less, we see that monetary investments, childcare attendance, skills of primary care-
taker and having adequate birth conditions all seem to have positive effects on the
skills of a child. We also observe that availability of childcare services decreases
both the price of childcare and the price of monetary investments in children. This
coefficients are estimated with high precision.
Looking at the estimates of the determinants of the Pareto weight, we see there
is an effect of the wage ratio on the Pareto weight. This is important because the
relationship holds even when we control for differences in education, age and in
non-labor income. We observe that, as the age gap between the man and woman
decreases, the bargaining power of the man decreases as well. Interestingly, we find
a negative relationship between gender ratio, unemployment ratio and wage ratio
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at the province level and the man’s bargaining power.
Regarding the measurement system, we can compute the extent to which each
measure contributes to the signal extraction problem. Every measure is contami-
nated by measurement error. With the estimation results I am able to extract the
proportion of the variance due to true signal and the proportion due to noise.
Signal-noise ratiom,k =
ι2m,1V ar(k)
ι2m,1V ar(k) + V ar(ε
k
m)
(1.7.1)
In Figures 1.14 - 1.15, I present the signal to noise ratio of the measurement
system of the model for measures of effort and investments.16 We find that cultural
activities are the most informative about time investment in children, while sharing
a meal or performing household chores are within the group of less informative
activities. We should be careful with the interpretation of these results: it does
not mean that cultural activities are the most productive ones but rather they are
the most informative ones. It can certainly be the case that there is an underlying
activity that is not reported in the dataset that is performed more often by those
parents who perform cultural activities and that such an activity is the one that
is really productive, rather than performance of cultural activities itself. Making
inferences about which activities are more productive requires more analysis.
16The signal to noise ratio of all the remaining measures for all the latent factors is available in
the online appendix. The estimates of the factor loadings are also available in the online appendix.
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1.7.1 Model fit
The model does a good job when predicting labor force participation and childcare
decisions of the household. In Tables 1.33 and 1.34, I report the means of labor
force participation for both mothers and fathers in 2010 and 2012. The model does
a good job in predicting the average levels of participation. Moreover, in Figure
1.8, I compare the predicted and observed levels of female employment by grade
of schooling attained. I predict the labor force participation when the terms corre-
sponding to unobserved heterogeneity are located at their mean. The model is able
to replicate the gradient in female labor force participation related to education.
More educated women participate more in the labor market both in the data and
in the simulated results of the model. No significant gradient between education
and male labor force is observed in either the model or the data.
I report the predicted levels of childcare demand and how they compare with
what is observed in the data in Table 1.35. The model does a good job at predict-
ing the demand for childcare services according to female labor force participation.
67.7% of children living in families where the mother works attend preschool ser-
vices, whereas the corresponding number for children living in families where the
mother does not participate in the labor market is 42.9%. The corresponding pro-
portions predicted in the model are 68.4% and 41.6%.
The simulated patterns from the model are generated assuming unobserved het-
erogeneity variables are at their means. An alternative way of reporting the model
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fit is to generate draws from their distributions and report the corresponding distri-
bution of model fit. I report the results of such model fit alternative using 200 draws
in Figures 1.10 - 1.11. As we can see, in both cases the model fits the data well.
Finally, the model does a good job at predicting the wages for men and women.
In Figure 1.12, I report the estimated distribution of wages for women and men,
both those predicted and those observed in the data. I report only the estimated
wages for agents who participate in the labor market. The model does a good job
of predicting not only the average wage but also the distribution.
With the information about measures and the information about the production
of skills, we can get a more precise estimate of the distribution of skills for each
individual. The estimated smoothing distribution of skills, which uses all informa-
tion available in order to make inference about the skills of each individual in the
sample, is estimated and the results are reported in Figure 1.13. The details for the
construction of the smoothing distribution are presented in Appendix A.0.5. The
results confirm huge disparities in skills between rich and poor kids.
1.7.2 Evaluating the Effects of Government Programs on the Skills of
Young Children
In this section, I describe the effects that different policy programs would have on
the skills of young children. Additionally, I consider the effects of such policies on
female labor force participation and preschool attendance. The policies considered
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are: 1. increasing the amount of monetary transfers that poor households receive
from the central government in the form of subsidies; 2. same as 1. but having
the father, rather than the mother, as the recipient of such transfers; 3. setting
up a system of free childcare services for children older than three and; 4. using
the resources of the first policy counterfactual in order to perform in-kind transfers
where poor families receive goods that can be used to enhance the skills of young
children, such as books, toys and puzzles.
Cash transfers are a widely-used program in developing countries. Every coun-
try in Latin America has a form of cash transfer that varies by the amount given to
the households and the type of conditions that families need to fulfill in order to be
beneficiaries (Fiszbein, Schady and Ferreira, 2009). Policymakers often invoke the
effect of such programs on the promotion of skills of young children as one of the
many benefits of these policies. Moreover, the vast majority of these programs es-
tablish that, for families with children, the mother should always be the beneficiary.
The main argument for this is that cash in the hands of women is associated with
better child outcomes than cash in the hands of men (Doepke and Tertilt, 2014).
Given the high use of cash transfers as a policy tool in developing countries,
and given the explicit condition that transfers go to mothers rather than fathers or
other adult members, the first counterfactual policy that I consider is to increase
the amount of cash transfers given to mothers of young children. Since 2010, the
value of transfers that poor families with children receive has increased significantly.
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Between 2012 and 2016, families in the lowest quintile of the income distribution
have seen an increase of 72.8%, in real terms, in the cash transfers that they re-
ceive from the central government. The details of these programs and how such
increase was distributed among various policies are described in Appendix A.0.6.
Given that governments seem to increasingly spend more resources in these type
of policies, the first counterfactual simulated in this paper consists on doubling the
amount of monetary transfers that families located in the lowest quintile of the in-
come distribution receive. Such a policy would imply a transfer equivalent to 18%
of the average income for families in the the lowest quintile, which corresponds to
$23,056 CLP a month.
The Chilean government states explicitly that mothers should be the recipients
of such transfers. In order to identify the extent to which this condition is justi-
fied, and to get an idea of whether it makes sense to spend additional resources in
targeting an individual household member as the recipient of such transfers, in the
second counterfactual I simulate what would happen if we set the father, rather
than the mother, as the recipient of the transfers.
Free childcare and preschool policies have also been very popular not only as
a way to promote skills in young children but also as a tool to promote female
employment. In 2013, the government of Chile established free and mandatory
preschool services for children older than five years of age. Partly due to this policy,
Chile is now the country with the highest expenditure on preschool education as
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a share of total government expenditure, among countries in the OECD. 17 Due
to the increasing importance of such public policies, in the third counterfactual I
simulate the effects of setting up free childcare services for families located in the
lowest quintile of the income distribution.
Finally, in the fourth counterfactual I simulate the effects of a system of in-kind
transfers where the families receive goods that can potentially increase skills in
young children. Although probably less prevalent than childcare subsidies or cash
transfers, in-kind transfer programs are starting to become more popular in devel-
oping countries. In Chile, for example, such transfers are being done through the
“Chile Crece Contigo”18 (ChCC) program, established in 2009. ChCC is composed
of a set of services for poor families with children younger than five years of age.
The goal of the program is to guarantee that every child has the necessary resources
so that they can achieve their full developmental potential during childhood. The
program offers resources to parents such as a 24-hour phone line for inquiries about
child development, and the distribution of books, toys, songs and story books for
children, as well as providing learning materials to parents in order to increase their
knowledge about child development. ChCC is the most important child develop-
ment public program currently operating in Chile. Due to its growing importance,
I simulate the effect of extending one of ChCC’s benefits: that of transfers of goods
to improve children’s skills, such as toys appropriate for cognitive stimulation, as
17Out of the total government expenditures, 2.3% go to the preschool system compared to the
average of other OECD countries, which is 1.1% (Chile, 2013).
18Chile Grows with You, in Spanish
62
well as musical material to increase their vocabulary. In the fourth counterfactual,
I analyze the effects of spending the same amount of resources as in counterfactual
1 -i.e. $$23,056 CLP a month per family- for families in the lowest income distri-
bution, but doing so as in-kind transfer.
The effects of such policies on the gaps in skills between children in the high-
est quintile of the income distribution and children in the lowest quintile can be
found in Figure 1.16. Initially the gaps in skills between rich and poor children are
estimated at approximately of 60% of a standard deviation. We see that in-kind
transfer is the most effective policy, decreasing the gap by 8%. Cash transfers and
childcare subsidies decrease this gap in approximately 2%. There are no differences
between cash in the hands of women and cash in the hands of men, as these two
policies have virtually the same effect.
Cash in the hands of women, however, increases their bagaining power so that
women have a stronger say in the household. This can be seen as part of the esti-
mation results of the Pareto weight function reported in Table 1.32. Additionally,
women have stronger preferences for children. However, the two effects combined
-the increase in their bargaining power and having stronger preferences for children-
are not strong enough to justify that it actually makes a difference to target spe-
cific members in the household as the sole recipients of monetary transfers from the
central government.
The effects of the policies being implemented are decomposed in Tables 1.36-
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1.39. Both cash transfers and childcare subsidies have an effect on employment
levels. Cash transfer decreases both female and male labor force participation by
less than one percentage point. Childcare subsidies have an effect only in female
employment, which is due to the fact that preschool services decreases the penalty
of participating in the labor market more for mothers than for fathers. Regard-
ing monetary investments in children, cash transfers and childcare subsidies do not
significantly affect this variable. Childcare subsidies increase it for two reasons.
First parents spend less resources on preschool fees. Additionally mothers partici-
pate slightly more in the labor market, increasing the amount of resources available
for child investments. However, in-kind transfers have by far the largest effect on
monetary investments. This particular mechanism explains most of the reason why
in-kind transfer are most effective when it comes to decreasing gaps in skills between
rich and poor children.
The fact that cash transfers are not very effective at closing the gap in skills
between rich and poor children is consistent with the results from the literature.
As pointed out by Heckman and Mosso (2014), evidence seems to suggest very lim-
ited effect of cash transfers on skills of disadvantaged children. Paxson and Schady
(2010) evaluate a cash transfer program in Ecuador using a strategy of random
assignment to the treatment. They find that such transfers had no effect on cog-
nitive development for children, except for the poorest, where a modest effect is
found. However, the authors suggest that the mechanism driving this effect might
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be through improvement in nutrition and health outcomes. Such a mechanism is
unlikely to operate in Chile, where the incidence of stunting and wasting in children
is below 1%, whereas in the sample used by Paxson and Schady (2010), the corre-
sponding proportions are 10% for stunting and 23% for wasting. Macours, Schady
and Vakis (2012) find a positive effect of a cash transfer program in Nicaragua.
However, the mechanisms suggested by the authors include improvement in nutri-
tional status, which might not necessarily operate in Chile for the aforementioned
reasons, in addition to the fact that the cash transfer program included educational
activities for parents that might modify their behavior. In summary, cash transfers
by themselves seem to have modest effects on children’s skills.
With regard to implementation of the policies, I find that childcare subsidies
are cheaper than the other policies. Providing free childcare service to families is
cheaper than implementing the increase in monetary or in-kind transfers to families.
The information about the cost of each policy is explicitly described in Table 1.40.
Although it is cheaper to provide childcare subsidies, at the same time, I assume
that there are no general equilibrium effects as a result of the increase in demand
for child care, which might generate an increase in price. Moreover, I am implicitly
assuming that the available infrastructure is enough to absorb the increment in the
demand. However, when we set the amount devoted to each program to be the
same as the cost of providing free childcare services, the ranking in the performance
of each policy is preserved. The effects of performing the same counterfactuals with
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the same amount of expenditure for each policy are reported in Figure 1.17.
1.7.3 Child Investments and Bargaining Power
As shown in the preliminary evidence, women spend more time with their children
even when controlling for labor supply. This, together with the evidence that cash
in the hands of women translates into better child outcomes than cash in the hands
of men, is often used as evidence that women have stronger preferences for children
and thus monetary transfers should be given to women if the objective is to invest
more in children. Nonetheless, this evidence is explained by several other factors.
First of all, mothers’ time seems to be more productive than fathers’ time, as
shown by the estimation results of the model. Additionally, mothers have stronger
preferences for children and the utility penalty of time investments is lower for moth-
ers than for fathers. However, in addition to these facts, the relative empowerment
of each member distorts time decisions, which explains part of the differences in
time investments. Given that both parents are making investments in a public
good (skills of their child) and that effort is costly and privately exerted, the fact
that women spend more time with children is also a consequence of their relative
disempowerment in the household rather than simply a result of different prefer-
ences.19
19Doepke and Tertilt (2014) develop a non-cooperative model of household behavior to answer
the question of how female empowerment might promote economic development. The authors
argue that the reason to develop a non-cooperative model of household behavior lies in the fact
that the only mechanism capable of generating differences in investments in children in a collective
approach would be that of preferences. However, in this paper I present a collective model of
household behavior where differences in investment can arise for a variety of reasons other than
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The allocation of time investments is a result of maximizing the household’s
welfare, which includes the skills of children, taking into account the utility penalty
of time investments. The time cost of each member is not equally weighted, it
depends on the relative empowerment of each household member. If the mother is
relatively less empowered, the cost of her time is lower than that of the father. This
difference in empowerment levels distorts the cost of providing effort and implies
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources for children. Put it differently, with the
same amount of total effort being provided, we can find an alternative allocation of
time investments that would make the child better off.
Consider the centralized problem of choosing the effort levels for the second
period in order to maximize the skills of children -taking all other inputs as fixed-
subject to the fact that the total amount of effort exerted should not exceed the
total amount of effort found in the problem of the household described in 1.5.20-
1.5.21. We are basically asking whether or not it is possible to find an alternative
allocation of time that would make children better off, whitout modifying the total
amount of effort exerted by both parents. The problem is formally defined as:
max
ef ,em
s2(e
f , em, .) subject to ef + em = ef,∗ + em,∗ (1.7.2)
where ej,∗ is the optimal solution to the maximization of the household welfare
problem described in Equation 1.5.7. Define the solution to the problem in 1.7.2 as
preferences.
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(
ef,c1 , em,c1
)
.
Similarly, we can define an alternate centralized problem where we maximize
skills subject to the fact that the total time-cost exerted in the production of skills
should not exceed that found in the household’s problem defined in 1.5.1-1.5.19.
Formally:
max
ef ,em
s2(e
f , em, .) subject to c
(
ef
)
+ c (em) = c
(
ef,∗
)
+ c (em,∗) (1.7.3)
where the cost of effort is given by cj(ej) = αj4,2e
j(1 + hj). I call the solution to
1.7.3
(
ef,c2 , em,c2
)
. In both cases, for l = 1, 2, we do find that:
(
ef,cl
em,cl
)
(
ef,∗
em,∗
) ∝ [(1− µ)
µ
]φ/(1−φ)
(1.7.4)
The difference of ratios of effort in the centralized solutions and in the household
problem originally defined in 1.5.1-1.5.19 depends on the Pareto weight and the de-
gree of substitutability between parental efforts. If the Pareto weight heavily favors
one member, and if there is some degree of substitutability between parental effort,
there would be an inefficient allocation in time investments given that we can find
an alternative allocation with the same amount of cost, or the same amount of total
effort, that will yield better child outcomes. I find that this mechanism explains
15% of the differences in time investments between mothers and fathers.
It is often argued in the literature that, in a collective model of household be-
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havior, observing different child outcomes when there is a shift in the bargaining
power can only be explained by differences in preferences or productivities between
parents (Doepke and Tertilt, 2014). Nonetheless, if we take into account that child
skills are a public good produced with effort, the cost of which is privately exerted,
shifts into bargaining power can translate in changes in child skills even when par-
ents are identical in terms of preferences and productivities.
This result can be interpreted as an additional argument for female empower-
ment within households, not invoking an argument of equality but one of efficiency:
disparities in bargaining power lead to inefficient allocations within the household.
Taking this into account, and with the estimates of the economic model, we can
quantify the extent to which the differences observed in time spent with children
are due to productivity, preferences or empowerment differences.
1.8 Conclusions
The way in which skills are shaped during the first years of life has significant
consequences for adult life outcomes. This fact has motivated a large amount of
research aimed at understanding the skill formation process in children. Some of
the key facts that we have learned from the literature about the skill formation
process in children are:
1. Malleability decreases with age. As children age, it is harder to modify,
or improve, children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
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2. Inequalities in skills emerge very early in life. In developing and de-
veloped countries, disparities in the process of skill formation are evident as
early as when children are three years old. Children who come from poor
families score systematically worse than their richer counterparts in tests and
parental assessments measuring cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
3. Parenting and general family environment largely determine the
skill formation process in children. Early stimulation in children, coming
directly from parents, has been shown to be one of the most relevant inputs
in the skill formation process. Such stimulation can come in the form of time
investments in children or by improving the environment of the children by
improving their housing situation, the quality of the food being provided and
the availability of items that promote skills, such as toys, puzzles, books and
music.
4. Parental investments in children can be complements or substitutes
of public policy programs. Given that inequalities in skills emerge very
early in life, there have been multiple attempts from central governments
to improve the conditions in which children live. Programs such as cash
transfers, preschool subsidies and in-kind transfers have been developed with
the goal of improving the quality of the environment in which children develop.
However, such programs might have consequences for the way parents invest
in their children, in ways that can be beneficial or detrimental for them. As
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an example, cash transfers might discourage female labor force participation
without further increasing the amount of investments made in children, as
there is no guarantee that such money will be used to improve skills in children.
Developing programs to improve the skill formation process for children in disad-
vantaged households should be a priority for central governments in developing and
developed economies. This is one of the most efficient ways to reduce crime, improve
educational outcomes and increase productivity (Cunha, Heckman and Schennach,
2010). However, when developing such programs, we need to understand what is
the most efficient way to do so and how such programs affect parental investments
in their children. This is the first article in the literature that empirically evaluates
the effect of cash transfers, childcare subsidies and in-kind transfers on the acquisi-
tion of skills for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
To have an accurate assessment of how such policies affect skills in children,
I develop a model of household behavior and child outcomes. One of the main
features of cash transfers is that they are targeted to women exclusively, with the
argument that cash in the hands of women translate into better child outcomes
than cash in the hands of men. To incorporate this feature, I allow parents to have
different preferences about skills for children. I also allow cash transfers to have an
effect on the bargaining process in the household. Additionally, I take into account
that parents can invest in their children either by improving the quality of their
environment via monetary investments, or by spending time with them performing
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activities such as reading, counting, going to cultural activities, among others.
The dataset used for this article was collected exclusively with the goal of get-
ting a better understanding about the skill formation process in children. Thanks
to that, I am able to incorporate several features of the skill formation process in
children that have been ignored previously in the literature, such as parental skills,
information about multiple dimensions of skills in children, quality and quantity of
time and monetary investments by parents in their children, and preschool atten-
dance, among others. This is the first paper in the literature that estimates a skill
production technology via a dynamic-latent-factor structure a-la` Cunha, Heckman
and Schennach (2010), nested within a model of household behavior. This allows
me to obtain non-parametric identification of the skill production function. By en-
dogenizing the investment decisions of parents, I am able to perform counterfactual
policy analysis, taking into account that parents’ investments in their children are
distorted by government interventions.
This article proposes a new framework to estimate models of household behavior
with unobserved and continuous state variables. By implementing particle filtering
techniques from Machine Learning and Financial Econometrics, I demonstrate an
efficient algorithm to circumvent the high-dimensionality problem. Additionally, I
introduce a new estimation strategy for collective models of household behavior.
Rather than using the consumption of semi-private goods within the household, I
use questionnaires about female empowerment and gender roles as noisy measures
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of bargaining power for adult members in the household.
The results of this paper show that cash transfers have a very limited effect
on reducing the gaps in skills between rich and poor children. Moreover, giving
the transfers to fathers or mothers does not seem to make a significant difference.
Consistent with most of the literature, I find that cash transfers have a very limited
effect on female labor force participation. Childcare services have a positive but
modest effect on skill promotion in children, as well as on female labor force par-
ticipation. The main result suggests that the most effective way to close the gaps
in skills between rich and poor children is by giving in-kind transfers. These are
transfers that are given to households through a basket of goods that can be used
to increase skills in their children, such as books, toys, puzzles and music. Whereas
doubling the amount of monetary transfers to poor households reduces the gap
in skills between children from the lowest quintile of the income distribution and
their richer counterparts by about 2%, spending the same amount of resources on
in-kind transfers decreases the gap by about 8%. These results are important for
the design of policies to promote skills in children. Cash transfers and childcare
subsidies have received significant attention in both the literature and the design
of government policies. Programs that directly affect the physical environment in
which children live have been less studied but seem to be more promising when it
comes to increasing skills in young children.
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1.9 Figures and Tables
Table 1.1: 2010 Tests-Measures of child skills
Test Scoring Interpretation Ages (in months) Abbreviation
TEPSI
Higher score indicates a higher level of
psychomotor development.
24-60 MS1,10-MS3,10
CBCL
A higher score indicates more persis-
tence of behavioral problems.
18-60 MS5,10-MS11,10
Table 1.2: 2012 Tests-Measures of child skills
Test Scoring Interpretation Ages (in months) Abbreviation
TADI
Higher scores indicate higher levels of
childhood development
6-84 MS1,12-MS4,12
BT
Higher score indicates a higher level of
child development-Batelle test score
. 6-84 MS5,12-MS10,12
TVIP
Higher scores indicate higher levels of
verbal intelligence for children
30-84 MS13,12
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Abbreviation Activity
MS1EF,12 Reads Children’s storybooks or drawing books
MS2EF,12 Tells her stories
MS3EF,12 Sings to child
MS4EF,12 Takes her to parks
MS5EF,12 Takes her to museums, zoos, libraries or other cultural activities
MS6EF,12 Spends time with her chatting or drawing
MS7EF,12 Invites her to participate in household chores
MS8EF,12 Takes her to the supermarket
MS9EF,12 Shares a meal with her
MS10EF,12 Teaches the animals and their sounds
MS11EF,12 Teaches her the colors
MS12EF,12 Goes with her to visit friends or family members
MS13EF,12 Teaches her the numbers and how to count
MS14EF,12 Teaches her words
For each question parents reply how often, during the last seven days,
they perform each activity. The possible answers are: Never, 1-3 times, 4-6 times.
Table 1.4: Measures used for parental effort in 2012
Abbreviation Activity
MS1EF,10 Reads Childre’s storybooks or drawing books
MS2EF,10 Tells her stories
MS3EF,10 Sings to her
MS4EF,10 Takes her to parks
MS5EF,10 Takes her to museums, zoos, libraries or other cultural activities
MS6EF,10 Plays with her
MS7EF,10 Spends time with her talking or drawing
Table 1.5: Measures used for parental effort in 2010
Abbreviation Outcome
MS112 TADI-Cognitive subdomain
MS212 TADI-Motor skills subdomain
MS312 TEPSI-Motor skills subdomain
MS412 TADI-Language subdomain
MS512 Battelle-I
MS612 Battelle-II
MS712 Battelle-III
MS812 Battelle-IV
MS912 Battelle-V
MS1012 Battelle-T
MS1112 PPVT-Vocabulary Test
All test scores are standardized to be mean zero and variance one.
Table 1.6: Measures used for Skills in 2012
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Abbreviation Outcome
MS110 TEPSI-Coordination subdomain
MS210 TEPSI-Language subdomain
MS310 TEPSI-Motor skills subdomain
MS410 CBCL-Emotional intelligence
MS510 CBCL-anxiety -depression
MS610 CBCL-somatic complaints
MS710 CBCL-Isolation
MS810 CBCL-Sleeping disorder
MS910 CBCL-Attention deficit
MS1010 CBCL-Aggressive behavior
All test scores are standardized to be mean zero and variance one.
Table 1.7: Measures used for Skills in 2010
Abbreviation Outcome
MS1BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Preeclampsia during pregnancy
MS2BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Cholestasis during pregnancy
MS3BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Urinary infections during pregnancy
MS4BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Hemorrages during pregnancy
MS5BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Hipertension during pregnancy
MS6BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Placenta Previa during pregnancy
MS7BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Diabetes G during pregnancy
MS8BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Anemia during pregnancy
MS9BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Toxoplasmosis during pregnancy
MS10BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Depression during pregnancy
MS11BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Bipolar D. during pregnancy
MS12BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Anxiety D. during pregnancy
MS13BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Obsesive compulsive D. during pregnancy
MS14BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Fobia during pregnancy
MS15BIRTH Mother diagnosed with Panic D. during pregnancy
MS16BIRTH Mother diagnosed with PTSD during pregnancy
MS17BIRTH Cigarrettes consumed during pregnancy
MS18BIRTH Cigarrettes consumed during the first six months of life of child
MS19BIRTH Alcohol consumption during pregnancy*
MS20BIRTH Substance abuse during pregnancy*
MS21BIRTH Child was born pre-term
MS22BIRTH Weight at birth (grams)
MS23BIRTH Height at birth (cm)
*Possible answers are never (0), rarely (1) and often (2).
Table 1.8: Measures used for Skills at birth
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Abbreviation Outcome
MS1PG WAIS-Numerical test
MS2PG WAIS-Vocabulary test
MS3PG BFI-Agreeableness
MS4PG BFI-Openness
MS5PG BFI-Extroversion
MS6PG BFI-Neuroticism
MS7PG BFI-Conscientiousness
All test scores are standardized to be mean zero and variance one.
Table 1.9: Measures used for Skills of primary caregiver
Abbreviation Question
MS1INV,10 Child has a special place where to store toys and belongings
MS2INV,10 Child has at least one toy that involves muscular activity
MS3INV,10 Child has toys to pull and push
MS4INV,10 Child has at least one toy with wheels
MS5INV,10 Availability of plush toys-stuffed animals
MS6INV,10 Availability of mobiles for child
MS7INV,10 Availability of musical or literary toys
MS8INV,10 Child has three or more books of his own
Table 1.10: Measures used for Investments in 2010
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Table 1.15: Summary statistics-Variables determining Pareto weight
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Father’s non-labor income share 0.27 (0.34) 4470
Age difference (Father-Mother) 3.01 (5.18) 4470
Difference in grades attained (Father-Mother) -0.21 (2.82) 4470
Sex ratio in region (Women/Men) 1.01 (0.06) 4470
Unemployment ratio in region (Men/Women) 0.67 (0.11) 4470
Wage ratio in region (Men/Women) 1.41 (0.07) 4470
Distance to women protection center (km) 19.15 (31.79) 4465
The ratio of wages offered is not reported in these table as is the results of the parameters estimated in the
model. The share of father’s non-labor income, as well as the age difference and the differences in grades attained
are all obtained from the ECLS dataset. The sex ratio in the city is computed using information from the CENSUS
dataset. The last CENSUS available for Chile is from 2002. I use information about female-male ratio based on the
population projections from the National Institute of Statistics fro Chile. The unemployment and wage information
is obtained from the CASEN household survey of 2011.
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Table 1.16: Time investments and labor supply (2010)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Mother’s effort (2010) Father’s effort (2010)
Mother: hours worked weekly -0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
Father: hours worked weekly 0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
Total household income 0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
Age of child (months) 0.01*** 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
BFI-Extraversion 0.05*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02)
BFI-Kindness 0.05** 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02)
BFI-Responsibility 0.06*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02)
BFI-Neuroticism -0.05*** -0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
BFI-Openness 0.15*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Wais-digits 0.01 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01)
Wais-Vocabulary -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of siblings -0.07*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 7,058 7,058
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Additional controls include age of child, race, age of both parents and test scores of primary caregiver.
The measure of effort is constructed via Principal component analysis, extracting one factor for the variables used
as measures of time investments by parents. The measures of parental effort, together with the big five
personality test scores and the Wais cognitive assessments are all standardized to have mean zero and one
standard deviation. In the regression the measure of effort is in hundreds.
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Table 1.17: Time investments and labor supply (2012)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Mother’s effort (2012) Father’s effort (2012)
Mother: hours worked weekly -0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
Father: hours worked weekly 0.00 -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Total household income 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Age of child (months) 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
BFI-Extraversion 0.01 0.05*
(0.03) (0.03)
BFI-Kindness 0.06 -0.00
(0.04) (0.03)
BFI-Responsibility 0.11** 0.11***
(0.04) (0.03)
BFI-Neuroticism -0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
BFI-Openness 0.19*** 0.05*
(0.04) (0.03)
Wais-digits -0.02 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Wais-Vocabulary 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 8,020 7,956
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Additional controls include age of child, race, age of both parents and test scores of primary caregiver.
The measure of effort is constructed via Principal component analysis, extracting one factor for the variables used
as measures of time investments by parents. The measures of parental effort, together with the big five
personality test scores and the Wais cognitive assessments are all standardized to have mean zero and one
standard deviation. In the regression the measure of effort is in hundreds.
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Table 1.18: Regressions of effort in differences
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ∆Effort father ∆Effort mother
∆Hours worked mother 0.03*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
∆Hours worked father -0.03*** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.01)
∆Effort mother 0.37***
(0.01)
∆Effort father 0.36***
(0.01)
Observations 4,531 4,531
R-squared 0.14 0.15
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Standard error in parentheses.
∆X = X2012 −X2010. The measure of effort is the same used as in Table 1.17 but in differences. The same
controls as in Table 1.17 are used.
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Table 1.19: Child outcomes in 2012 and share of income earned by women
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Motor skills 2 (B3) Cognitive test (B5) Batelle Total
Mother’s income share 0.09* 0.09* 0.10**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Total household income 0.00 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.01** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s years of schooling 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Number of siblings 0.02 -0.00 -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age of child (months) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BFI-Extraversion 0.06*** 0.04** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
BFI-Kindness -0.00 0.09*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
BFI-Responsibility 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
BFI-Neuroticism -0.02 -0.03* -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
BFI-Openness 0.07*** 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Wais-digits 0.01 0.01 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Wais-Vocabulary 0.00 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 6,823 6,823 6,822
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Additional controlsi include age of child, race, age of both parents, test scores of primary caregiver and number of
siblings. +: lower scores indicate lower incidence of behavioral problems.
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Filter Number of households
Initial sample 18,310
Household not surveyed in 2012 16,033
Household not surveyed in 2010 12,898
Parent not living in household 7,855
Siblings within five years of age in the household 4,125
Children with incomplete skills questionnaires 2,247
Households with incomplete questionnaires 950
Table 1.21: Description of sample used in the analysis
Variable Mean 25% 75% Sd
Mother’s age 34.52 29.00 39.00 6.94
Father’s age 37.41 32.00 43.00 7.96
Mother’s years of schooling 11.27 10.00 12.00 2.97
Father’s years of schooling 10.72 8.00 12.00 3.13
Mother’s hours of work (week) 24.22 0.00 45.00 21.34
Father’s hours of work (week) 43.20 45.00 48.00 16.03
Mother’s weekly wage (1,000 CLP) 82.73 41.86 95.24 92.78
Mother’s weekly wage (USD) 165.46 83.72 190.49 185.55
Father’s weekly wage (1,000 CLP) 85.48 42.62 93.02 88.19
Father’s weekly wage (USD) 170.95 85.23 186.05 176.39
Household’s total Income (Weekly-CLP) 124.55 59.88 151.16 108.83
Household’s total Income (Weekly (USD)) 249.10 119.76 302.33 217.66
Age of child (months) 64.60 58.00 72.00 8.40
Table 1.22: Descriptive statistics - Families in 2012
All summary statistics are reported for the survey used in 2012.
Table 1.23: Age distribution (2012)
Item Number Per cent
4 310 32.63
5 397 41.79
6 243 25.58
Total 950 100.00
89
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
αm1,12 0.6312 0.0028
αm2,12 0.0517 0.0001
αm3,12 0.3035 0.2208
αm4,0,12 0.0136 0.0001
αm4,1,12 0.0012 0.0001
αm1,10 0.0554 0.0003
αm2,10 0.0038 0.0001
αm3,10 0.1026 0.2437
αm4,0,10 0.0001 0.0001
αm4,1,10 0.0001 0.0001
αm5,10 0.8381 0.3831
Table 1.24: Estimates: Utility function. Mother’s preferences
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
αf1,12 0.1587 0.0026
αf2,12 0.0339 0.0001
αf3,12 0.8042 0.3610
αf4,0,12 0.0032 0.0001
αf4,1,12 0.0016 0.0001
αf1,10 0.6157 0.0026
αf2,10 0.1407 0.0005
αf3,10 0.8042 0.4496
αf4,0,10 0.0114 0.0001
αf4,1,10 0.0001 0.0001
αf5,10 0.0057 1.0415
Table 1.25: Estimates: Utility function. Father’s preferences
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
σmW,A 3.6627 0.8352
σmNW,A 0.9095 0.1140
σmNW,NA 0.0794 0.2469
σfW,A 0.5020 0.4519
σfNW,A 0.0851 0.4550
σfNW,NA 0.0020 0.0777
Preference shocks for work-no childcare are standardized to zero
Table 1.26: Estimates: Preference shock
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error
βm0 5.7874 0.4394
βm1 0.2757 0.0251
βm2 0.0732 0.0379
βm3 -0.0006 0.0006
σwm 0.8280 0.0606
Table 1.27: Estimates: Mothers wages
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
βf0 5.8103 0.2997
βf1 0.1260 0.0055
βf2 0.1875 0.0156
βf3 -0.0022 0.0002
σwf 0.6894 0.0130
Table 1.28: Estimates: Fathers wages
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
θ0 0.2128 0.0011
θ1 0.2673 0.0017
θ2 0.5199 0.0032
φ 0.4688 0.0007
γf 0.3647 0.0006
γm 0.6353 0.0016
δ0 -0.8000 0.0051
δ1 -0.0000 0.0001
δ2 0.0010 0.0004
δ3,10 3.5038 0.0172
δ3,12 5.3000 0.0408
δ4 0.0130 0.0001
σs 1.5754 0.0065
Table 1.29: Estimates: Production of Skills
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
σmef 2.5133 0.0039
σfef 3.3754 0.0025
σinv 2.1896 0.0144
Table 1.30: Estimates: Distribution of latent factors
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error
PriceI0 966.2378 1.8225
PriceI1 1.0537 0.0019
Pchildcare0 2440.6020 1.1684
Pchildcare1 622.6098 1.2417
Table 1.31: Estimates: Prices
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Description
λ0 -2.7321 0.0136 Intercept
λ1 0.0023 0.0143 Wage ratio
λ2 0.0527 0.0006 Non-labor income ratio
λ3 -0.1194 0.0001 Age difference
λ4 0.0036 0.0026 Educational difference
λ5 -2.5325 0.0039 Gender ratio
λ6 -0.0069 0.0328 Unemployment ratio
λ7 -0.7722 0.0006 Wage ratio (region)
σµ 0.5179 0.0074 Standard deviation
Table 1.32: Estimates: Pareto weight
Table 1.33: Model Fit - I
Female Labor Force Participation Predicted Data
2010 57.2% 60.28%
2012 62.6% 61.47%
Table 1.34: Model Fit - II
Male Labor Force Participation Predicted Data
2010 91.8% 94.6%
2012 96.1% 93.2%
Table 1.35: Model Fit - III
Childcare Attendance Predicted Data
Working Mothers 68.4% 67.7%
Not-working Mothers 41.6% 42.9%
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Counterfactual Effect on Female employment
1 -0.63
2 -0.63
3 0.63
4 0.00
Table 1.36: Effects of Policy counterfactuals. Change in Female employment (per-
centage points)
Counterfactual Effect on Male employment
1 -0.21
2 -0.21
3 0.00
4 0.00
Table 1.37: Effects of Policy counterfactuals. Change in Male employment (per-
centage points)
Counterfactual Change in Money Invested
1 11.36
2 11.36
3 34.08
4 333.59
Table 1.38: Effects of Policy counterfactuals. Change in Money invested
Counterfactual Change in Money Invested
1 11.36
2 11.36
3 34.08
4 333.59
Table 1.39: Effects of Policy counterfactuals. Change in Money invested
Counterfactual Expenditure per capita (USD)
Transfers to Mother 449.59
Transfers to Father 449.59
Childcare Subsidy* 221.64
In-kind transfers 449.59
Table 1.40: Cost of policy interventions
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Figure 1.2: Example of distribution of childcare providers. City of “La Serena”,
Chile
95
Figure 1.3: Weekly frequency of activities between parents and children
For each activity there are possible answers: 0: never, 1: one to three times a week; 2: four to
six times a week; 3: everyday.
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Figure 1.4: Female Labor Force Participation (%)
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Figure 1.5: Gaps in health at birth (%)
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Figure 1.6: Gaps in skills at age 5
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The green (solid) line is the mean score, the blue (dashed) line is the 95% confidence interval.
All test scores and parental assessments are normalized to have mean zero and variance one.
PPVT stands for Peabody Picture Vocabulary Tests. Battelle is an instrument containing
different scales to measures development of children. TADI is a test of learning and child
development20. In all tests, differences between the scores of children in the lowest quintile of the
income distribution is statistically different to those children who are in the highest quintile of
the income distribution.
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Figure 1.7: Monetary Transfers to Families in Chile
The graph reports the relationship between monetary transfers that families receive from the
central government, on a monthly basis, from three main programs: “Unique Family
Subsidies”21, “Family Assignments”22 and “Social Protection Transfer”23 and their score in the
Social Protection Card24. The conditions to be eligible for these programs are to have a score in
the Social Protection Card below 11.734 and for those who work, having a monthly income of
less than $187,515 CLP. The final amount being transferred to the household also depends on
the size of the household and the time they have been beneficiaries of such programs. The solid
line represents the schedule for a family composed of two adults and one child who has been in
the program for 50 months. The dashed line corresponds to a bi-parental household with three
children under 18 who have been in the program for less than six months.
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Figure 1.10: Bootstrap fit: Parents’ Labor Force Participation in 2012
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Figure 1.11: Bootstrap fit: Childcare decisions (%)
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Figure 1.12: Model fit: distribution of wages
Kernel density estimates of predicted and observed wages. Bandwidth chosen is 3.
Figure 1.13: Distribution of skills. Smoothing distribution
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Figure 1.14: Signal to noise ratio. Mother’s effort (2012)
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Figure 1.15: Signal to noise ratio. Monetary Investment (2012)
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Figure 1.16: Effects of Policy Interventions
Effects on the gap in skills between the top 20% richest households and the
poorest 20% of the households
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Figure 1.17: Effects of Policy Interventions
Effects on the gap in skills between the top 20% richest households and the
poorest 20% of the households when money spent in each policy is the same.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Student Loans on the
Provision and Demand for Higher Educa-
tion
This chapter is co-authored with David Zarruk.
Abstract
We characterize the outcomes of the tertiary education market in a context where
borrowing constraints bind, there is a two-tier college system operating under mo-
nopolistic competition in which colleges differ by the quality offered and returns to
education depend on the quality of the school attended. College quality, tuition
prices, acceptance cut-offs and education demand are all determined in a general
equilibrium model and depend on the borrowing constraints faced by households.
Our main finding shows that subsidized student loan policies can lead to a widen-
ing gap in the quality of services provided by higher education institutions. This
happens because the demand for elite institutions unambiguously increases when
individuals can borrow. This does not happen in non-elite institutions, since re-
laxing borrowing constraints makes some individuals move from non-elite to elite
institutions. The higher increase in demand for elite institutions allows them to in-
crease prices and investment per student. As investment and average student ability
are complementary inputs in the quality production function, elite universities also
increase their acceptance cut-offs. In this new equilibrium, the differentiation of the
product offered by colleges increases, where elite universities provide higher quality
to high-ability students and non-elite universities offer lower quality to less-able
students. We illustrate the main results through a numerical exercise applied to
Colombia. We show that the observed increase in the quality gap can be a by-
product of the subsidized loan policies. Such results show that, when analyzed in
a general equilibrium setting, subsidized loan policies can have regressive effects on
the income distribution.
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2.1 Introduction
The market for higher education has received significant attention in the economics
literature. In particular, the effects that subsidized loan policies have on the de-
mand side of the market have been widely studied, given the dramatic increase in
student debt during the last two decades in the U.S. Overall, there seems to be a
consensus in the literature on the fact that credit constraints explain only a small
fraction of enrollment decisions in higher education in the U.S. However, this is not
necessarily the case in developing countries, where student financial aid systems are
weak and evidence suggests that college enrollment is highly determined by family
wealth (World Bank, 2003, 2012). In this context, the implementation of subsidized
student loan policies can potentially affect the demand for education, generating
equilibrium effects such as increases in tuition prices and changes in the quality of
services offered by colleges.
Understanding the effects of these policies is of central importance given the
massive investments that have been made in student credit programs during the
last two decades in the developing world, in Latin America and some African coun-
tries25. The demand side effects of these policies in a context where borrowing
constraints determine enrollment decisions have been studied by the literature and
the conclusions are certainly appealing: an expansion in student loans will lead
25See Salmi (1999) and World Bank (2009) for a review on student loan programs in Latin
American and African countries.
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to an increase in the demand for higher education among the most able students
(Canton and Blom, 2004). This will reduce the inefficiency that exists when very
high-ability individuals with low initial wealth cannot access tertiary education. A
partial equilibrium perspective would unambiguously show that such policies have
welfare improving effects on it’s beneficiaries. As a consequence, these programs
have often received the support of multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank26.
However, the equilibrium effects of such credit programs have not been widely
studied. In particular, not much has been said about the effect of subsidized stu-
dent loans on tuition prices and on the quality of services provided by educational
institutions. Such policies can have negative effects on a subset of the agents in the
economy that might offset the overall benefits from introducing such policies27.
This paper contributes to the literature studying the consequences of subsidized
loan policies, by analyzing the general equilibrium effects that such programs have
on the quality of education provided by different tiers of colleges, which we will de-
note henceforth as low and high-quality, or elite and non-elite colleges. We develop a
26These institutions have contributed to different student loan projects in the developing world.
For example, the World Bank has been financing the Colombian ACCES program since 2002 and
committed in 2014 to lend $200 million during the period 2014-2019. Recently, the IDB provided
a $10 million dollar loan to the Higher Education Finance Fund in 2012, to finance student loan
programs in 4 Latin American countries.
27Obiols-Homs (2011) argues that in an incomplete markets setting, although increasing borrow-
ing limits increases the welfare of borrowing constrained individuals, in equilibrium this also leads
to an increase in the interest rate paid by the borrowers. The two effects oppose each other, so
the effect of loosening borrowing limits on welfare is ambiguous and follows a U-shape. Although
we do not take into account the effect of borrowing constraints on the interest rate and assume
government student loans are subject to an exogenous interest rate, his findings strengthen our
theory that student loan policies might have negative effects on welfare, in equilibrium.
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general equilibrium model where families decide whether or not to go to college, and
if they go they need to decide which college they will attend. The market of higher
education operates under monopolistic competition, as is common in the literature
(Epple, Romano and Sieg, 2006), in a two-tier system where students who graduate
from elite colleges have higher rewards in the labor market than students who go
to the non-elite system. Colleges maximize the quality of the services offered where
such quality depends on the skills of their student body and on the investment per
student made by the university. Their objective is to chose skills thresholds for ad-
mission, tuition rates, and investment per students, while maintaining a balanced
budget in order to maximize the quality of the services offered. We characterize
the demand for higher education, the incentives to invest and admit students by
each tier-college, as well as the consequences of loan policies in the equilibria arising
from such setting.
We find a set of equilibria such that once the subsidized loan policy is imple-
mented, colleges change the quality of services provided in a way such that the
gap in quality provided by elite and non-elite institutions becomes wider. Elite
universities will face a higher demand for services as a consequence of the subsi-
dized loan policy. They will be able to increase the minimum level of skills required
for acceptance while maintaining budget balancedness. Increasing the quality of
their student body will make elite-universities invest more in their students so long
as these two inputs are complements in the provision of quality provided by col-
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leges.. This will lead to a higher segmentation of the market for higher education
as high-ability students will attend elite colleges and low-ability students will be
concentrated in the non-elite system. In such case, least able students will not be
exposed to high-ability students, limiting the extent to which they benefit from their
peer effects. Additionally, the marginal productivity of investments per students
will decrease in non-elite colleges as the quality of their student body deteriorates,
decreasing the incentives by non-elite colleges to invest in their students. This ends
up decreasing the gains from higher education for students attending non-elite uni-
versities, making subsidized-loan policies a regressive policy in the overall economy.
The rationale behind the widening gap in quality comes from the fact that the
market for higher education operates under monopolistic competition and each tier
will serve a different segment of the market once the subsidized loan policy has been
implemented. Under such circumstances, universities have incentives to differenti-
ate their product -quality offered-, given the differential effect that such policy has
on the segments of the market that each university serves. On one hand, the size
of the segment that attends the low-quality college is ambiguous after the policy is
implemented. It can expand, as people that could not study before can now afford
to attend the low-quality college, but can also contract, given that some individuals
that prefer the high-quality college can now afford to pay for better education. On
the other hand, the demand for the elite college unambiguously expands, since now
some individuals can afford its services and no individuals will stop attending it
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because of the policy. The larger increase in the demand for the elite college, as op-
posed to the non-elite college, allows the former to increase prices per student more
than the latter. With more resources, the high-quality college will find it optimal
to increase investment per student. Moreover, if the peer effects and the investment
per student are complements in the quality production function, the elite institution
will increase the cut-offs, so that the average student ability is higher in equilibrium.
In this way, the quality gap supplied in equilibrium widens.
Our analysis is also novel, given our focus on developing countries and the fact
that the structural literature has only explored the context of the U.S., as far as our
knowledge goes. The educational sector in developing economies is particularly dif-
ferent from that of developed economies, for three main reasons. First, in developing
countries there is evidence that credit constraints play a role in determining college
enrollment decisions among households (Melguizo, Sanchez and Velasco, 2015), as
opposed to the case of developed countries. Second, in many developing countries
the private institutions own a larger share of the market for higher education, as
compared to European countries or even the U.S. (see Figure 2.1). This is impor-
tant because public institutions may not be as responsive to market incentives, but
rather follow the social planner’s objectives. In contrast, private institutions are
potentially more responsive to market signals, so any change in demand will gener-
ate stronger equilibrium effects in developing economies. Third, enrollment rates in
developing countries are very low, when compared to enrollment in developed coun-
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tries. As documented by Mestieri (2016), there is an existing positive correlation
between enrollment rates and income per capita at a cross-country level.
Figure 2.1: % of enrollment in private institutions by country.
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We use the results of the equilibria to rationalize what we observe happened in
Colombia after the introduction of a massive subsidized loan policy. Colombia is
a developing country that undertook massive expansions of publicly supplied stu-
dent loan availability during the last decade. A contribution of this paper is the
construction of a novel dataset that allows us to analyze the evolution of various
measures of quality of education before and after the policy was implemented. After
the introduction of such policy, we see that the number of students increased. How-
ever, with the dataset constructed we also find evidence consistent with a widening
gap in the quality of elite and non-elite universities. The data reveals that the
gap between elite and non-elite colleges increased in measures such as average test
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scores in entry and exit examination tests, the number of professors per students
and various measures of academic production such as articles published per faculty.
The main purpose of this paper is to rationalize how this expansion in the gap
can arise as a consequence of the subsidized loan policy previously implemented.
This would imply that student loan programs also have downsides when studied in
general equilibrium, and all of this should be taken into account for future policy
design.
Finally, our analysis will give us tools to discuss the design of the optimal stu-
dent loan policy in a context where the government has outside funds that has to
allocate within the existing population. From a partial equilibrium perspective,
we find that the student loan policy that maximizes the average utility of society
(and enrollment) is one that gives priority to the lowest-ability individuals that are
borrowing constrained and would like to study. The reasoning behind this is the
following: high-ability individuals will receive higher incomes over their lifetime,
regardless of their education level. Since marginal utility is decreasing, the benefits
of studying to have additional income are relatively small. In addition, those that
are borrowing constrained and study will not be able to smooth consumption. In
this sense, they face a higher opportunity cost of education. Therefore, relaxing
the constraint for high ability individuals will change the study decision of fewer
individuals, than if the constraint were relaxed among lower ability individuals.
In a general equilibrium setting, there is an opposing force in action. Individuals
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choose whether and where to study according to the quality offered by each college,
since their future earnings will depend on it. The quality offered by colleges, in turn,
is a composite of the average ability of the student body (to resemble peer effects)
and investments per student made by the college. As assumed by the literature,
these two inputs are complements in the quality production function. In this regard,
the best quality-enhancing student loan policy would maximize the average student
ability, which would increase returns to investments per student, and would lead
to higher quality offered. That is, loosening credit constraints to the most able
students would lead to higher education quality.
In this regard, there are two opposing forces shaping the optimal student loan
policy. Relaxing the borrowing constraints of lower ability households will have the
highest impact on school enrollment, but will reduce the returns to investments
per student done by schools and the quality of education. In contrast, relaxing
the borrowing limits of high ability households maximizes the education quality
offered, but enrollment is not as large. The issue becomes even more complex
once we incorporate a two-tier education system, in which colleges might respond
differently in their pricing, admissions and investment policies when faced to a
demand shock of this nature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the literature
relevant to our paper. Section 2.3 describes an model of the market for higher ed-
ucation, characterizes the demand for a two-tiered education system and explains
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the mechanism through which borrowing constraints affect equilibrium quality sup-
plied. In this section we illustrate the main theoretical results of the paper. That
is, a policy leading to subsidized loans can increase the gap of quality of education.
Section 2.4 describes the case of Colombia and illustrates how this case is consistent
with what we predict in the theoretical model. Section 2.5 estimates the parameters
of the quality function, using data on average test scores, professors per student and
average wages of students from each university in Colombia. Section 2.5.2 describes
the computation of the model and the parameters used for calibration. Section 2.6
shows the main results of the estimations and some counterfactual experiments.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Different strands of the literature are related to the present research. First, our
paper is related to the literature that studies the importance of borrowing con-
straints in the schooling decisions. Given that we are studying the welfare effects
of government loan policies in developing countries, knowing whether borrowing
constraints matter is of central importance. Although there is evidence suggesting
that borrowing constraints do not determine school attendance of students in de-
veloped countries, the opposite is the case for countries in the developing world.
Second, our paper is related to the literature that studies general equilibria in the
market for education. This literature has mostly studied what is known as the
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“Bennett Hypothesis”28. Our paper adds to this literature because we study equi-
librium welfare effects that go beyond prices in the context of binding borrowing
constraints, whereas this literature has been concerned only with studying equilibria
in the United States, where the inefficiency caused by the existence of borrowing
constraints in education is, at best, small. Finally, our paper models the edu-
cational sector following the treatment that the industrial organization literature
has given to universities, as monopolistically competitive firms that maximize the
quality provided, subject to a budget balance constraint.
2.2.1 The Role of Borrowing Constraints
Using data from the United States, there is a wide literature that argues that the
effects of borrowing constraints on the post-secondary decisions of youngsters are
negligible. Using the 1979 of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79),
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) find evidence that borrowing constraints and fam-
ily income account for a very small fraction of post-secondary school attendance
decisions, while early childhood differences are determinant. Once the estimations
control for family background and ability, current family wealth becomes unimpor-
tant in the schooling decision. According to their estimates, only between 0% and
8% of high school graduates are actually borrowing constrained. Similarly, Keane
and Wolpin (2001) find that, although borrowing constraints are tight in the U.S.
28The “Bennett Hypothesis” states that an expansion in the number of grants provided to
students are almost totally appropriated by colleges through increases in tuition prices.
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and individuals cannot even borrow the amount to cover one year of schooling, their
existence does not determine the decision to study. In counterfactual experiments,
when the authors remove the borrowing constraints, the educational attainment
does not change significantly. Borrowing constraints only affect labor supply and
savings decisions of students.
Dinarsky (2003) measures the impact of the exogenous elimination of the Social
Security Student Benefit Program in 1982 on school attendance in the U.S. This
program provided students that came from families with deceased, disabled, or re-
tired Social Security beneficiaries with monthly payments while enrolled in college.
The paper finds that the exogenous reduction in aid led to a decrease in the proba-
bility of being enrolled by students at the margin. However, the author argues that
this cannot be interpreted as existence of borrowing constraints, since grants do
not only relax the borrowing constraints of households, but change also the relative
price of education.
More recent studies argue that, although credit constraints did not seem to affect
the schooling decision some decades ago, during the last two decades they might be
playing an important role in post-secondary schooling in the United States. Using
data from the 1979 and 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79 and
NLSY97), Belley and Lochner (2007) find a dramatic increase in the importance
of family income on school attainment, after controlling for family background and
ability as in the previous studies. Similarly, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011)
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estimate a structural model that suggests that, although American households were
not borrowing constrained during the 1980s, during the last decade family income
has been determinant in schooling decisions. They argue that in the last two decades
there have been rising costs and returns to education, while government student
loan programs have not grown at the same pace, so people have become borrowing
constrained.
Although there is not much research that studies the role of credit constraints in
educational choices in developing countries, the existing evidence seems to unam-
biguously point towards the importance of borrowing constraints in the educational
decisions. As Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) state, “one important difference be-
tween Mexico and the U.S., for instance, might be the wider availability of scholar-
ships and student loans in the U.S., cannot be found in Mexico for higher education.”
Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) and Kaufmann (2014) provide evidence suggest-
ing that liquidity constraints do determine the post-secondary schooling decision
in Mexico. They use data that characterizes the expected returns of education
for every household in their sample. If credit constraints were not binding, there
should exist a positive gradient between subjective expected returns from schooling
and school attendance. Their results show that this gradient breaks for the low-
est income households in their sample. Under their interpretation, this is evidence
of existing borrowing constraints. Solis (2013) studies the existence of borrowing
constraints in Chile. Using administrative data on the entire sample of individuals
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that participate in the college admissions’ process, he uses a regression discontinu-
ity approach to study the impact of providing educational loans. After controlling
for socio-economic covariates, individuals right above the eligibility threshold for
receiving educational loans have a significantly higher probability of enrolling in
college than those right below the threshold. The author finds evidence suggesting
a positive gradient between income and enrolment among those households that
have no access to the government loans. This gradient disappears for individuals
that access the program. Also using a regression discontinuity approach, Gurgand,
Lorencau and Melonio (2011) find evidence that the enrolment to college of house-
holds without access to student loans is 20 percentage points lower in South Africa.
Regarding the Colombian case, Melguizo, Sanchez and Velasco (2015) find evidence
that the implementation of a massive government loan program in the past decade,
which is the topic of this paper, did increase student enrolment.
2.2.2 General Equilibrium Effects and the Bennett Hypothesis
During the last decade, the literature that has tried to explain what has become to
be known as the Bennett Hypothesis : expansions of government-supplied student
aid for education have been almost almost entirely appropriated by colleges through
an increase in tuition prices. As the former U.S. Secretary of Education stated in
1987, ”If anything, increases in financial aid in recent years have enabled colleges
and universities blithely to raise their tuitions, confident that Federal loan subsidies
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would help cushion the increase.”29 Singell and Stone (2007) study the effect that
Pell Grants have had on tuition prices of public and private schools. They study the
Pell Program, which has been the biggest post-secondary educational loan program
in the United States. In 1999, the Pell Grants were awarded to 3 million students
across more than 6000 colleges, out of a total of 9 million students. The authors
estimate the impact of Pell Grants per student on tuition charged by universities,
using a panel of 1554 colleges from 1989 to 1996. They find that the increase in
Pell Grants caused an almost one-to-one increase in the price of tuition charged by
private and public out-of-state colleges. However, they find no such a causality on
the in-state tuition charged by public schools. In contrast, Rizzo and Ehrenberg
(2002) find evidence that private and public out-of-state tuition prices were not
affected by government loans, while in-state tuition by public colleges were. Finally,
Lucca, Nadauld and Shen (2016) use exogenous variation in the legislation that rules
Pell Grants, to study the relationship between student aid and tuition.
Gordon and Hedlund (2015) study the increase in tuition prices by estimating a
structural model in which universities provide human capital and households decide
their investments in education. They study the rise in college tuition over the last
decades, as a reaction to cuts in state appropriations, an increase in the costs of
skilled labor in other industries, and an increase in government supplied loans.
The authors find out that the increase in government loans explains 102% of the
tuition increase, as opposed to only 16% of the other two hypotheses. This result
29William Bennett to the New York Times, 1987.
122
provides evidence in favor of the Bennett Hypothesis. Our paper differs from theirs
in the sense that we want to study the equilibrium effects on quality provided and
welfare effects of relaxing borrowing constraints in a context in which they matter.
The authors study increases in the borrowing limits in the context of the U.S. As
has been already argued, there is evidence that these constraints are of secondary
importance on the decision to attend school. Therefore, relaxing these limits does
not improve efficiency. In contrast, in countries in which the borrowing constraints
are binding, relaxing them does generate efficiency improvements.
2.2.3 The Education firms
Our paper makes part of the literature that models universities as firms in the
educational sector. Universities produce human capital and use households both
as inputs and costumers. This approach has been used to study different questions
regarding post-secondary education. For instance, Chade, Lewis and Smith (2014)
model the universities as an oligopoly with a fixed number of universities (firms), in
which the goods produced by universities (education) are ranked exogenously by all
households in the same way. Universities only choose admission standards, so as to
fill a fixed capacity of students and maximize the ability of the student body. The
paper studies the role of frictions in the application process on the student sorting
between universities. Namely, the model has information frictions and fixed costs
of application. The authors, as Caucutt (2001), treat the utility that households
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receive of attending each of the universities as exogenous and independent from the
product offered by each university. We endogenize the valuation of households as
a function of the equilibrium quality offered. The authors do not include tuition
prices as a policy of universities, assume an exogenous valuation for the universities
and take the size of universities as fixed. We depart from all of these assumptions,
but assume there are no frictions in the application process. The reason is that
our purpose is not to study the outcome of the application process but, instead,
model the strategic interactions in the post-secondary education sector between
universities and households.
The educational sector in our model closely mimics Epple, Romano and Sieg
(2006). In their paper, the authors model the supply side of the educational sector
as an oligopoly sector in which a fixed amount of colleges interact to attract stu-
dents and maximize the quality of the education they offer, subject to a balanced
budget constraint. Quality by universities is a composite of average student abil-
ity, to resemble peer effects in schooling, and the average investments per student.
This treatment of quality has been standard in the literature that models schools
(Caucutt, 2001). Households value quality as an input on their utility function.
In their model, households play a passive role in their model, since their purpose
is not to estimate equilibrium interactions between households and firms. Rather,
they concentrate in studying thoroughly the supply side. Furthermore, they esti-
mate their model by using a “club goods” approach, instead of explicitly solving
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the Nash equilibrium of the monopolistically competitive market. We depart from
this approach, since we consider that the strategic interactions between colleges
are of first order importance to explain the different reaction of elite and non-elite
institutions to subsidized student loan policies.
Finally, we treat wages of college graduates as a function of the quality sup-
plied by the school attended. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has
not been used in structural estimations in the past, but there is empirical evidence
that relates future wages to the quality of the education. Black and Smith (2006)
estimate a latent model in which quality is a latent variable, and there are “sig-
nals” of quality. They find out that SAT scores, faculty-student ratio, rejection
rate, freshmen retention rate, and faculty salaries are significant signals of quality.
Furthermore, the latent variable of quality significantly affects post-college wages
of individuals. Similarly, Black, Smith and Daniel (2005) find evidence that quality
increases post college earnings, driven by higher wages. Leaving quality aside, there
is extensive evidence that estimates positive returns to college attendance in terms
of higher future wages (Zimmerman, 2014; Patrinos, Ridao-Cano and Sakellariou,
2006). OECD and World Bank (2012) estimates that average starting earnings for
individuals with a bachelor’s degree were 4 times higher than those of individuals
with high-school degree. Although these estimates do not control for unobservable
household characteristics, other estimates find that people with post-secondary de-
grees earn significantly higher wages in Latin America (Gasparini et al., 2011).
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2.3 A Model of the Market for Higher Education with Credit Con-
straints
There are two types of agents in the economy: households and universities. There is
a government that offers educational credits to high-ability individuals that decide
to attend college, at an exogenous interest rate R ≥ r, where r is the risk free inter-
est rate. In additition, the government subsidizes the interest paid by the poorest
households that access the credit, at a subsidy rate s. In order to finance these sub-
sidies, the government levies a marginal tax, τ , to every household in the economy.
The government policies are exogenous, fixed before the economy starts and satisfy
budget balance. Given these policies, the market of higher education operates un-
der monopolistic competition. Universities supply human capital in the market for
education, by choosing a tuition price, a minimum ability level for admission and
a level of investment per student. Given government and university policies, the
households decide if they want to study in any university at the prevailing market
prices.
2.3.1 Households
Households are born with innate ability and wealth (θ, b), according to a bivariate
distribution F (θ, b) over the space [0, 1] × [b, b¯]. Individuals live for two periods,
after which they die with probability equal to one. In period 1, individuals choose
either to study at the university or work in the non-skilled labor market at a wage
126
w per efficiency unit of labor. Individuals that do not study receive a wage θw,
do not have access to credit markets and can save at the risk-free rate r. There
are two universities in the economy denoted by h and l. Each university sets a
threshold θj for j = h, l such that only students that have ability θ ≥ θj are
admitted to university j, and we assume that this information is public30. Therefore,
individuals with θ < min{θh, θl} cannot study and have to work. Individuals who
decide to study at university j cannot work, and have to pay a tuition, P j, set by
the university.
In order to finance education, the government offers student loans of up to the
price of the tuition, P j, at the interest rate R to people that decide to study and
have an ability level θ ≥ θmin. In addition, students with low wealth, b ≤ bmax, that
decide to study and have access to the loan will receive a subsidy on the interest
rate, s. Loans are given conditional on studying, and individuals that study and
are eligible for the loan choose whether to borrow from the government or not. In
order to finance these subsidies, the government levies a proportional tax, τ , to
every individual in the economy. Individuals for which θ < θmin are borrowing
constrained and can only finance education with their initial wealth. Therefore, in
the first period the household decides its level of consumption, c, whether to study
or not in any university, h, l, and the level of savings, a, which can be potentially
negative for households that study and satisfy the government conditions for the
30We assume that θj , j = h, l is a public threshold, since our purpose is not to study the frictions
in the college application process, as opposed to some papers in the literature that model explicitly
these information frictions (Chade, Lewis and Smith, 2014; Fu, 2014).
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educational loans.
In the second period, the households are either non-, low- or high-skilled, de-
pending on whether they decided to study in the first period and which college
they attended. Those who decided to study in period 1, will enter the j-skilled
labor market in period 2, and receive a wage equal to wθ(1 + zj), where zj is a
skill premium that is university specific. This quality is an equilibrium object that
depends on the quality of the student body and investments per student, and is
fully characterized in the next section. We assume that individuals have perfect
foresight of the value of zj for j = h, l when they optimize. Individuals who do not
study will become part of the non-skilled labor force at a wage wθ. We exclude the
possibility of default in the model by assuming that repayment is fully enforced, so
in the second period individuals that have government debt will repay their student
loan. Given prices R, r, w, government policies τ, s, university policies {θj, P j}j=h,l,
and perfect foresight about education quality {zl, zh}, a household that is eligible
for studying at the university j, θ ≥ θj, and decides to study gets a utility equal
to:
V j(θ, b) = max
c,a
u(c) + βu(c′), s.t. (2.3.1)
c+ a+ P j = b · (1− τ) (2.3.2)
c′ = a(1 + r) · 1{a≥0} + a(1 + R˜) · 1{a<0} + wθ(1 + zj) (2.3.3)
R˜ =

R(1− s) if b ≤ bmax
R if b > bmax
(2.3.4)
a ≥ −1{θ≥θmin} · P j , c ≥ 0, c′ ≥ 0 (2.3.5)
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Individuals that decide not to study, get the following utility:
V N(θ, b) = max
c,a
u(c) + βu(c′), s.t. (2.3.6)
c+ a = b · (1− τ) + wθ (2.3.7)
c′ = a(1 + r) + wθ (2.3.8)
a ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, c′ ≥ 0 (2.3.9)
The individual with ability and wealth (θ, b) decides to study at university j
whenever θ ≥ θj and V j(θ, b) ≥ V N(θ, b), and V j(θ, b) ≥ V −j(θ, b) if they can
attend to the other university −j, i.e. θ ≥ θ−j. Otherwise, the individual decides
not to study. Therefore, the household’s value function is given by:
V (θ, b) =

max{V h(θ, b), V l(θ, b), V N(θ, b)} if θ ≥ max{θh, θl}
max{V j(θ, b), V N(θ, b)} if θ−j > θ ≥ θj
V N(θ, b) if θ < min{θh, θl}
The following section gives a detailed characterization of the demand for both
tiers of schools in the state space. This characterization will allow us to give insights
on the optimal student loan policy on a monopolistically competitive market.
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Figure 2.2: Representation of the education decisions on the state space.
Characterization of the Demand
For a given set of initial parameters, the shaded region in Figure 2.2 illustrates the
individuals that choose to study in the state space when both universities set their
acceptance threshold to 0 and there are no government-supplied student loans. The
following sequence of theorems characterize the demand for college education on
the state space, and its close relationship with borrowing constraints. This will let
us derive some results about the socially optimal student loan policy. First, we
describe the college decision for households that are unconstrained.
Theorem 1. Among the unconstrained households, the decision of whether and
where to study is independent of initial wealth, b, and follows a cut-off rule on θ.
That is, there exist θ and θ¯ such that:
• If θ ≤ θ, the individual will not study.
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• If θ ≤ θ ≤ θ¯, the individual will attend the low-quality college.
• If θ¯ ≤ θ, the individual will attend the high-quality college.
where:
θ¯l =
1 + r
w
(
Pl
zl − (1 + r)
)
, θ¯h =
1 + r
w
(
Ph − Pl
zh − zl
)
Proof. See Proof B.0.1
Theorem 1 is a result of the fact that ability θ, unskilled labor w and quality
of the school attended zj are complements. In particular, this complementarity
implies: a) among the unconstrained individuals, those with higher ability face
higher marginal returns of education, so will choose, ceteris paribus, a higher qual-
ity school for a given wealth, b) as the wages of unskilled labor w increase, the
marginal returns to education rise for every θ, so marginal individuals will shift to
higher levels of education, c) if college j, for j ∈ {l, h}, increases its price Pj or
reduces its quality zj, marginal individuals will change their schooling decision in
the expected direction. That is, if Pj increases or zj decreases, marginal individuals
will change their decision of attending school j. Finally, d) if the interest rate r
increases, present consumption becomes more valuable than future consumption, so
marginal individuals will reduce their present expenditures in education. Theorem
2 characterizes the individuals that, given their decision to attend college j, are
borrowing constrained.
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Theorem 2. Given an ability θ, there exist cut-offs, b¯ju(θ), j ∈ {N, l, h}, on the
initial wealth, such that individuals with b ≥ b¯ju(θ) that attend college j will not be
borrowing constrained. Individuals that attend college j and have b < b¯j(θ) will be
borrowing constrained and will not be able to smooth consumption over time. The
cut-offs are linear, increasing in θ and take the form:
b¯Nu (θ) = −A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))− wθ(1− (β(1 + r))−1/σ)
b¯lu(θ) = Pl + (β(1 + r))
−1/σwθ(1 + zl)− A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
b¯hu(θ) = Ph + (β(1 + r))
−1/σwθ(1 + zh)− A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
Proof. See Proof B.0.2
Given a level of education and initial wealth, individuals with a higher θ have
higher lifetime income and in an unconstrained world would consume more in every
period of their lives. Given the existence of a borrowing limit A¯, for a sufficiently
high θ individuals will be borrowing constrained. As a consequence, the initial
wealth that individuals must have not to be borrowing constrained is increasing
in ability. Figure 2.2 illustrates the cut-off functions b¯ju(θ) on the state space. As
illustrated, individuals above the b¯ju(θ) function, will decide to study in college j
whenever her θ falls inside the corresponding interval in the cut-offs defined in The-
orem 1. Note also that individuals that are borrowing constrained when studying at
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college l will also be borrowing constrained when studying in h, assuming a higher
price of education in the high-quality college (which, of course, is an equilibrium
object). Moreover, the functions b¯ju(θ) are steeper when the quality zj increases,
since quality of schooling and ability are complements. Finally, we do not consider
the case in which individuals are borrowing constrained when they do not study.
Since in our context, individuals that do not study earn the same wage in every pe-
riod, they will only be borrowing constrained when the interest rate β(1 + r) << 1.
However, for a reasonable calibration, individuals will be able to smooth consump-
tion. The following two theorems illustrate the study decision of individuals that
are borrowing constrained.
Theorem 3. Given ability θ, the decision to study in the low-quality college, l, or
not study at all, follows a cut-off strategy on b, such that individuals with b ≥ b¯lc(θ)
will attend college l, and those with b < b¯lc(θ) will not study. The cut-off is char-
acterized implicitly by equation (B.0.1) in the proof. Moreover, if the intertemporal
elasiticity of substitution is lower than 1 the cutoff is U-shaped and there exists a
θ∗ such that b¯lc(θ) is:
• decreasing in θ for θ ≤ θ∗
• increasing in θ for θ ≥ θ∗
where θ∗ solves:
(
1
1− σ
)
(b(θ∗)− Pl + A¯)1−σ +
(
β
1− σ
)
(wθ∗(1 + zl)− (1 + r)A¯)1−σ−
133
Φ(wθ∗(2 + r) + b(θ∗)(1 + r))1−σ = 0
b(θ) = θ
[
wX(1 + zl)− w(2 + r)
1 + r
]
−XA¯
X =
[
Φ(1− σ)(2 + r)
β(1 + zl)
]1/σ
Proof. See Proof B.0.3.
The cut-off b¯lc(θ) is illustrated in Figure 2.2, where we assume that the utility
function is CRRA with σ = 2, as is common in the literature, so the intertemporal
elasticity is lower than 1. The individuals who are constrained (below b¯lu(θ)) will
choose either to study at l or not, if their initial wealth exceeds b¯lc(θ). The cut-
off is U -shaped because two effects are in action. First, the “complementarity”
effect means that, given a b, individuals with higher θ will have higher marginal
returns from studying, so are willing to study even though they will not be able
to smooth consumption. Therefore, the cut-off is initially decreasing. However,
the “constrainedness” effect dominates after some point: given an initial wealth b,
individuals with higher θ will face a larger wedge in their Euler equation, meaning
that they will be able to smooth consumption to a lower extent. When the wedge
is large enough, individuals will prefer not to study and smooth consumption by
deciding not to study. Of course, this results strongly depends on the value of σ
chosen, and continues to hold for any σ > 1. For the sake of exposition, in Appendix
B.0.7 we characterize the demand for education with a linear utility function (that is,
when σ = 0 and there is an infinite elasticity of substitution). Figure B.1 illustrates
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the decision of individuals in the state space. As can be expected, in the linear case
individuals derive no utility from consumption smoothing, so there does not exist
such a “constrainedness” effect. In this case, the threshold is never increasing. The
next theorem characterizes the cut-off for individuals that are constrained when
studying at h. The results are parallel to Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Given ability θ, the decision to study in h or l, follows a cut-off
strategy on b, such that individuals with b ≥ b¯hc (θ) will attend college h, and those
with b < b¯hc (θ) will attend l. The cut-off is characterized implicitly by equation
(B.0.2) in the proof. Moreover, if the intertemporal elasiticity of substitution is
lower than 1 the cutoff is U-shaped and there exists a θ∗∗ such that b¯hc (θ) is:
• decreasing in θ for θ ≤ θ∗∗
• increasing in θ for θ ≥ θ∗∗
where θ∗∗ solves:
(
1
1− σ
)(
b∗(θ∗∗)− Ph + A¯
)(1−σ)
+
(
β
1− σ
)(
wθ∗∗(1 + zh)− (1 + r)A¯)−
Φ× (wθ∗∗(1 + zl) + b(1 + r)− Pl(1 + r)) = 0
b∗(θ) = θw
(
X∗(1 + zh)− (1 + zl)
)−X∗ + Pl
X∗ =
(
Φ× (1− σ)(1 + zl)
β(1 + zh)
)1/σ
Proof. See Proof B.0.4.
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Having characterized the demand for education in the state space, we can say a
couple of things about the relationship between borrowing constraints and the de-
mand. The following result describes the differential effect of relaxing the borrowing
limits to households, A¯.
Theorem 5 (Borrowing constraints). If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is lower than 1, for any given θ the cut-offs b¯lc(θ) and b¯
h
c (θ) are decreasing on A¯.
Moreover, the elasticities of b¯lc(θ) and b¯
h
c (θ) with respect to the borrowing limit A¯
are decreasing on θ, meaning that a relaxation of the borrowing constraint has a
higher impact on enrollment among the marginal individuals that have lower θ.
Proof. See Proof B.0.5.
Theorem 5 states that among the constrained individuals, those with lower θ
are more sensitive to relaxing the borrowing constraints. That is, if the borrowing
constraints were relaxed by the same amount to all the individuals, more low-θ
individuals would change their study decision. This result is a consequence of
the decreasing marginal utility. Individuals with high θ and sufficiently low initial
wealth have a trade-off between earning relatively high wages in every period and
smoothing consumption it they do not study, or studying to earn large wages in
the second period at the expense of a very low consumption in the first period.
However, because of decreasing marginal utility, the utility of a very large wage
in the second period is not as large as for lower θ individuals, so individuals will
optimally decide to study only when there is a large increase in the borrowing limits
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of the first period.
This result has very important implications on the design of an optimal student
loan policy in a partial equilibrium setting. If the objective of the government is to
maximize enrollment, the policy should target the lower ability individuals. As a
matter of illustration of Theorem 5, Figure ?? illustrates the number of individuals
of ability θ that change their study decision as the borrowing constraint is relaxed
from A¯ = 0. As stated in Theorem 5, the individuals in the state space with
low ability that would study in the unconstrained world (those with θ ∈ [θ¯l, θ¯h])
are more sensitive to relaxing borrowing constraints. Therefore, increasing the
borrowing capacity increases enrollment more among the low ability individuals.
Figure 2.3: Number of students that change their study decision when borrowing
constraints change from A¯ = 0 to A¯, by ability θ.
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2.3.2 Universities
Universities act as firms that maximize an objective function. Given that university
systems in most countries are non-profit firms, we follow the literature on education
and industrial organization and assume that universities maximize a composite of
the quality they offer to students, denoted by z, and the economic diversity of their
student body, subject to a budget constraint. Quality offered by universities is an
abstract concept. The literature has argued that the quality offered by a school
is determined both by the quality of the student body and the investments per
student done by the school. Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006), for instance, model
the objective function of the university as a composite of the average ability of the
student body, the investment per student and the inverse of the mean income. They
argue that there is empirical and anecdotal evidence that shows that colleges engage
in policies to attract low income students. Universities take as given the values of
τ, s, R, w and the distribution F . Additionally, we assume that universities set their
policies simultaneously and so, the pricing and admission policies set in equilibrium
should satisfy the no profitable one shot deviation principle.
University j takes as given (τ, r, s, R, w, P−j, θ−j) and will set the pricing and
admission policies (P j, θj) in order to solve the following problem:
max
{P j ,θj ,Ij}
(
zj
)α (
σjb
)1−α
(2.3.10)
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subject to:
zj = θ˜j
α1
(Ij)α2 (2.3.11)
θ˜j =
∫
Θ×B
θ · ej(θ, b)dF (θ, b) (2.3.12)
Ij ·N j + V j(N j) + Cj = P j ·N j + Ej (2.3.13)
N j =
∫
Θ×B
ej(θ, b)dF (θ, b) (2.3.14)
where θ˜j is the average ability of the individuals that attend school j. σjb is
the inverse of the average income of the student body and reflects the fact that
universities care about the diversity in their student body. ej(b, θ) indicates with
values zero or one if a student with ability θ and wealth b decides to study or not. Ij
is the monetary amount that the university invests per student, V j is a convex cost
function, N j is the size of the student body, Cj is a fixed cost and Ej the university’s
endowment. Note that the policy P j does not depend on student’s characteristics
such as wealth or skills. This is not only a simplifying assumption but also follows
closely the case of Colombia where private universities do not price-discriminate
students based on ability or wealth. As will be discussed in the relevant section, the
extent of financial aid provided by such institutions is very limited in the period of
analysis.
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2.3.3 Discussion
Although in principle the solution to the problem of the university might seem sim-
ple given that there are only two variables of choice, there are several elements of
the model that increase the complexity of such decision. First of all, both policies
are interdependent. When a university changes one decision variable -either the
price or the admission threshold- this will distort the incentives faced when setting
the other policy. For instance, a change in tuition price will not only change the
revenue of the university but will change the demand in a way that we expect to
see a change in the average ability of the student body. Such a change in the aver-
age ability of the student body will affect the marginal productivity of investments
made by the university, which in turn will affect its pricing decisions.
Moreover, we need to deal with the fact that in equilibrium no university should
have incentives to deviate. Given that both universities make the decision simul-
taneously and that there are no elements of incomplete information in the model,
the relevant equilibrium concept is Nash Equilibrium: no university will have incen-
tives to deviate given the decisions made by the other university. Note that given
the nature of the problem we cannot be sure of the existence of such equilibrium
-university payoffs are not continuous- and moreover, uniqueness cannot be guar-
anteed.
The aforementioned elements make it clear why analyzing the consequences that
subsidized loan policies will have in the market of higher education is a complex
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problem. Let’s suppose that the government imposes such policy by subsidizing the
interest rate of student loans. The first effect such policy will have is an increase in
the number of students going to college. Note, however, that it is also not unrea-
sonable to assume that the quality of the student body will change. This is because
people who changed their decision to go to college are either those who were credit
constrained or those having low ability levels that now decide to go to college given
the decrease in the opportunity cost.
We can expect that after imposing such a policy, households will react by chang-
ing their decision of studying and universities should expect a change not only in
the size of their student body but also in their quality. Given such changes, univer-
sities might want to change the prices charged to their students. This is due to the
fact that as the quality of the student body changes, the productivity of investment
will also be affected. Additionally, the willingness to pay for educational services
is affected by such policy and universities will react to that. Moreover, universities
might want to change the admission threshold either to improve the quality of their
student body or to attract less able students that are willing to pay more for ed-
ucation. The overall effect depends on how sensitive is the demand for education
with respect to the quality of services being provided.
Finally, note that -as said previously- the decisions of universities need to be
analyzed in equilibrium. When deciding what is optimal, each college needs to take
into account what their competitor is doing in the market and there should be no
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room for profitable deviations. After imposing a subsidized loan policy we might
end up in an equilibrium where one college serves a specific part of the population.
For instance one college serves a large demand for students with relatively low levels
of ability whereas the other one specializes in providing high quality education for
a reduced number of high ability students. Additionally, we can have a symmetric
equilibrium where both firms are indistinguishable from one another or one in which
only one firm operates in the market.
2.3.4 Government
We do not model the government as a welfare maximizing agent in the economy.
We abstract from this fact and simply analyse the impact of the change in the
government policies on the higher education market. However, we do interpret
the student loan policy implementation as a way of the government to reduce the
existent inefficiency in the educational market.
In a social planner’s solution, the efficient outcome would be one in which the
high ability individuals decide to study, independent of their wealth. Thus, the
role of the student loan policy can be interpreted as a way to reduce the existing
inefficiency in the educational sector, although we do not model it as an optimal
decision. We assume that the government has a borrowing constraint in the interna-
tional borrowing markets, so is only able to finance the education of some fraction of
the individuals in the economy. For now, we assume that the government finances
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individuals that have θ ≥ θmin, and of those that can access the loans, subsidizes the
interest rate on the loan for those individuals that have b ≤ bmax. The government
sets thresholds b¯ and θ0, such that
s · (R− 1− r) ·
∫
Θ2×B2
(
el(b, θ) + eh(b, θ)
)× dF (θ, b) = τ ∫
Θ×B
bdF (θ, b) (2.3.15)
where Θ2×B2 = (Θ1×B1)∩ ([θ0, 1]× [0, b¯]) is the set of households who study
and decide to take the subsidy.
Definition 6 (Competitive Equilibrium). Given a set of government policies, τ, s, bmax, θmin,
and pricesR, r, w, a competitive equilibrium is a set of university policies (P j, θj, Ij)j=h,l
and household’s value function V (θ, b) and policy functions c(θ, b), a(θ, b), eh(θ, b), el(θ, b),
such that:
1. Given τ, s, bmax, θmin, R, r, w, and university policies {P j, θj, Ij}j=h,l, the value
function V (θ, b) solves the household’s problem, with c(θ, b), a(θ, b), eh(θ, b)
and el(θ, b) being the corresponding policy functions.
2. For each university j = h, l, it should hold that given τ, s, bmax, θmin; prices,
R, r, w; policy functions c(θ, b), a(θ, b), eh(θ, b), el(θ, b); and policies from uni-
versity −j, (P−j, θ−j, I−j), university j chooses policies (P j, θj, Ij) that solve
the university’s problem described in 2.3.10-2.3.14.
3. The government’s budget is balanced (equation 2.3.15 holds).
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The nature of the problem makes it hard not only to compute the competitive
equilibrium but also to show its existence. Note that, by only analyzing the supply
side of the market, we cannot be sure that such an equilibrium will exist in this
economy. In order to compute the Nash equilibrium of the supply side of the mar-
ket, we need to find pricing and admission policies that are profit-maximizing given
what the policies of the other university.
The computation of such equilibrium is more involved when we note that there
is an additional fixed-point problem in the computation of the equilibrium. Uni-
versities offer their students a given level of quality that needs to be self-fulfilled:
the quality offered by universities will attract certain students to the market but
the quality of students going to universities determines the quality offered by uni-
versities. It is not possible to use any fixed-point theorem to show existence of a
fixed point in this quality self-fulfilling problem given that the necessary assump-
tions are not satisfied. In particular, note that the fixed-point quality problem is
not continuous as whenever the low-quality university offers the same quality as the
high one, all students who are beyond the ability threshold will go to the cheapest
one, generating a massive exit from one university to the other one, generating a
discontinuous jump in the quality being offered.
In order to illustrate this point extensively, we show in appendix B.0.7 the failure
to prove existence of the equilibrium in the case of a linear utility function.
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2.4 The “Revolucio´n Educativa” of Colombia
In the present research, we will use Colombia as a natural experiment of a country
that implemented a rapid credit expansion program to alleviate credit constraints.
Colombia is a developing country which by the beginning of last decade had low
enrollment rates in post-secondary education, and significant differences in enroll-
ment by quintiles of income. As will be argued, the majority of students came from
high-income families, and the existence of financial constraints kept high-ability in-
dividuals from the lowest quintiles out of the education market. During the last
decade, the government engaged into the strategy Revolucion Educativa, aimed
at increasing the education coverage at all levels. During the decade, there were
substantial increases in enrollment and educational credit access (see Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4: Enrollment, income and financial aid.
(a) Enrollment and % of students with financial
aid.
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(b) Average income and % of students with fi-
nancial aid.
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2.4.1 Enrollment and inequality
At the beginning of last decade, college enrollment in Colombia was among the
lowest in Latin America and a student financial aid system was almost non-existent.
In 2000, 23.2% of the people between 18 and 23 years old enrolled in tertiary
education, below the enrollment rates of Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela,
and very close to the enrollment rates of Mexico. Because of a lack of a well-
functioning financial aid system, less than 5%31 of the entering cohorts had any
31Extracted from the dataset of indicators for tertiary education, SPADIES, from the Ministry
of Education.
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kind of public or private financial support (World Bank, 2003, 2012). By the end
of the decade, the enrollment rates grew to 37%, and reached 50% in 2015. The
fraction of students with some type of credit increased to almost 25% of the entering
cohorts (see Figure 2.4(a)).
Access to education has always been unequal and, despite the fast growth of
enrollment, many disparities persist. In 2013, only 45% of the low-income students
graduated from high school, and only 25% of them enrolled in tertiary education.
Of the high-income households, 60% graduated from high school and 54% of them
enrolled in a post-secondary institution (Melguizo, Sanchez and Velasco, 2015).
According to World Bank (2003, 2012), the enrollment gap between the lowest
and the highest quintiles of wealth widened throughout the decade: in 2001, the
enrollement rates were of 8% in the lowest quintile and 41% in the highest, while
in 2010 these numbers grew to 10% and 52%, respectively. If quality is taken
into account, disparities are even larger as a larger proportion of the low-income
students attend non-professional institutions, which have less resources and offer
lower expected income in the future. Many theories have been used to explain the
low enrollment of low-income students, such as disparities in the quality of public
and private high school education, the high costs of tertiary education and the lack
of a well-functioning financial aid system (Melguizo, Sanchez and Velasco, 2015).
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2.4.2 Higher Education institutions
The university system in Colombia functions as a monopolistically competitive mar-
ket in which there are significant institutional barriers to entry, and universities do
not have fixed “production capacities”, as assumed by Chade, Lewis and Smith
(2014) (Figure 2.5). There are approximately 300 tertiary education institutions,
of which around 190 are universities, and the rest offer non-professional degrees
(mainly technical and technological). Despite the growing size of the entering co-
horts throughout the decade, the number of institutions remained almost constant,
while the average size of each institution doubled, on average. It is important to
note that around 45 − 50% of the total student body is enrolled in private ter-
tiary education institutions (OECD and World Bank, 2012). Private institutions
do not have any regulations regarding the price or investment per student they
offer, although they have to satisfy a minimum quality requirement in terms of the
programs and degrees offered. Therefore, the education market in Colombia can
be studied as a monopolistically competitive market with barriers to entry and not
subject to much government regulation.
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of Higher Education in Colombia
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In Colombia, every student that wants to graduate from high school has to
present an exam called SABER11 set by the Colombian Institution for Education
Evaluation (ICFES), similar to the SAT test in the U.S. Although not every tertiary
education institution takes into account the results of the SABER11 in their ad-
mission decision, 78% use it as a criterion for admission (OECD and World Bank,
2012). As SABER11 has no pass-mark, each institution sets its own minimum
threshold for admission. In contrast to what happens in Chile and some European
countries, in Colombia there is not any institution that clears the market for ad-
missions, so individuals apply to as many institutions as they like and universities
choose their admission standards independently (Melguizo, Sanchez and Velasco,
2015). Although not perfect, the results in the SABER11 exam can be used as a
proxy for the quality of the student body at universities. Figure 2.6 illustrates the
average decile of the SABER11 scores of the entering cohorts to tertiary education
institutions. Throughout the decade, universities seem to have adjusted their ad-
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missions standards in such a way that led to a reduction in the ability of the student
body, as measured by relative position in the test scores.
Figure 2.6: Average decile of ability of entering student body, measured by test
scores
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2.4.3 The ACCES Program
To alleviate the low access, in 2002 the government implemented the credit pro-
gram Access with Quality to Higher Education, ACCES, with the support of the
World Bank, that massively increased the available credit to students. The credit is
awarded to students that have test scores above a threshold set by the government,
and covers up to 75% of the tuition for the lowest income students, and up to 50%
for the rest. The credit has a subsidized zero-real interest rate for the poorest house-
holds, and a real interest rate of 8% for the high-income students. Students that
graduate from their programs have twice the time of their study period to repay the
loan. The ACCES program has full coverage, in the sense that any student that has
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test scores on the highest deciles of their region can access this credit line. The test
score cut-offs vary by region, to account for disparities in the quality of secondary
education across regions with different infrastructure and economic development.
Given that the credit is awarded according to regional cutoffs, the disparities in the
ability of people accessing the credit are large. The best students from the poorest
regions might not have high ability and preparation when compared to the best
students of the principal cities, so the credit is not awarded to the highest ability
individuals in absolute terms.
Using a regression discontinuity approach, Melguizo, Sanchez and Velasco (2015)
find evidence that the ACCES program had a positive impact on the enrollment
rates, especially for individuals that come from poor households. Although the
growth in the number of students enrolled in college may have been a consequence
of other factors, such as better economic activity, the massive increase in financing
seems to be a driving factor of such a trend.
2.4.4 Product Differentiation in the Market for Higher Education
In this subsection we introduce the dataset constructed to analyze the behavior
of colleges before and after the introduction of the subsidized loan program. We
use administrative data from the Ministry of Education including the SABER-PRO
examination scores of each college. These are major-specific examinations that are
mandatory in Colombia in order to receive the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree.
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Additionally, we use publicly available information scrapped from the internet re-
garding the academic production of professors, as well as the academic credentials
of the professorial body for each university. Moreover, we build information regard-
ing the major-specific tuition charged by each college in order to track its behavior
during the last ten years.
The analysis suggests that, after the introduction of the subsidized loan policy,
elite institutions engaged in significant efforts to improve the quality of services
provided. All the evidence suggest that once the subsidized loan policy was intro-
duced, the gap in quality between elite and non-elite institutions increased. Figure
2.9 shows how the composition of the entering student body in elite institutions
changed during the period of reference when compared to non-elite institutions.
When ranked according to the decile in the distribution they are located by the
SABER-11 examination score, we find that in 2007, students entering to elite in-
stitutions where, on average, located 1.5 deciles above the average student entering
to non-elite universities. After five years we see that such gap increased to 1.7 and
has remained constant until the last period of data available.
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Figure 2.7: Differences in quality of student body
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Note: Differences in the average decile of entering cohort in SABER-11 ex-
amination scores. This dataset is constructed using publicly available informa-
tion provided by the Colombian Ministry of Education on its official website:
http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/w3-channel.html
Differences in the quality of student body are also observed when analyzing exit-
level examination scores. Figure 2.8 shows the evolution of average test scores in
written comprehension and reading comprehension, for students attending elite and
non-elite colleges. The test scores are standardized to be mean zero and standard
deviation one for every year in the dataset. Although in 2009 there were negligible
differences between test scores of elite and non-elite colleges, we observe that in
2014 the average student graduating from an elite institution would score 60% of
a standard deviation above the mean whereas students in non-elite institutions
would score slightly below the mean. Taking into account that the average length
of a bachelor’s degree program lasts 4.5 years, the score for 2014 corresponds to
students who were entering in 2008, approximately. This fact is consistent with the
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scores for reading comprehension presented in panel B of the corresponding figure.
Moreover, reading comprehension exams were being done since 2006 and thus we
have a longer panel allowing us to infer that no significant changes were observed
until cohorts graduating after 2010.
Figure 2.8: Quality supplied by colleges.
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Note: Test scores are standardized to be mean zero and standard deviation 1 in every year.
This information comes from the official statistics provided by the Colombian Ministry of
Education.
So far we have provided evidence suggesting that the gap between elite and non-
elite institutions, when it comes to the the quality of entering and exiting cohorts,
increased after the introduction of the subsidized loan policy. However, the evidence
suggest that the behavior of universities changed beyond the quality of their student
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body. Figure 2.9 shows that during the same period, elite universities engaged in
significant efforts to increase the ratio of professors per students when compared to
non-elite institutions. In 2007, the difference in the ratio of professors per student
between elite and non-elite institutions, was under 0.02. However, for 2013 the
difference more than doubled beyond 0.05.
Figure 2.9: Difference in professors per student
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Note: This data is publicly available at the National System for Information on Higher
Education website: http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/sistemasdeinformacion/1735/w3-
propertyname-2672.html
We can go beyond the gross statistics of professors per student and analyze
the academic credentials of the faculty composition of elite and non-elite colleges.
In Colombia, it is not uncommon to see new hired faculty whose highest academic
credential corresponds to a Bachelor’s or a Master’s degree. Taking into account this
fact, the trend observed in Figure 2.9 would not imply by itself that elite institutions
are making significant efforts to improve the quality of their faculty body. They
might be substituting PhD professors by faculty whose highest academic credential
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is a Bachelor’s degree. However, In Figure 2.10 we find that the professors-student
ratio of elite institutions increased when compared to non-elite institutions for every
category of professors: those with a PhD, with a Master’s degree, and with a
Bachelor’s degree.
Figure 2.10: Evolution of Faculty composition. Professors per Student
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Finally, the dataset also allows us to analyze the academic production of faculty
from every college in Colombia. We construct a dataset of articles published in
refereed journals by authors’ affiliation as well as total number of books by faculty.
The results are presented in Figure 2.11. When we analyze the academic production
per students, as measured by articles and books published, we also find evidence
suggesting that the gap in academic production between elite and non-elite univer-
sities increased dramatically after the introduction of the subsidized loan policy.
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Figure 2.11: Gap in academic production.
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Note: We constructed this dataset by scrapping information available online at
the Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (Colciencias)
http://www.colciencias.gov.co/. A more detailed description of how this dataset was
constructed is available in Spanish at http://laramaciudadana.com/universidades.html
Finally, we analyze the evolution of tuition being charged by higher education
institutions. Figure 2.12 illustrates the behavior of the average real price of tu-
ition during the decade, in terms of 2004 pesos. As can be observed, there has
been a steady increase in the real price of education throughout the decade for all
universities in Colombia. Additionally, the price of the high-quality colleges seems
to have peaked at a higher pace for Law, Engineering and Medicine schools. This
increasing trend suggests that the Bennett Hypothesis might also be taking place
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in the Colombian context, given the fast increase in the government provided loans
to education.
Figure 2.12: Evolution of average tuition prices over the decade
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Finally, we conclude this subsection by summarizing the main findings we ob-
serve from the data. We find that after the subsidized loan policy program was
implemented in Colombia, the degree of product differentiation between elite and
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non-elite universities in Colombia increased. We conclude this after analyzing the
trend of four key characteristics of universities in Colombia. First, the gap in
the quality of student body increased dramatically when analyzing it via entering
(SABER-11) or exiting (SABER-PRO) test scores. Second, we observe a gap in
the professors per student ratio for every possible category of professorship (PhD,
Master’s and Bachelor’s degree). Third, the gap in academic production, measured
as number of peer-reviewed articles and books published, per student, increased
during the same period. Finally, we observe that in both, elite and non-elite insti-
tutions, there was a significant increase in the tuition being charged for some of the
most popular degrees of study. All this evidence is consistent with the fact that
after the introduction of subsidized loan policies, the gap in quality between elite
and non-elite institutions increased significantly.
2.5 Numerical Analysis
In this section we perform a numerical analysis of the economic presented in Section
2.3 illustrating that the increased gap in quality between elite and non-elite institu-
tions observed in the data, can be rationalized as a consequence of the introduction
of subsidized loans for higher education.
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2.5.1 Evolution of Quality
According to the specifications assumed in the model, we are able to identify the
parameters of the wage equation. For this, we will use data on the average wages of
graduates from each university in Colombia through 2007-2012, and the minimum
wage, as a measure of w, to estimate the parameters of the quality production
function of universities. Per-efficiency unit wages are given by:
wh = w · (1 + zh), wl = w · (1 + zl)
Where wh and wl are the wages of high- and low-quality college graduates, given
equilibrium qualities of education zh and zl, respectively, and w is the wage of non-
skilled labor per-efficiency unit. The quality of education, z, is given by equation
(2.3.11) in the universities’ problem. We have a panel of data for 50 universities in
Colombia from 2007 to 2012. We have the average ability of students in the entering
cohorts, number of professors per student and average wages during the first year
after graduation. For every university i in our sample, the following equation holds:
wi = w · (1 + κθ¯iα1Iα2i )
Rearranging and taking logarithms:
log
(wi
w
− 1
)
= log κ+ α1θ¯i + α2Ii
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Assuming that there is measurement error in the wages of each of the universities,
and assuming an exclusion restriction that the measurement error is uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables, we can estimate the following equation:
log
(
wi,t
wt
− 1
)
= log κ+ α1θ¯i,t + α2Ii,t + ηTi,t + φt + ψi + i,t
where Ti is an indicator function that takes the value of one when the university
i is a low-quality institution, and zero otherwise. Under this specification, we can
estimate possible differences in the technology parameter, κ, between top and second
tier schools. In order to isolate possible omitted variable bias, we estimate the above
model under three different specifications, with and without time and geographic
fixed effects, φt and ψi, respectively.
For the estimation, we constructed a panel of the top 50 universities in Colombia,
according to a quality ranking published by the Ministry of Education in 201432.
This panel includes data on average wages during the first year after graduation
for graduates of every school, as a measure of wi,t, the average test scores for the
entering cohorts, as a measure of θi,t, and the number of professors per student,
as a measure for Ii,t. We also have data on total operational expenditures by each
school for 2014. However, with only one year we are not able to construct the
evolution of quality of universities over time. Since the number of professors per
student are a good indicator of the total expenditures per student, we will use that
32The ranking is published in the website of the Ministry of Education, and can be found in the
following link: http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/cvn/1665/w3-article-351855.html
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Parameter OLS OLS OLS
αˆ1 0.211 0.228 0.168
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
αˆ2 .358 0.478 0.414
(0.361) (0.357) (0.403)
ηˆ -0.029 0.008 -0.046
(0.047) (0.043) (0.046)
ˆlog(κ) -0.84 -0.957 -0.163
(0.232) (0.228) (0.198)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
City fixed effects Yes
N 382 382 382
R-squared 0.353 0.444 0.567
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 2.1: Estimates for the quality production function.
variable, instead. For the non-skilled labor wages, wt, we will use the values of
the real minimum wage (in 2007 pesos). The average wages of college graduates
are strictly above the minimum wage during the period, so the dependent variable
is well defined for every college in every period. In addition, we have information
about the municipality of the school, to control for regional differences. The results
of the estimation are displayed in Table 2.1.
The estimates show that the elasticities α1 and α2 are fairly robust to different
specifications and do not change dramatically when including control variables.
Moreover, the parameter η is negative in two of the specifications, although non
statistically significative. This means that, on average, tier 2 universities have a
lower technology parameter, κ, on their quality production function. This will be
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one of the main differences between tier 1 and tier 2 universities in our calibration
of the model.
2.5.2 Calibration of the Model
In order to draw conclusions about the relevance of our model, we calibrate the
parameters to values that are relevant to the Colombian context. To achieve this,
we will map a life-cycle model to a two period model, so the conclusions of Section
2.3 hold. We follow an approach similar to the one used by Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo (2011), but in a discrete time economy. The environment is as follows.
Individuals live for T periods, after which they die with certainty. Individuals
start their adult life at t = 0, when they must choose whether to attend the low-
or high-quality school, or not study at all. Studying lasts for S periods, so those
individuals that attend college will not receive any income during t ∈ {0, . . . , S−1}
and have to pay a per-period price of Pj for attending school j. Moreover, during
the first S periods individuals are borrowing constrained. Those that decide not
to study cannot borrow at all. Those that decide to study, can borrow up to the
exogenous limit set by the government student loan policy, A¯. After period S − 1,
the individual enters the labor market and earns a per-period wage θw(1+zj), that
depends on the quality of the school attended. During periods S, . . . , T individuals
only consume and save. We assume that from period S onwards, individuals enter
into perfect financial markets where debt repayments are fully enforced. In this
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context, individuals can borrow any amount they want.
Clearly, individuals that are not borrowing constrained during their study period
will perfectly smooth consumption along the life-cycle. However, those individuals
that are constrained during the first S years of life will exhibit a jump in their con-
sumption once they graduate from college. This setting can be easily embedded into
the two-period model described in last section, by setting the discount factors and
budget constraints appropriately. Namely, the problem for the household becomes:
max
c,c′
c1−σ
1− σ + β˜
(c′)1−σ
1− σ , s.t.
c+ c′
(
ΦS
Φ0(1 + r)S
)
+ (PHh+ Pll)
(
Φyr
Φ0
)
=
wθ(1− h)(1− l)
(
Φyr
Φ0
)
+ wθ(1 + zj)
(
Φ0r
Φ0(1 + r)S
)
j +
b
Φ0
a ≥ A¯
The derivation of the parameters β˜,Φ0,ΦS,Φ
o
r,Φ
y
r is explained in detail in the
Appendix B.0.8. In this environment, all the results from Section 2.3 hold.
2.5.3 Parameterization
In our calibration, we set one period to be exactly one year. We will set some
parameter values to match the Colombian educational market. All parameter values
are reported in Table 2.2.
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We set S = 5, so that the individuals that choose to attend a college study
during 5 periods, since most professional degrees in Colombia take exactly 5 years.
In Colombia, life expectancy at birth is 73.95 years of life33. Although the National
Statistics Department of Colombia (DANE) does not publish the life expectancy
by age, we estimate the life expectancy at 18 years to be 55 more years of life34.
That is, we set T = 55 to match the life expectancy in Colombia for high-school
graduates.
We set σ = 2, which a standard parameter in the literature (Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger, 2011; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011). For the real interest rate,
we choose r = 8.9%, which is the value for Colombia in 2014 published by the World
Bank35. We do not claim that this value is representative of developing countries,
since the real interest rate for most Latin American countries has a huge varia-
tion, ranging from negative values in Argentina (−4.1%) and Venezuela (−14.5%
in 2013), to very high values like Brazil (23.5%). We choose β = 0.92 such that
β = 1/(1 + r). With these parameter values, the discount factor in our two-period
model becomes β˜ = 1.89. This reflects the fact that the post-college period is much
longer than the study period, even though individuals discount time at a high rate.
As for the university parameters, we use the estimations of Section 2.5. In
particular, we choose α1 = 0.211, α2 = 0.358, κl = 0.8 and κh = 0.85, obtained
33See life expectancy tables here.
34For instance, in the U.S. life expectancy at 18 is only 0.79 more years than life expectancy
at birth. Therefore, we will set life expectancy at 18 in Colombia to be 1.05 years above life
expectancy at birth, as a conservative estimate.
35See the real interest rates for all the countries in this link.
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from the wage regressions displayed in Table 2.1.
Parameter Value Source
Utility and discount
β 0.97 Literature
σ 2 Literature
r 2% Colombia
w 2 Normalization
Time parameters
T 78 Colombia
S 5 Colombia
University parameters
α1 0.211 Estimation
α2 0.358 Estimation
κl 1.4 Estimation
κh 1.2 Estimation
Eh − Ch -12 Estimation
El − C l -7 Estimation
Table 2.2: Parameter values
2.6 Results
In this section we show the results of the numerical computation of the equilibria
without the subsidized-loan policy being implemented and once it was implemented.
In order to mimic as closely as possible the post-reform equilibrium, we set up a
tax rate of 10% used to fund a subsidized loan policy offering credits for higher
education for people whose income is below the median income in the economy. The
policy implemented in Colombia is designed as a subsidy to the interest rate paid by
students. In the model we set up the subsidy in such a way that students that have
access to it only have to pay 50% of the interests accumulated in students debts.
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In addition to having an income below the median, a student who wants to qualify
for the policy must have an ability level in the top 30%36. Table 2.3 illustrates the
results before and after the implementation of the student loan policies. As can be
observed, after the reform there is a widening gap in the quality offered by each
university. Elite universities offer a higher quality, while non-elite universities reduce
it. There is also a market segmentation, where better students attend the elite
institution, and the ability of the students attending the low-quality institutions
falls.
Table 2.3: Equilibria computations
Pre-reform Post-reform
Elite institutions Students attending 5,863 9,431
Average ability of student body 0.48 0.64
Quality offered 1.01 1.19
Non-elite institutions Students attending 6,971 6,753
Average ability of student body 0.41 0.38
Quality offered 0.53 0.42
[TO DO: WELFARE ANALYSIS]
2.7 Conclusion
Subsidized loan policies have been used widely in both developing and developed
economies, as a policy tool to increase college attendance. Such policies are partic-
ularly relevant in a context where credit constraints explain a significant amount in
the college non-attendance rate. However, when implementing such policies, it is
36The institutional details of the policy implemented in Colombia are fully described in Melguizo,
Sanchez and Velasco (2015)
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important to observe not only the distortion it imposes in the demand side of the
market but also the way it affects the incentives of the providers of higher education.
We show that subsidized loan policies can distort the incentives of colleges pro-
viding services of higher education in a way that can be harmful for a group of
households in an economy. Taking into account that the market for higher educa-
tion operates under a monopolistic competition setting, granting subsidized loans
does not translate into an expansion of the providers of higher education services
but rather on the same colleges facing a new set of incentives. As elite institutions
unambiguously observe an increase in their demand, they can use their pricing and
admission policies to be more selective in their admission process and to spend more
per student, which translates into providing better services for their student body.
On the contrary, the universities in the low-quality tier will observe a migration to
the high-quality group when such policies are implemented. The result is a new
equilibrium in the market for higher education where the quality gap between elite
and non-elite institutions is widened as a result of the implementation of subsidized
loan policies.
Our model is consistent with what we observe in the market for higher education
in Colombia: an expansion of the gap in the quality offered by different institutions.
In such scenario, subsidized policy loans can make some households worse off as,
although the attendance to higher education institutions becomes easier, the gains
from attending low-quality universities is not offset by the amount households have
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to pay in taxes in order to pay for the policy implemented.
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Appendices
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Appendix Chapter 1
A.0.1 Identification of Measurement System
The measurement system is described by:
Z = ι0 + ι1K + ε (A.0.1)
We normalize E[k] = 0 for every factor. The variance-covariance matrix of the
measurement system is given by:
ΣZ = ι1ΣKι
′
1 + Σε (A.0.2)
The matrix of moments ΣZ contains M(M + 1)/2 moments in order to identify the
necessary parameters of the models. M is the total number of measures available
and is equal to the sum of measures for each factor:
M =
∑
k∈K
Nk = 151 (A.0.3)
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as we have
Nln(S0) = 23
Nln(S1) = 11
Nln(S2) = 13
Nln(PG) = 8
Nµ = 19
Nln(I1) = 8
Nln(I2) = 21
Nln(eˆf1 )
= 10
Nln(eˆf2 )
= 14
Nln(eˆm1 ) = 10
Nln(eˆm2 ) = 14
The dedicated factor structure assumed imposes that each measure loads exclu-
sively to one factor. This implies that rather than 11×M factor loadings to obtain
we only have to estimate M elements in ι1 to be estimated. Given that the scale
of the factor is irrelevant for the analysis, we can normalize one factor loading for
each factor to be 1. In total, we have M−11 = 140 factor loadings to be estimated.
The matrix ΣK contains (11 × (11 + 1)/2) covariances to be estimated and Σε
has M × (M + 1)/2. We see that it is necessary to make some assumptions about
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the correlation structure of the factors or of the measurement error system in order
to be able to identify the system. If we assume that the measurement error in
the system for skills at birth is independent of measurement error in the remaining
systems ε
ln(s0)
m ⊥ εkm′ for m = 1...Nln(s0), k ∈ K, k 6= ln(s0), m′ = 1...Nk we have
enough moments to identify the system. By doing this assumption, we are assuming
that the elements in Σε that correspond corresponding to ln(s0) and other factors
are zero. With this, we have enough moments to identify the system.
A.0.2 Estimation
In this section I will derive the full likelihood function of the model as well as the
filtering procedure to estimate it.
Likelihood function
The likelihood of the model is:
L (Θ|O;X) = P (O|X; Θ) = P (O1, O2, O3|X; Θ)
p0(O0|Θ, X)p1(O1|O0,Θ, X)p2(O2|O1,Θ, X) (A.0.4)
Now, inspecting every element. The first term is composed by the observed out-
comes in period zero. Given that the only one observed in this case is the first
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period of skills, this is composed then by that.
p0(O0|Θ, X) =
∫
p0(O0, K0|Θ, X)dK0 =
∫
p0(O0|K0,Θ, X)p(K0|Θ, X)dK0 =
Ep(K0|Θ,X) [P0(O0|K0,Θ, X)] ≈
RR∑
rr=1
P0(O0|K{rr}0 ,Θ, X) (A.0.5)
for RR large, and for the {K{rr}0 }RRrr=1 being drawn from the distribution p(K0|Θ, X).
K0 is the set of unobserved factors relevant for period zero given by
K0 = {ln(s0), ln(PG)} (A.0.6)
Note that in the model the distribution p(K0|Θ, X) is not specified. I will assume
that both factors are independent and each follow a normal distribution with mean
zero and variance σ2s0 and σ
2
PG respectively. This way, evaluating the likelihood for
period 0 ends up being a process of drawing shocks from the distribution p(K0|Θ, X),
computing the likelihood of each shock given by the measurement system of the
unobserved latent factors and averaging such likelihoods over the RR shocks.
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For the first period the set of relevant factors is given by:
K1 = {ln(s1), ln(ef,∗1 ), ln(eˆm,∗1 ), ln(I∗1 ), µ1} (A.0.7)
and the likelihood can be expressed as:
p1(O1|O0,Θ, X) =
∫
p1(O1, K1|O0,Θ, X)dK1 =
∫ ∫
p1(O1, K1, K0|O0,Θ, X)dK1dK0 =
∫ ∫
p1(O1|K1, K0, O0,Θ, X)p(K1|O0, K0,Θ, X)p(K0|O0,Θ, X)dK1dK0 (A.0.8)
Note that
p(K1|O0, K0,Θ, X) = p(K1|K0, θ,X) (A.0.9)
as O0 would not carry more information beyond that in K0 that is relevant for K1.
Also, note that
p1(O1|K1, K0, O0,Θ, X) = p1(O1|K1,Θ, X) (A.0.10)
175
Taking into account the facts presented in Equations A.0.9 and A.0.10 we can
express A.0.8 as:
∫ ∫
p1(O1|K1,Θ, X)p(K1|K0,Θ, X)p(K0|O0,Θ, X)dK1dK0 =
∫
p(K0|O0,Θ, X)
[∫
p(O1|K1,Θ, X)p(K1|K0,Θ, X)dK1
]
dK0 =
Ep(K0|O0,Θ,X)
[∫
p(O1|K1,Θ, X)p(K1|K0,Θ, X)dK1
]
= (A.0.11)
in Equation A.0.11 p(O1|K1,Θ, X) is given by the measurement system of factors,
the likelihood of wages (for those that are observed) and the preference shocks cdf.
We can re-write such expression as:
p(O1|K1,Θ, X) =
p(Z1|K1,Θ, X)× p(wf |K1,Θ, X)(1−hf,∗) × p(wm|K1,Θ, X)1−hm,∗
× p(hf,∗, hm,∗, a|wf , wm, K1,Θ, X) (A.0.12)
As specified previously, p(Z1|K1,Θ, X) is given by the measurement system.
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p(wf |K1,Θ, X) is given by the measurement error associated to the observed wages:
ln
(
wj
)
= βj0 + β
j
1yrschool
j + βj2Age
j + βj3(Age
j)2 + εwj (A.0.13)
where εwj is measurement error following a distribution εwj ∼ N(0, σεj).
Finally, p(h∗f , h
∗
m, a
∗|wf , wm, K1,Θ, X) is given by the probability of having the
observed decisions as the optimal ones:
p(h∗f , h
∗
m, a
∗|wf , wm,K1,Θ, X) =
p(.)
(
W (uf (hf∗, hm,∗, a∗), um(hf,∗, hm,∗, a∗))
∈ arg max
{hf ,hm,a}
W (uf (hf , hm, a), um(hf , hm, a))|K1,Θ, X
)
(A.0.14)
where p() is the distribution of the preference shocks.
p(K1|K0,Θ, X) is given by the transition equation. Note, however, that the
dynamics of the system are only given through the skills of the child, the remaining
factors do not have any dynamics carried from the previous period. This implies that
such expression will be given by the skills production function and the distribution
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of heterogeneity in the remaining factors. Being explicit:
p(K1|K0,Θ, X) =p(ln(s1), ln(ef,∗1 ), ln(eˆm,∗1 ), ln(Iˆ∗1 ), µ1|ln(PG), ln(s0),Θ, X)
= p(ln(s1), ln(e
f,∗
1 ), ln(e
m,∗
1 ), ln(I
∗
1 ), µ1|ln(PG), ln(s0),Θ, X) =
p(ln(s1)|ln(ef,∗1 ), ln(em,∗1 ), ln(I∗1 ), µ1, ln(PG), ln(s0),Θ, X)
(A.0.15)
× p(ln(ef,∗1 )|µ1Θ, X) (A.0.16)
× p(ln(em,∗1 )|µ1,Θ, X) (A.0.17)
× p(ln(I∗1 )|µ1,Θ, X) (A.0.18)
× p(µ1|Θ, X) (A.0.19)
The term A.0.15 is given by the production of skills and the remaining A.0.16-
A.0.18 are given by the distribution of heterogeneity in each factor: ηef , ηem and ηI .
The term A.0.19 is given by the distribution of heterogeneity in 1.5.14. Note that
we can also use Monte-Carlo techniques to approximate the expression in A.0.11
by:
RR∑
rr=1
wˆ
{rr}
0
[∫
p(O1|K1,Θ, X)p(K1|K{rr}0 ,Θ, X)dK1
]
(A.0.20)
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where {K{rr}0 }RRrr=1 are drawn from an importance distribution g0(K0|Z0,Θ, X) and
the weights are given by:
wˆrr0 =
wrr0∑RR
rr=1w
rr
0
(A.0.21)
and the individual weights are defined:
wrr0 ∝
p(K0|O0,Θ, X)
g0(K0|Z0, θ0,Θ, X) (A.0.22)
Note that after some algebra, we can define:
w˜1 =
p(O1|K1,Θ, X)p(K1|K0,Θ, X)
gt(K0|, O0, O1,Θ, X) (A.0.23)
where gt(K0|, O0, O1,Θ, X) is the proposal -importance- distribution from which
the particles are going to be drawn. We will explain below what this distribution
is. Note that replacing A.0.23 into A.0.11 we obtain:
RR∑
rr=1
wˆ
{rr}
0
[∫
p(O1|K1,Θ, X)p(K1|K{rr}0 ,Θ, X)dK1
]
=
RR∑
rr=1
wˆ
{rr}
0
[
RR∑
rr′=1
w˜rr
′
1 (rr)
]
(A.0.24)
And finally note that the dependence given between rr and rr′ generates a dirac
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measure in dependence (all that follow from rr different in the dependence path
go to zero in rr′). Then, we can write the expression of the likelihood in the first
period as:
p1(O1|K1, K0, O0,Θ, X) =
RR∑
rr=1
wˆrr0 w˜
rr
1 (A.0.25)
The computation of the likelihood for the second period is identical to that of
the first period with the exception that we need to change the measurement system
for the corresponding measures available in the second period and the childcare
decision is not available in the behavioral model.
In this case we will use as importance distribution the same transition equation.
The literature refers to this type of filtering as the bootstrap filter Creal (2012).
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A.0.3 Estimates of Measurement System
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MS1,10 0.1679 0.0002
SDS1,10 2.5059 0.0040
MS2,10 0.1305 0.0003
SDS2,10 2.4928 0.0027
MS3,10 0.1117 0.0002
SDS3,10 2.4283 0.0019
MS4,10 -0.6097 0.0008
SDS4,10 2.0847 0.0022
MS5,10 -0.5080 0.0003
SDS5,10 2.2865 0.0014
MS6,10 -0.3238 0.0002
SDS6,10 2.6349 0.0019
MS7,10 -0.4028 0.0003
SDS7,10 2.4463 0.0011
MS8,10 -0.3325 0.0002
SDS8,10 2.2173 0.0020
MS910 -0.5363 0.0003
SDS910 2.2473 0.0012
MS1010 -1.0000 0.0000
SDS1010 0.0010 0.0000
Table A.1: Estimates: Measurement system -Skills in 2010
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MS112 1.000 0.000
SDS112 2.754 0.010
MS212 0.951 0.048
SDS212 3.102 0.083
MS312 1.097 0.012
SDS312 2.943 0.032
MS412 1.059 0.033
SDS412 3.192 0.106
MS512 0.990 0.012
SDS512 3.533 0.134
MS612 1.086 0.019
SDS612 2.292 0.039
MS712 1.102 0.012
SDS712 2.794 0.041
MS812 1.131 0.036
SDS812 2.595 0.112
MS912 0.977 0.100
SDS912 3.055 0.005
MS1012 1.244 0.036
SDS1012 0.003 0.016
MS1112 1.116 0.002
SDS1112 4.810 0.084
Table A.2: Estimates: Measurement system -Skills in 2012
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MS1,10 0.1679 0.0002
SDS1,10 2.5059 0.0040
MS2,10 0.1305 0.0003
SDS2,10 2.4928 0.0027
MS3,10 0.1117 0.0002
SDS3,10 2.4283 0.0019
MS4,10 -0.6097 0.0008
SDS4,10 2.0847 0.0022
MS5,10 -0.5080 0.0003
SDS5,10 2.2865 0.0014
MS6,10 -0.3238 0.0002
SDS6,10 2.6349 0.0019
MS7,10 -0.4028 0.0003
SDS7,10 2.4463 0.0011
MS8,10 -0.3325 0.0002
SDS8,10 2.2173 0.0020
MS910 -0.5363 0.0003
SDS910 2.2473 0.0012
MS1010 -1.0000 0.0000
SDS1010 0.0010 0.0000
Table A.3: Estimates: Measurement system -Skills in 2010
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MS1BARG -0.2155 0.0667
SDS1BARG 0.6144 0.0141
MS2BARG 0.0875 0.0684
SDS2BARG 0.6301 0.0145
MS3BARG -0.0703 0.0694
SDS3BARG 0.6395 0.0151
MS4BARG 0.0155 0.0668
SDS4BARG 0.6151 0.0141
MS5BARG 0.1219 0.0694
SDS5BARG 0.6395 0.0147
MS6BARG -0.1325 0.0675
SDS6BARG 0.6223 0.0142
MS7BARG 0.1015 0.0657
SDS7BARG 0.6056 0.0139
MS8BARG -0.0151 0.0672
SDS8BARG 0.6191 0.0142
MS9BARG 0.0941 0.0685
SDS9BARG 0.6307 0.0145
MS10BARG -0.0283 0.0671
SDS10BARG 0.6180 0.0144
MS11BARG 0.0166 0.0040
SDS11BARG 0.0292 0.0059
MS12BARG 0.0445 0.0020
SDS12BARG 0.0117 0.0005
MS13BARG 0.6507 0.0889
SDS13BARG 0.6429 0.0879
MS14BARG -0.5486 0.0546
SDS14BARG 0.5027 0.0116
MS15BARG 0.2877 0.0230
SDS15BARG 0.1605 0.0128
MS16BARG -0.7954 0.0907
SDS16BARG 0.6504 0.0744
MS17BARG 1.0000 0.0416
SDS17BARG 0.1868 0.0078
MS18BARG 0.6205 0.0376
SDS18BARG 0.0725 0.0044
Table A.4: Estimates: Measurement system -Pareto weight
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MS1INV,10 0.123 0.020
SDS1INV,10 0.176 0.181
MS2INV,10 1.000 0.000
SDS2INV,10 2.241 1.349
MS3INV,10 0.383 0.211
SDS3INV,10 0.617 0.373
MS4INV,10 0.334 0.247
SDS4INV,10 0.404 0.316
MS5INV,10 0.047 0.043
SDS5INV,10 0.052 0.089
MS6INV,10 0.041 0.002
SDS6INV,10 0.171 0.162
MS7INV,10 0.115 0.096
SDS7INV,10 0.242 0.181
MS8INV,10 0.074 0.062
SDS8INV,10 0.259 0.175
Table A.5: Estimates: Measurement system -Investments 2010
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MS1EF,10 0.368 0.084
SDS1EF,10 1.101 0.081
MS2EF,10 0.280 0.008
SDS2EF,10 0.887 0.058
MS3EF,10 0.212 0.049
SDS3EF,10 0.325 0.181
MS4EF,10 0.280 0.091
SDS4EF,10 0.917 0.003
MS5EF,10 0.299 0.045
SDS5EF,10 0.391 0.026
MS6EF,10 1.000 0.000
SDS6EF,10 0.962 0.109
Table A.6: Estimates: Measurement system -Parental effort 2010
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Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MS1BARG -0.2155 0.0667
SDS1BARG 0.6144 0.0141
MS2BARG 0.0875 0.0684
SDS2BARG 0.6301 0.0145
MS3BARG -0.0703 0.0694
SDS3BARG 0.6395 0.0151
MS4BARG 0.0155 0.0668
SDS4BARG 0.6151 0.0141
MS5BARG 0.1219 0.0694
SDS5BARG 0.6395 0.0147
MS6BARG -0.1325 0.0675
SDS6BARG 0.6223 0.0142
MS7BARG 0.1015 0.0657
SDS7BARG 0.6056 0.0139
MS8BARG -0.0151 0.0672
SDS8BARG 0.6191 0.0142
MS9BARG 0.0941 0.0685
SDS9BARG 0.6307 0.0145
MS10BARG -0.0283 0.0671
SDS10BARG 0.6180 0.0144
MS11BARG 0.0166 0.0040
SDS11BARG 0.0292 0.0059
MS12BARG 0.0445 0.0020
SDS12BARG 0.0117 0.0005
MS13BARG 0.6507 0.0889
SDS13BARG 0.6429 0.0879
MS14BARG -0.5486 0.0546
SDS14BARG 0.5027 0.0116
MS15BARG 0.2877 0.0230
SDS15BARG 0.1605 0.0128
MS16BARG -0.7954 0.0907
SDS16BARG 0.6504 0.0744
MS17BARG 1.0000 0.0416
SDS17BARG 0.1868 0.0078
MS18BARG 0.6205 0.0376
SDS18BARG 0.0725 0.0044
Table A.7: Estimates: Measurement system -Pareto weight
186
A.0.4 Filtering
Now that we have an expression for the likelihood function in a way that can be
computed via simulation, I will present the algorithm used to evaluate the likelihood
function at a given point:
Filtering Algorithm
1. Set t=0.
(a) For rr=1....RR:
i. draw K
{rr}
0 from proposal distribution g(K0|Θ, X)
ii. Compute the weights wˆ
{rr}
0 =
1
RR
(b) Compute likelihood for measurement system
in t = 0: 1
RR
∑RR
rr=1 P0(O0|K{rr}0 ,Θ, X)
2. Set t=t+1
(a) For rr=1....RR:
i. Draw θt from proposal distribution (transition equation):
p(K
{rr}
t |K{rr}t−1 ,Θ, X)
ii. Compute the weights w˜
{rr}
t = p(Ot|K{rr}t ,Θ, X)
iii. Define w
{rr}
t = wˆ
{rr}
t−1 w˜
{rr}
t
(b) For rr=1...RR
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i. Define wˆ
{rr}
t =
w
{rr}
t∑RR
rr=1 w
rr
t
(c) Compute the likelihood for period t:
∑RR
rr=1 w˜
rr
t wˆ
rr
t−1
(d) For rr=1....RR
i. Re-sample RR particles θ
{rr}
t from step (2.i) with probabilities wˆ
{rr}
t
ii. Set wrrt =
1
RR
It is usually assumed that it is costly to sample from the original distribution
p(Kt|Kt−1, ψ,X). Such is not the case of this article and then as importance distri-
bution we will use the transition system as the importance distribution. When such
distribution is used, the algorithm implemented receives the name of the bootstrap
filter.
Figure A.1: Particle Filtering Algorithm
Figure A.1 illustrates the particle filtering algorithm with eight particles. In
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the first step, particles are drawn from the proposal distribution g(K0|Θ, X). In
the second step, the likelihood of each particle is evaluated through the likelihood
system P0 (O0|K0,Θ, X). In the third step, a new set of particles are drawn with
the corresponding weight given by the measurement system. Some particles might
die and some others are drawn multiple times.
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A.0.5 Smoothing distribution
The smoothing distribution is useful if we are interested in making inference about
the state of the unobserved factors. In this case, it is particularly interesting to
make inference about the skills of children. The following procedure describes how
to use the information provided in the model and in the data in order to derive the
smoothing distribution of the unobserved latent factors. This procedure is adapted
from Klaas et al. (2006):
I use as main input for this file the article ”Fast Particle Smoothing: If I had
a Million Particles”. I translate the notation in the one used in the paper. Define
O0:t = {O0, O1..., Ot}. The smoothed density is:
p(Kt|O0:2) (A.0.26)
where we basically condition on all the measures we have. Note that we can write
Equation A.0.26 as:
p(Kt|O0:2) = p(Kt|O0:t)
∫ (
p(Kt+1|O0:2)p(Kt+1|θt)∫
p(Kt+1|θt)p(K1|O0:t)dKt
)
dKt+1 (A.0.27)
And then we can approximate this distribution by pˆ(θt|O0:2) with:
pˆ(Kt|O0:2) =
RR∑
rr=1
w
(rr)
t|T δK(rr)t
(Kt) (A.0.28)
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where δ
K
(rr)
t
(Kt) is the Dirac distribution and
w
(mm)
t|T = w
(mm)
t
 RR∑
rr=1
w
(rr)
t+1|T
 p
(
K
(rr)
t+1 |K(mm)t
)
∑KK
kk=1w
(kk)
t p
(
K
(rr)
t+1 |K(kk)t
)
 (A.0.29)
where wT |T = wT
Smoothing algorithm
1. For t=0,1,2 perform the particle filtering to obtain {Krrt , wrrt }RRrr=1
2. Set wrr2|2 = w
rr
2 for rr = 1...RR
3. For t=1,0 define w
(mm)
t|2 = w
(mm)
t
[∑RR
rr=1w
(rr)
t+1|2
(
p
(
x
(rr)
t+1 |x(mm)t
)
∑KK
kk=1 w
(kk)
t p
(
x
(rr)
t+1 |x(kk)t
)
)]
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A.0.6 Cash Transfer Programs in Chile
The basic program through which poor families receive cash transfers from the
central government is the “Unique Family Subsidy”.37 Such program established a
monthly transfer of $14,340 CLP in 2012, for a family in conditions of vulnerability38
with one child.39 The recipient of the transfer is always set to be the mother of
the children who generate the transfer. In addition to be within the 40% most
vulnerable, in order for the mother should be economically inactive in order to
receive the transfer. However, the alternate program “Family Assignment” cash
transfers of the same value for those mothers who were working, with a fadeout
scheme.40
In 2016, the basic amount of a transfer in the programs “Unique Family subsidy”
and “Family Assignments” corresponded to $10,577. When compared to the $7,170
CLP of 2012, this represents an increase of 29% in real terms. Additionally, in 2014
the government of Michelle Bachelet implemented the implemented the “Permanent
Family Contribution Program”. In 2016, those families who were eligible to either
“Unique Family Subsidy” or “Family Assignments” were automatically eligible to
be part of the “Permanent Family Contribution Program”. which consisted in a
37Subsidio Unico familiar in Spanish.
38The condition of vulnerability corresponds to a score below 11.734 in the “Ficha de Proteccin
Social”. Approximately 40% of Chilean families lie below this threshold
39The $14,340 CLP were generated by the mother and the child, each generating a transfer of
$7,170 CLP.
40The transfer scheme consisted of $7,179CLP for women with monthly wages below $187,515
CLP; $5,054 CLP for women whose wages was in between $187,515 CLP and $307,863 CLP; and
$1,600 CLP for women whose wages was between $307,863 CLP and $480,163.
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transfer of $43,042 anually for each children and one for the family as a whole.
Thus, a family one child would be eligible to receive $86,084 CLP.
Overall, a family of one child that was receiving transfers from the “Unique
Family Subsidy” program in 2012, would see an increase in the monetary transfers
from the central government equivalent to 72.8% in real terms.
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Appendix Chapter 2
The problem of the households is:
max
c,l,h,a
c1−σ
1− σ + β
c
′1−σ
1− σ , s.t.
a+ c+ hPh + lPl = wθ(1− h)(1− l) + b
c′ = wθ + wθzhh+ wθzll + (1 + r)a
B.0.1 Solution of the unconstrained households:
Proof of Theorem 1. The unconstrained consumptions are:
cN =
(β(1 + r))−1/σ (wθ(2 + r) + (1 + r)b)
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
,
c
′N =
(wθ(2 + r) + (1 + r)b)
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
cl =
(β(1 + r))−1/σ (wθ(1 + zl) + (1 + r)b− Pl(1 + r))
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
,
c
′l =
(wθ(1 + zl) + (1 + r)b− Pl(1 + r))
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
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ch =
(β(1 + r))−1/σ (wθ(1 + zh) + (1 + r)b− Ph(1 + r))
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
,
c
′h =
(wθ(1 + zh) + (1 + r)b− Ph(1 + r))
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
The utilities of each of the options are:
uN = Φ× (wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r))1−σ
ul = Φ× (wθ(1 + zl) + b(1 + r)− Pl(1 + r))1−σ
uh = Φ× (wθ(1 + zh) + b(1 + r)− Ph(1 + r))1−σ
where
Φ =
(
1
1− σ
)(
1
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
)1−σ (
(β(1 + r))(σ−1)/σ + β
)
The household’s decision of whether and where to study follows a cut-off rule
on θ, and the decision is independent of initial wealth, b. The cut-offs are:
θ¯l =
1 + r
w
(
Pl
zl − (1 + r)
)
, θ¯h =
1 + r
w
(
Ph − Pl
zh − zl
)
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B.0.2 Wealth cutoff rules for households:
Proof of Theorem 2. The debt levels of the unconstrained households are:
aN =
wθ(1− (β(1 + r))−1/σ) + b
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
al =
b− Pl − (β(1 + r))−1/σwθ(1 + zl)
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
ah =
b− Ph − (β(1 + r))−1/σwθ(1 + zh)
1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
Given the exogenous borrowing constraint A¯, for a given θ we can construct a
cut-off b¯(θ) on the initial wealth such that individuals with b < b¯(θ) are constrained
and b ≥ b¯(θ) are unconstrained. These are given by:
aN ≥ A¯ ⇔ b ≥ −A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))− wθ(1− (β(1 + r))−1/σ)
al ≥ A¯ ⇔ b ≥ Pl + (β(1 + r))−1/σwθ(1 + zl)− A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
ah ≥ A¯ ⇔ b ≥ Ph + (β(1 + r))−1/σwθ(1 + zh)− A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
That is, the cut-offs are:
b¯Nu (θ) = −A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))− wθ(1− (β(1 + r))−1/σ)
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b¯lu(θ) = Pl + (β(1 + r))
−1/σwθ(1 + zl)− A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
b¯hu(θ) = Ph + (β(1 + r))
−1/σwθ(1 + zh)− A¯(1 + (β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
This subdivides the state space in three subregions, as shown in the following
Figure 2.2.
B.0.3 Solution of the constrained households:
Next, we have to consider the decision of studying of those households that are
constrained. Note that, although if an individual is borrowing constrained when
he decides to study, he might prefer to study and not smooth consumption, than
not studying and being able to smooth consumption. Therefore, we must compare
the utility of studying while being constrained, with the utility of not studying and
being unconstrained. The constrained consumptions are given by:
cNc = wθ + b+ A¯, c
′N
c = wθ − (1 + r)A¯
clc = b− Pl + A¯, c
′l
c = wθ(1 + zl)− (1 + r)A¯
chc = b− Ph + A¯, c
′h
c = wθ(1 + zh)− (1 + r)A¯
There are three decisions to characterize:
1. Whether to study in l or not study, for individuals that are constrained when
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studying in l. These individuals will study in l whenever:
(
1
1− σ
)
(b− Pl + A¯)1−σ +
(
β
1− σ
)
(wθ(1 + zl)− (1 + r)A¯)1−σ−
Φ× (wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r))1−σ ≥ 0
2. Whether to study in l or in h, for individuals that are constrained when
studying in h but not constrained when studying in l. These individuals will
study in h whenever:
(
1
1− σ
)(
b− Ph + A¯
)1−σ
+
(
β
1− σ
)(
wθ(1 + zh)− (1 + r)A¯
)1−σ−
Φ× (wθ(1 + zl) + b(1 + r)− Pl(1 + r))1−σ ≥ 0
3. Whether to study in l or in h, for individuals that are constrained when they
decide to study in h or l. These individuals will study in h whenever:
(
1
1− σ
)(
b− Ph + A¯
)1−σ
+
(
β
1− σ
)(
wθ(1 + zh)− (1 + r)A¯
)1−σ
(
1
1− σ
)(
b− Pl + A¯
)1−σ − ( β
1− σ
)(
wθ(1 + zl)− (1 + r)A¯
)1−σ ≥ 0
The cut-offs that define the college decision for constrained individuals are de-
fined in the following theorem proofs:
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Proof of Theorem 3. Define the following function:
G(θ, b) =
(
1
1− σ
)
(b− Pl + A¯)1−σ +
(
β
1− σ
)
(wθ(1 + zl)− (1 + r)A¯)1−σ−
Φ× (wθ∗(2 + r) + b(1 + r))1−σ (B.0.1)
Let the function b¯lc(θ) be implictly defined by the equality G(θ, b¯
l
c(θ)) = 0. By the
implicit function theorem,
∂b¯lc(θ)
∂θ
= −∂G/∂θ
∂G/∂b
Setting ∂G/∂θ = 0 gives the result in Theorem 3.
B.0.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is similar to Proof B.0.3. Define:
G∗(θ, b) =
(
1
1− σ
)
(b− Ph + A¯)1−σ +
(
β
1− σ
)
(wθ(1 + zh)− (1 + r)A¯)1−σ−
Φ(wθ∗(1 + zl) + b(1 + r)− Pl(1 + r))1−σ (B.0.2)
and setting ∂G/∂θ = 0 gives the result in Theorem 4.
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B.0.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of Theorem 5. By implicit function theorem, ∂b/∂A¯ = −∂G/∂A¯
∂G/∂b
.
∂G
∂A¯
= (b− Pl + A¯)−σ + β(1 + r)(wθ(1 + zl)− (1 + r)A¯)−σ ≥ 0
Since ∂G/∂b > 0, the first result follows.
For the second result, note that:
∂b
∂A¯∂θ
=
1
(·)2
[(
σβ(1 + r)w(1 + zl)(wθ(1 + zl)− (1 + r)A¯)−(1+σ)
)
· ((1 + r)((b− Pl + A¯)−σ − Φ(1− σ)(1 + r)(wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r))−σ))]
+
1
(·)2
[(
(b− Pl + A¯)−σ + β(1 + r)(wθ(1 + zl)− A¯(1 + r))−σ
)
· (σΦ(1− σ)w(1 + r)(2 + r)(wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r))−σ)]
≥ 0
(B.0.3)
This proves Theorem 5.
B.0.6 Computation of Nash Equillibrium
In this section we will describe the algorithm used to compute the Nash Equilibrium
between elite and non-elite universities. The Nash Equilibrium is composed by a
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tuple (P ∗h , θh
∗, P ∗l , θl
∗) such that:
(P ∗i , θi
∗) ∈ arg max
(Pi,θi)∈R+×[0,1]
(
zi(Pi, θi, P
∗
−i, θ−i
∗)
)α (
σb,i(Pi, θi, P
∗
−i, θ−i
∗)
)1−α
(B.0.4)
Note that the problem defined in B.0.4 involves solving for a fixed point nested
within another fixed point problem. In particular, the universities will offer a given
level of zl, zh to the households and, conditional on such offer households will de-
mand education services that need to fulfill the promised levels of zl, zh. This
implies that when solving for the optimal of the universities we need to take into
account that the offered level of productivities need to be satisfied by the demand of
educational services. The full procedure to find the Equilibrium is described below:
Computation of the Nash Equilibrium
1. Start algorithm with some initial guess 〈P gh , θgh, P gl , θgl 〉. Set E = 10.
2. Find 〈PTh , θTh 〉 ∈ arg max(Ph,θh)∈R+×[0,1]
(
zh(Ph, θh, P
g
l , θl
g)
)α (
σb,h(Ph, θh, P
g
l , θl
g)
)1−α
(a) Set 〈P rh , θrh〉 = 〈P gh , θgh〉
(b) Given 〈P rh , θrh, P gl , θgl 〉, go to 5. to compute 〈zh, zl〉
(c) Given S1 = 〈P rh , θrh, P gl , θgl , zh, zl〉 compute the objective function of the university
H(S1).
(d) Update for a new guess of the optimal 〈P rh , θrh〉 = 〈Pnewh , θnewh 〉 according to some
rule.
(e) Repeat (b)− (d) until optimal 〈PTh , θTh 〉 is found
3. Find 〈PTl , θTl 〉 ∈ arg max(Pl,θl)∈R+×[0,1]
(
zl(P
g
h , θ
g
h, Pl, θl)
)α (
σb,l(P
g
h , θ
g
h, Pl, θl)
)1−α
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(a) Set 〈P rl , θlh〉 = 〈P gl , θgl 〉
(b) Given 〈P gh , θgh, P rl , θrl 〉, go to 5. to compute 〈zh, zl〉
(c) Given S1 = 〈P gh , θgh, P rl , θrl , zh, zl〉 compute the objective function of the university
L(S1).
(d) Update for a new guess of the optimal 〈P rl , θrl 〉 = 〈Pnewl , θnewl 〉
(e) Repeat (b)− (d) until optimal 〈PTl , θTl 〉 is found
4. Set E = ||〈P gh , θgh, P gl , θgl 〉−〈PTh , θTh , PTl , θTl 〉||. If E is smaller than a tolerance level, stop the
algorithm, the NE is given by the tuple 〈PTh , θTh , PTl , θTl 〉. Otherwise, set 〈P gh , θgh, P gl , θgl 〉 =
〈PTh , θTh , PTl , θTl 〉 and go to 2.
5. Computation of 〈zh, zl〉 given 〈Ph, θh, Pl, θl〉
(a) Start algorithm with some initial guess 〈zgh, zgl 〉 and set ε = 10
(b) Given 〈Ph, θh, Pl, θl〉, the guess 〈zgh, zgl 〉 and the policy functions of the households,
compute the realized values of 〈zrh, zrl 〉
(c) set ε = (zrh − zgh)2 + (zrl − zgl )2.
(d) If ε is smaller to a tolerance level, the algorithm is complete. Otherwise, set 〈zgh, zgl 〉 =
〈zrh, zrl 〉 and go to (b).
B.0.7 Analysis in the linear case
In order to get a clear idea of how credit constraints affect the market for higher
education, we illustrate the linear case where σ = 1. Furthermore, we need to
distinguish scenarios where households would like to substitute future for current
consumption and the other way around. This is given by the inequality β(1 + r) <
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1. Whenever this inequality is satisfied, households would prefer to get as much
debt during the first period. The opposite case, when β(1 + r) ≥ 1 will motivate
households to save as much as possible given that the returns to savings, in terms
of utility, are more than one to one.
Case 1.β(1 + r) ≥ 1
In this case, households will prefer to save as much as they want and then the value
functions for each case (not study, study in low quality university or study in high
quality university) are given by:
V N(b, θ) = β [b(1− τ)(1 + r) + wθ(2 + r)] (B.0.5)
(B.0.6)
The value function for households going to the low quality university is only defined
whenever they can afford it. That is, whenever Pl− b(1− τ) ≤ min{A¯, wθ(1+zl)1+r }. In
particular, consider the case where Pl− b(1− τ) ≤ 0. If this holds, then households
are able to afford the price of education with their income after taxes and thus we
have no concerns about they not getting enough debt to fund their education.
However, when students should get positive debt in order to attend the low
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quality university, the amount of debt should satisfy two constraints:
Pl − b(1− τ) ≤A¯ (B.0.7)
Pl − b(1− τ) ≤wθ(1 + z
l)
1 + r
(B.0.8)
The constraint given in B.0.7 states that the amount of debt students get should
not exceed the upper limit given exogenously in the economy. The inequality given
in B.0.8 guarantees that students have enough funds to get the necessary debt to
attend college. The two aforementioned inequalities give bounds in b and θ for
students to being able to pay the tuition in the low quality college:
b ≥bpl =
A¯− Pl
1− τ (B.0.9)
b ≥L(θ) = Pl
1− τ −
wθ(1 + zl)
(1− τ)(1 + r) (B.0.10)
Now, for households with state variables (b, θ) such that low quality education
is affordable, we can define the value of going to the low university as:
V L(b, θ) = β
[
(b(1− τ)− Pl)(1 + r) + wθ(1 + zl)] (B.0.11)
Similarly, in order to be able to go to the high quality institutions, it should be the
205
case that:
b ≥bph =
A¯− Ph
1− τ (B.0.12)
b ≥H(θ) = Ph
1− τ −
wθ(1 + zh)
(1− τ)(1 + r) (B.0.13)
For those households, we can define the value of going to the high quality college
as:
V H(b, θ) = β
[
(b(1− τ)− Ph)(1 + r) + wθ(1 + zh)
]
(B.0.14)
Consider the case of a person who is deciding whether to go to the low quality
college or not study. In such case, granted that he could afford to pay tuition, he
will decide to attend whenever V L(b, θ) ≥ V N(b, θ). This implies that the decision
will be to go to the low quality college whenever:
θl ≥ θL = Pl(1 + r)
w[zl − r − 1] (B.0.15)
Similarly, when a person is deciding whether to go to the high quality college
or to the low quality one, and granted he could afford both, the relevant decision
rule will be to go to the high quality college whenever V H(b, θ) ≥ V L(b, θ). This
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Figure B.1: Representation of the education decisions on the state space.
inequality generates the decision rule of going to college whenever:
θ ≥ θH = (Ph − Pl)(1 + r)
w(zh − zl) (B.0.16)
The decision rules can be represented in the state space according to the follow-
ing graph:
Note that we can express NH in terms of elements that we have found previously:
NH =
∫ θIh
θH
∫ b¯
H(θ)
dF (b, θ) +
∫ 1
θIh
∫ b¯
bPh
dF (b, θ) (B.0.17)
where b¯ is the maximum level of bequests in the state space and
θIh =
(1 + r)A¯
(1 + zh)w
(B.0.18)
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For the sake of simplicity, we will assume a uniform distribution for (b, θ). As long
as P h > P l and zh > zl we can express the measure of people going to the high
quality university as:
NH =
1
b¯
[(
b− Ph
1− τ
)(
(1 + r)A¯
(1 + zh)w
− (Ph − Pl)(1 + r)
w(zh − zl)
)
(B.0.19)
+
w(1 + zh)
(1− τ)(1 + r)
[(
(1 + r)A¯
w(1 + zh)
)2
−
(
(Ph − Pl)(1 + r)
w(zh − zl)
)2]]
Similarly, the average level of skills of people attending such college is given by:
θ˜H =
1
b¯
[((
(1 + r)A¯
(1 + zh)w
)2
−
(
(Ph − Pl)(1 + r)
w(zh − zl)
)2)(
b¯
2
− Ph
2(1− τ)
)
+
w(1 + zh)
3(1− τ)(1 + r)
[(
(1 + r)A¯
w(1 + zh)
)3
−
(
(Ph − Pl)(1 + r)
w(zh − zl)
)3]
+
1
2
[
b¯− A¯
1− τ +
Ph
1− τ
(
1−
(
(1 + r)A¯
1(1 + zh)
)2)]]
(B.0.20)
We can express the relevant variables for low quality college, granted Ph > Pl and
zh > zl, as:
NL =
∫ θH
θL
∫ 1
L(θ)
dF (b, θ) +
∫ θIl
θH
∫ H(θ)
L(θ)
dF (b, θ)+
∫ θIh
θIl
∫ H(θ)
bPl
dF (b, θ) +
∫ 1
θIh
∫ bPh
bPl
dF (b, θ) (B.0.21)
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θ˜L =
∫ θH
θL
∫ 1
L(θ)
θdF (b, θ) +
∫ θIl
θH
∫ H(θ)
L(θ)
θdF (b, θ)+
∫ θIh
θIl
∫ H(θ)
bPl
θdF (b, θ) +
∫ 1
θIh
∫ bPh
bPl
θdF (b, θ) (B.0.22)
µbL =
∫ θH
θL
∫ 1
L(θ)
bdF (b, θ) +
∫ θIl
θH
∫ H(θ)
L(θ)
bdF (b, θ)+
∫ θIh
θIl
∫ H(θ)
bPl
bdF (b, θ) +
∫ 1
θIh
∫ bPh
bPl
bdF (b, θ) (B.0.23)
It is important to note that throughout this analysis we have not implemented
the fact that both colleges are able to set a threshold rule such that people with
a level of skills below such threshold will not be admitted. In such a case, we will
simply modify the regions of integration to consider that only people with ability
beyond the threshold will be able to attend.
Existence of equilibrium
The expressions found in B.0.19, B.0.20, B.0.21 and B.0.22 can be used to express
the necessary conditions that the offered qualities need to satisfy in equilibrium. In
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particular, we need to find zh, zl such that:
zh
zl
 =
κh
(
θ˜h(θh, θl, Ph, Pl, z
h, zl)
)α1 (
I(θh, θl, Ph, Pl, z
h, zl)
)α2
κl
(
θ˜h(θl, θl, Ph, Pl, z
h, zl)
)α1 (
I(θh, θl, Ph, Pl, z
h, zl)
)α2
 (B.0.24)
We need to prove existence of a fixed point in the qualities offered by univer-
sities before proving the existence of the Nash Equilibrium. Note, however, that
difficulty arises in this point given the fact that there is no natural way to bound the
set of qualities offered by the universities. Additionally, note that equations B.0.19,
B.0.20, B.0.21 are not continuous in zh = zl. The inability of proving the existence
of a fixed point in the qualities offered by universities shows that it is not possible
to prove existence of the Nash Equilibrium. We rely purely on the computational
analysis to find a Nash Equilibrium in this case that might not be unique.
Case 2.β(1 + r) < 1
This case is more involved as households value more current consumption than
future and will try to get as much debt as possible. The difficulty arises as even when
students can afford to pay college, they might be constrained given that they want
to substitute future by current consumption. Additionally, we need to establish
which is the relevant constraint that households face when getting the desired level
of debt, either the exogenously given level of credit constraint or they reach a point
where they can’t fund the debt with their resources.
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We start analyzing the case of a person who is not going to university. In this case,
the person will get as much debt as possible and he will be constrained whenever
wθ
1+r
> A¯. If this is the case, the person will get the maximum level of debt A¯.
Taking into account this case when computing the value of not going to college, we
see that:
V N(b, θ) =

b(1− τ) + wθ 2+r
1+r
if θ ≤ A¯(1+r)
w
b(1− τ) + w(θ)(1 + β) + A¯[1− β(1 + r)] if θ > A¯1+r
w
(B.0.25)
Now, let’s consider a household that goes to the low-quality university. Evi-
dently, the value function will only be defined for the case when it is possible to pay
tuition price via endowment or debt. For people whose income is below the tuition
price (b(1 − τ) < Pl) and who are constrained either by the exogenous level A¯ or
by their earning capacity wθ(1+z
l)
1+r
, the value of going to the low quality college will
not be defined.
An individual who is not constrained and takes as much debt as he can, will
derive utility given by b(1 − τ) − Pl + wθ(1+zl)1+r . The first term, b(1 − τ) − Pl cor-
responds to net income after tuition and the remaining part wθ(1+z
l)
1+r
is simply the
amount they will make in the second period taken to the present value of the first
period.
If the net income after tuition is negative, an individual will not be credit con-
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strained so long as:
Pl − b(1− τ) ≤ min{A¯, wθ(1 + z
l)
1 + r
} (B.0.26)
However, it is possible to have individuals who are borrowing constrained even
if the net income after tuition is positive. These individuals are those who would
like to borrow against their future income, given that current consumption is more
valuable than future consumption, but they are not able to borrow as much as they
want given the exogenous limit A¯. Those are individuals such that:
wθ(1 + zl)
(1 + r)
< A¯ (B.0.27)
and they are forced to borrow no more than A¯. This implies that we can define the value of going to low-quality
college as:
V L(b, θ) =

b(1− τ)− Pl + wθ(1+z
l)
1+r
if

b(1− τ)− Pl ≥ 0 θ ≤ A¯(1+r)w(1+zl)
or
b(1− τ)− Pl < 0 Pl − b(1− τ) ≤ min{A¯, w(θ)(1+z
l)
1+r
}
b(1− τ)− Pl + A¯[1− β(1 + r)] + wβ(1 + zl) if b(1− τ)− Pl > 0 and θ > A¯(1+r)w(1+zl)
(B.0.28)
Finally, doing the same analysis but with Ph and z
h we can find the value of
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going to the high quality college:
V H(b, θ) =

b(1− τ)− Ph + wθ(1+z
h)
1+r
if

b(1− τ)− Ph ≥ 0 θ ≤ A¯(1+r)w(1+zh)
or
b(1− τ)− Ph < 0 Ph − b(1− τ) ≤ min{A¯, w(θ)(1+z
h)
1+r
}
b(1− τ)− Ph + A¯[1− β(1 + r)] + wβ(1 + zh) if b(1− τ)− Ph > 0 and θ > A¯(1+r)w(1+zh)
(B.0.29)
B.0.8 Life-cycle Model
In this section we embed a life-cycle model into a two-period model, so our cali-
bration of Section 2.5.2 is realistic. We solve the household’s problem in two parts:
1) during the study periods, t = 0, . . . , S − 1, and 2) after college age, S, . . . , T ,
and leave the problem expressed as a two-period maximization problem in which
households decide how much to save for post-college periods. First, we start by
solving the post-college optimization problem. We assume that after college grad-
uation, individuals enter perfect financial markets, so there is perfect consumption
smoothing. The problem of the households is:
max
ct
T∑
t=S
βt−S
c1−σt
1− σ , s.t.
cS = b+ aS+1 + w(1 + zj)θ
ct + at(1 + r) = at+1 + w(1 + zj)θ, t ∈ {S, . . . , T}
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where at+1 is the debt at period t to be repaid next period, and b are the savings
that the individual carries from the college years. In here, we assume that there are
no borrowing constraints, since households enter perfect financial markets. Solving
this problem, yields the present value budget constraint in period S:
T∑
t=S
ct
(1 + r)t−S
= b+
T∑
t=S
wθ(1 + zj)
(1 + r)t−S
Combining this with the Euler equation, the optimal consumption path is given
by:
cS =
1
ΦS
(b+ w(1 + zj)θΦ
o
r)
ct = ((1 + r)β)
t−S
σ cS, t ∈ {S, . . . , T}
where ΦS and Φ
o
r are given by the following expressions:
ΦS =
1−
(
β
(1+r)σ−1
)T−S+1
σ
1−
(
β
(1+r)σ−1
) 1
σ
Φor =
1− ( 1
1+r
)T−S+1
1− ( 1
1+r
)
The present value utility at time S of this consumption path is given by:
T∑
t=S
βt−Su(ct) = ΦSu(cS)
Note that cS is determined for every given savings b carried from the college
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period, so without solving the problem for periods {0, . . . , S − 1}, it will not be
completely pinned down. Now, we solve for the households’ problem during periods
0, . . . , S−1. Given that during college, there exist exogenous borrowing constraints
given by A¯, there are two cases: a) individuals are unconstrained, and b) individuals
are constrained. The unconstrained solution of the problem in periods {0, . . . , S−1}
yields:
c0Φ0 + (Phh+ Pll)Φ
y
r +
a
(1 + r)S
= wθΦyr(1− l)(1− h) + b
ct = ((1 + r)β)
t
σ c0, t ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}
where b is the initial wealth of individuals, and Φ0,Φ
y
r are given by:
Φ0 =
1−
(
β
(1+r)σ−1
)S
σ
1−
(
β
(1+r)σ−1
) 1
σ
Φyr =
1− ( 1
1+r
)S
1− ( 1
1+r
)
Utility in period 0 is given by
S∑
t=0
βtu(ct) = Φ0u(c0)
Note that now, the problem can be perfectly embedded in the two-period model
described in Section 2.3. Households solve the following two-period problem:
max
c0,cS
u(c0) + β˜u(cS), s.t.
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csΦS = a+ wθ(1 + zj)Φ
o
r
c0Φ0 + (Phh+ Pll)Φ
y
r +
a
(1 + r)S
= wθΦyr(1− l)(1− h) + b
a ≥ −A¯
where:
β˜ =
βSΦS
Φ0
These two budget constraints can be rewritten as a single lifetime budget constraint:
c0Φ0 + (Phh+ Pll)Φ
y
r +
csΦs
(1 + r)S
= wθΦyr(1− l)(1− h) +
wθ(1 + zj)Φ
o
r
(1 + r)S
+ b
The unconstrained consumptions are given by:
cn =
(β(1 + r))(−S/σ)
[
wθ
(
Φor+(1+r)
SΦyr
ΦS
)
+ b(1+r)
S
ΦS
]
1 + (β(1+r))
(−S/σ)Φ0(1+r)S
ΦS
ch =
(β(1 + r))(−S/σ)
[
wθ(1 + zh)
Φor
ΦS
+ b(1+r)
S
ΦS
− PhΦyr (1+r)S
ΦS
]
1 + (β(1+r))
(−S/σ)Φ0(1+r)S
ΦS
cl =
(β(1 + r))(−S/σ)
[
wθ(1 + zl)
Φor
ΦS
+ b(1+r)
S
ΦS
− PlΦyr (1+r)S
ΦS
]
1 + (β(1+r))
(−S/σ)Φ0(1+r)S
ΦS
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